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Many American families have a difficult time balancing their obligations at work 
with their responsibilities at home. This is especially the case when a member of the 
family needs an increased level of caregiving, for instance after the birth of a child or 
when a family member is seriously ill. Governments around the world have passed 
legislation to make these difficult times easier for workers by mandating that employers 
provide paid family leave to their employees. However the US federal government 
mandates only 12 weeks of job-protected leave through the Family and Medical Leave 
Act of 1993, which only covers approximately 60% of US workers and is unpaid.  The 
result is that US workers and families are often unable to take leave when they 
experience increased responsibilities at home. 
Proponents of expanding FMLA to include a wage replacement provision argue it 
would increase a worker’s ability to stay home when there is an increase need for 
caregiving. It would also make the ability to take leave more equal across all workers. 
And while a number of political movements, on both the state and federal level, have 
sought to expand FMLA to include a paid provision, most have been unsuccessful due to 
ix	
the strong opposition it faces. Opponents argue that paid family leave mandates will place 
additional costs on employers, and therefore cause a decrease in employment and wages, 
especially for women who will be labeled as “risky” workers since they are more likely 
to take leave compared to their male counterparts. Up until recently it was impossible to 
test this “job killer” hypothesis, since no paid leave mandates existed in the US. However 
this changed in 2002 when California passed the first-of-its-kind paid maternity leave 
legislation. This provides us with a natural experiment to study how paid leave mandates 
would impact labor markets in the US, as well as study its impact on different family 
types. 
Chapter 2 uses establishment level employment data from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to study the impact California’s policy has had on employment. 
Most model specifications revealed a positive and significant impact on CA employment, 
with the policy being correlated with an approximately 2% increase in establishment 
level employment. In other model specifications the law had a positive but insignificant 
effect. These findings would suggest that at worst CA’s paid family leave mandate was a 
non-event for establishments in the state, and at best it had positive impact on 
employment. 
Chapter 3 examines how CA’s policy impacted the wages of workers using data 
from the Current Population Survey. The analysis shows that the policy is correlated with 
a modest but positive increase in wages for all workers. It was also shown that women 
saw a more dramatic increase in their wages, which suggests that the policy has not lead 
to an increase in statistical discrimination as some opponents feared.  
x	
Chapter 4 looks at the behavior of non-traditional households by analyzing the 
maternity leave behavior of women with different relationship statuses. Using both CPS 
data as well as NLSY97 data this analysis shows that new mothers in cohabiting 
household behave differently than their married counterparts when it comes to maternity 
leave, taking significantly shorter leaves and working more hours in the year of birth. The 
results suggest that their partner’s income is not a significant factor in determining their 
incidence and length of leave. However having access to paid leave increases their 
willingness and ability to take leave.  
xi	
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The difficulty of balancing work and family is undoubtedly one of the most 
challenging problems for contemporary American families. Many Americans find it hard 
to have a good balance between their job or career, which is essential to provide the 
material necessities for themselves and their families, and their family responsibilities. 
This is especially true for families that are either dealing with the arrival of a new child 
into the family, or those that are experiencing a hardship because a family member has a 
prolonged illness or disease. Either of these circumstances creates extra demands at home 
that may require families to make difficult choices regarding work and family. 
Modern governments have often intervened in the labor market by instituting 
“family policies.” These policies often use different policy instruments to achieve certain 
goals. For instance a government may pass a law that provides women with job-protected 
maternity leave in order to increase female labor force attachment rates (Waldfogel, 
1997; Waldfogel, 1998). Or they may pass mandated paternity leave laws in order to 
increase fathers’ involvement at home (Haas & Hwang, 2008; Nepomnyaschy & 
Waldfogel, 2007; Huerta et al, 2013; Patnaik, 2014). Governments can also use these 
policy instruments to help families deal with the work-family balance. For instance they 
can offer subsidies or tax breaks for those who use professional childcare services. Or 
they can mandate job-protected leave for those who need to take care of a sick family 
member. 
In the United States one of the most important “family policy” laws is the Family 




by many to be a groundbreaking piece of legislation. It was the first federal policy that 
was designed to help US employees balance their work life with their family 
responsibilities by providing job-protected leave for certain family and medical 
situations. The FMLA requires employers with 50 or more employees to offer 12 weeks 
of job-protected leave to qualifying employees who need to take time off of work due to 
their own illness or to take care of a sick child, spouse, or parent, or to bond with a new 
baby or adopted child. The law does not require these leaves to be paid, but it does 
require employers to continue any health insurance benefits they were providing before 
the leave (Klerman et al, 2012)1. To be eligible an employee must have been employed 
by their current employer for at least 1250 hours in the past year. Up until the passage of 
this law there was no national policy protecting workers when they needed to devote 
more time to their family responsibilities, meaning men and women had to rely on a 
patchwork of employer and state policies (when available).  
Proponents of family leave legislation have long argued that the modern economy 
requires such policies. While the main policy goal of such legislation is to support 
families in times of need, proponents of the legislation argued that it also had broader 
implications for our economy. Some of the more cited arguments for having a policy that 
mandates job-protected family leave are poverty reduction, gender equality, and better 
health and well-being outcomes. 
Job protection during times of major change within families (such as an illness or 
birth of a child) reduces the chance that a worker will lose his or her job for taking 








families (Phillips, 2004; Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). It is also the case that family 
leave policies have a positive effect on female labor force attachment rates after the birth 
of a child (Waldfogel, 1998). In the modern economy this is important for poverty 
reduction because in most OECD countries, including the United States, many families 
require two members in the labor force to earn enough income to support the household 
(Warren & Tyagi, 2003). Studies that compare family policies among OECD countries 
have found that there is a correlation between female employment and lower poverty 
rates, and pro-family policies were important for this relationship (Thevenon, 2011; 
Misra, Moller & Budig, 2007; Misra et al 2012; Misra, Budig & Boeckmann, 2011).  
It is also the case that because of changing demographics in the US, more and 
more families are headed by a single parent (Waldfogel, et al, 2010). Policies that help 
the work-life balance are especially important for these families since the one adult in the 
household must fulfill all care-taking responsibilities and is also the household’s only 
source of income. Also, since these households are significantly more likely to be in or 
near poverty, having job protected leave during times of increased care-taking 
responsibilities is even more important for their economic security (Thomas & Sawhill, 
2005; McLanahan et al, 2009). 
In the United States the average full-time female employee earns 78 percent of the 
average full-time male employee’s earnings (DeNavas-Wal et al., 2014). This gender 
wage gap can be attributed to several differences between male and female employees, 
such as choice in occupation and incidence of employer discrimination (Blau & Kahn, 
2006; Misra & Murray-Close, 2014). However a large part of the wage gap can be 




women having more caretaking responsibilities at home (Waldfogel, 1998; Waldfogel 
1997). When a woman does not have job protected maternity leave, often times she must 
leave the labor force when she gives birth or adopts a child, even if she wouldn’t have 
otherwise. This decrease in labor force attachment of women with children is a major 
reason why the gender wage gap has persisted, even as women have increased their level 
of education and have less occupational segregation (Waldfogel, 1998; Waldfogel, 1997). 
Therefore family leave legislation is an important tool for improving gender equality in 
the labor market because it would increase the labor force attachment of mothers. And 
indeed studies have found that women are more likely to return to their prebirth jobs 
when they have access to such policies (Waldfogel, 1998) 
Study after study has found that when workers are able to take time off to care for 
a sick relative or a new baby, the individuals that are being cared for have better 
outcomes than if they received care from market sources. Studies have found that there 
are positive correlations between access to paid leave and child health outcomes (Ruhm 
& Waldfogel, 2012). Mothers who are able to take a significant period of time off (12 
weeks or longer) after the birth of a new baby breastfeed for longer (and studies have 
shown there are many health benefits to breastfeeding for both mom and baby), are more 
likely to take their baby to well-child visits, and keep up with the recommended infant 
immunization schedule (Berger et al, 2005; Baker & Milligan, 2008). Cross-country 
studies have shown that better leave policies are correlated with lower rates of infant 
mortality (Ruhm, 2000). And a long-term study of children born in 1977 in Norway 
found that when mothers had the ability to stay home with their children in the first year 




30 for their children (Carneiro et al., 2011). Other studies have shown that sick children 
have significantly better outcomes and require shorter hospital stays if their parents are 
present (Heymann, 2000; Ruhm, 2000; Schuester et al., 2009). And elderly individuals 
that require care do better being cared for by a relative compared to those being cared for 
by home health aids (Van Houtven & Norton, 2004). All of these studies show that 
individuals of all ages fare better when being cared for by a parent/relative when they 
have an increased need for caregiving. 
For all of these reasons FMLA was seen as a groundbreaking piece of legislation 
that was vital for our economy and our nation’s families and has been hailed as a success 
by some. In 2012 the United States Department of Labor released a report on how FMLA 
was working 20 years after its passage (Klerman, et al, 2012). The report showed that 
each year, a substantial part of the workforce is taking advantage of FMLA benefits. 
During the survey year (2011-2012) 13% of workers in the US took leave due to reasons 
that are covered by the law, and this rate has been consistent since 2000. Among those 
that are eligible for FMLA the leave-taking rate was 16%, versus only 10% among those 
that do not qualify under the FMLA eligibility rules. Therefore being covered by FMLA 
significantly increases the likelihood that a worker will take leave at some point during 
the year.  
The survey also revealed that vast majority (57%) of the leave that is taken is due 
to an employee’s own illness. 22% of the leave was taken due to either pregnancy or to 
take care of a new child and 19% was taken due to an illness of a spouse, parent or child.  
Nearly half (42%) of leave taken is relatively short and last 10 days or less and only 17% 




employees who take leave, 48% of those that took leave reported receiving full pay while 
out on leave and 17% reported receiving partial pay using accrued vacation days, sick 
time, or other personal time the company offers. 
However the many critics of FMLA are quick to point out that when compared to 
the legislation in other advanced industrialized countries (and even most developing 
countries) it does very little to help many American workers during times of increased 
family responsibilities. Compared to leave policies in most countries, FMLA is shorter, 
unpaid and available to only a fraction of its workforce due to rules of eligibility 
(Kamerman & Gatenio, 2002). Because of the limitations of FMLA, compared to 
workers in other advanced industrialized countries, those in the US have access to shorter 
job-protected leaves and have significantly less access to any paid leave (Kamerman 
2000; Waldfogel 2001b). These two facts combined contribute to the fact that US women 
return to work much more quickly after the birth of a child compared to their peers in 
other countries and there is a lot of unmet need for family leave in general (Gustafsson et 
al. 1996; Smith & Bachu 1999). Having less ability to take leave, either because mothers 
do not have access to it or cannot afford it because it is unpaid, may also contribute to the 
lower levels of maternal employment that the US experiences relative to other OECD 
countries (Gornick, Meyers & Ross, 1998; Budig, Misra & Boeckmann, 2012; Blau & 
Kahn, 2006). 
Only about 17% of worksites in the DOL survey reported being subject to the 
rules in FMLA, and another 30% are unsure of their coverage. While the majority of 
workplaces are not covered by FMLA, the majority of workers in the United States work 




with the law is that even if an employee works in an establishment that is covered by 
FMLA, they may not be eligible because they either 1) do not have 12 months of tenure 
with their current employer and if they do they 2) did not work at least 1,250 hours in the 
past year. Because of these employer and employee requirements, only 59% of 
employees in the US are eligible for job-protected leave under the FMLA. This means 
that a large portion of employees are left to bargain with their employer individually 
when it comes to the conditions surrounding any leave of absence they may take.  
Consequently a large portion of working families in the United States do not have access 
to job-protected family leave, and if they do it is likely to be unpaid (Ruhm, 1997).  
In fact the US is the only developed country (and one of only four countries in the 
world) that does not provide paid leave (Sandler, 2014). While most (65%) employees 
who took leave in in the DOL survey reported that they received some pay, for those who 
took longer leaves of 10 or more days the rate falls to 40%. Additionally the survey 
showed that the inability to afford additional leave was a common reason for returning to 
work earlier than the employee wanted (40%), and almost half (46%) of those with unmet 
need for any leave said their reason was because they couldn’t afford it. This would 
indicate that if the leave was paid, more employees would take leave and some 
employees would opt to take longer leaves. 
Other critics of FMLA are quick to point out that the law has not kept up with our 
modern definitions of what constitutes a family. The existing federal law only covers care 
for a spouse, son, daughter or parent. It does not cover cohabiting couples (same-sex or 
different-sex), grandparents, grandchildren, in-laws, or siblings. Non-traditional families 




FMLA ignores this reality (Lofquist et al., 2012). In the 2010 US Census, married, 
straight couples with children made up 48% of US households. This marks the first time 
this group has fallen below 50% since census data was first collected on these issues in 
1940 (Nahn, 2012). In fact this family type was the only one in decline between 2000 and 
2010. All other family types (single-parent, nonrelated households, and people living 
alone) saw their percentage grow in the double digits (Lofquist et al., 2012). FMLA is 
written in such a way that it benefits traditional families, since covered care is limited to 
spouses (rather than unmarried partner), own children (rather than a partner’s children), 
and own parents. Therefore FMLA may not serve the needs of a growing portion of US 
families. 
Due to all the reasons listed above, some States have taken matters into their own 
hands and passed their own paid family leave mandates. The first state to pass its own 
program was California, which implemented its Paid Family Leave program in 2004 
(CAPFL). The program provides partial wage replacement for virtually all private sector 
employees for up to 6 weeks for the birth or adoption of a child, as well as to care for a 
seriously ill family member. As states pass their own paid family leave laws, it provides 
an excellent opportunity to study the effects of paid family leave laws in the US by 
creating a quasi-experimental setting for any research. 
Studying the effects of family leave policy can be an important goal in its own 
right. Understanding how a government policy is impacting its intended beneficiaries is 
essential in order to evaluate how a policy is working. And as the country and its 
population changes older policies need to be revaluated to make sure they are still 




discipline of economics. Households are where important economic decisions are made, 
such as the production and maintenance of human capital, decisions about consumption, 
and the allocation of time between household and market production (Becker, 1991). 
Family policy can have an impact on these decision-making processes, which in turn can 
have an effect on households, on firms, and on the economy as a whole. Family policy 
that comes in the form of mandated benefits can also impact the behavior of firms if it 
changes employment costs or worker productivity. The goal of this research is to better 
our understanding of firm and household behavior by studying the effects of paid family 
leave mandates on labor market outcomes, as well as female labor supply behavior in 
different household types. 
In chapter 2, I study how firms respond to a paid family leave mandate. While our 
current national law has no provision for paid leave, several states have passed laws that 
extend FMLA to include some sort of paid provision. One such law is California’s Paid 
Family Leave (CPFL) program that was passed in 2002 and implemented in 2004. It 
provides a great opportunity to look at what happens to employee and employer behavior 
when a paid provision is added to leave policies. This chapter looks for any employment 
effects California’s PFL program has had in that state since its implementation. 
Specifically I look at if the program has changed the overall demand for labor by 
establishments in that state, as well as determine if the demand for female labor in 
particular has changed since the law was implemented. 
In chapter 3 I turn to the CAPFL’s impact on wages in the state of California. The 
economic theory of statistical discrimination, as well as some existing literature on 




workers, and that mandate has positive and significant costs, employees may pass along 
the costs of the mandate onto the workers that use the benefit the most. In this case, since 
the majority of those who use family leave are women, I study how the law has impacted 
the wages of workers in the state, specifically the wages of women. 
In chapter 4, I examine the usage of maternity leave among different-sex 
cohabiting couples. Cohabiting couples make up an increasing proportion of American 
families, however the majority of the research on maternity leave has focused on married 
mothers or single women with children. Existing research on heterosexual cohabiting 
families have suggested that they are a very heterogeneous group that behave in different 
ways relative to married couples as well as single individuals. Therefore my goal is to 
study the labor supply decisions of workers in different-sex cohabiting relationships, 
specifically their decisions related to family leave after the birth of a child. This research 
improves our understanding of how economic decisions are made in these types of 
families and whether they behave like more traditional family structures. I also look at 
how CAPFL impacted the leave patterns of cohabiting mothers. 
In summary, I hope that my dissertation expands our understanding of how 
employers and labor markets react to paid family leave mandates, specifically how the 
California Paid Family Leave program impacted aggregate labor market outcomes by 
changing employee and employer behavior. It also provides valuable insights into the 
economic behavior of mothers in cohabiting households, specifically if their labor supply 






EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF CALIFORNIA’S 2002 PAID FAMILY LEAVE 
LAW 
Introduction 
All workers will, at some point or another, face conflicts between their work 
responsibilities and their life outside of work. Those employees with children or 
dependent elderly family members must arrange for suitable and reliable care for their 
loved ones while they are at work. They usually do this using a variety of methods such 
as using different forms of market child-care or eldercare services, seek help from 
extended family, or use creative scheduling with other adults in the household. There are 
certain situations, however, where these approaches may not work, such as when a new 
child is born or adopted, or a close family member is seriously ill.2 In these cases the 
employee must take time off of work. This can be a serious problem for these employees 
if their employer does not offer them any time off. Not only are they dealing with a 
change in their family situation, but they could also be facing the loss of their job and the 
possible financial hardship that would impose. These situations could also have adverse 
effects on the employer, who could face increases in costs, perhaps due to temporary 
















In the United States the only piece of federal legislation that protects workers 
during these times of increased family responsibilities is the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, which was passed in 1993 and has not been significantly changed since. While many 
policy makers, as well as a recent US Department of Labor report, claim that “the FMLA 
is working”, there have been many attempts at expanding its scope and design (Klerman, 
et al, 2012). This is because while many people have benefited from being able to take 
leave because of the job protection that the FMLA provides, it does not work for 
everyone.  
As stated previously, one of the major problems of the existing federal legislation 
is that the employee and employer requirements make it so that a large segment of the US 
workforce, over 40%, are not eligible for job-protected leave under FMLA (Ruhm, 1997). 
And not only are some US employees not eligible to use the protections of FMLA, of 
those employees that are covered there may be a significant portion that are unable to 
take full advantage of the law due to the financial hardship of taking unpaid leave. While 
most of those that took leave reported being either fully or partial compensated while on 
leave, the rates of pay drop significantly for those leaves that are longer than 10 days 
(40% received full pay versus 60% for leaves of 10 days or less) (Klerman, et al, 2012).  
The 2012 Department of Labor survey also reported that an inability to afford 
leave is the second most common reason for why employees chose to return to work 
when they did (40%). The report also found that 5% of all the employees surveyed 
wanted to take leave but could not, and among these employees almost half  (46%) said 
the reason was that the leave was unpaid and they could not afford to take it. This would 




paid and available to all workers, more workers would take leave and some would take 
longer leaves. 
In fact, according to a 2003 study of parental leave usage among both fathers and 
mothers, the FMLA had no significant effects on the instance and length of leave taken 
by fathers (Han and Waldfogel, 2003). The results for women were more mixed, but 
when they controlled for state fixed-effects they found that that FMLA had no significant 
effects on mother’s incidence and length of leave. The authors conclude that the limited 
impact of the FMLA on the instance and length of leave among new parents is due to the 
fact that it does not guarantee paid leave and that “parents may be unwilling or unable to 
take substantially more unpaid leave when a new child is born, even when they are given 
the right to do so”, (Han & Waldfogel, 2003). The findings in this study suggest that 
because of the restrictions on eligibility, and the fact that it is unpaid, means that the law 
has not had far-reaching effects for US families. And in fact it suggests that those covered 
under the law may have already had access to employer provided leave policies before 
the law was enacted. 
For these reasons many family leave advocates have argued for extending the 
FMLA to include some sort of paid provision and some states have chosen to do so with 
their own legislation. In September of 2002, California made history when it passed the 
nation’s first comprehensive paid family leave legislation (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013; 
Rossin-Slater et. al., 2013; Bartel et. al., 2014; Baum & Ruhm, 2013). Before the passage 
of the California Paid Family Leave Act (CAPFL) the state already had more progressive 
legislation when compared to FMLA on the national level. It led the way in the early 




Act), which then became a model for FMLA. It also has its own Short-Term Disability 
Program (SDI) that provides for partially paid leave covering disability due to pregnancy 
and childbirth.3 However CAPFL is the first law of its kind that provides employees with 
paid leave for the expressed purpose of bonding with a new child or to take care of a sick 
relative. Advocates hope that this breakthrough legislation will pave the way for more 
state laws that provide more workers with paid family leave. And in fact New Jersey 
passed its own law in 2008, Rhode Island passed a similar law in 2013 and there are 
several statewide campaigns across the country, which are gaining momentum. It is also 
the case that The White House has set up several major initiatives to help expand family-
friendly employment policies. One such initiative is to create a State Paid Leave Fund at 
the Department of Labor that would provide grants to states that set up paid leave 
programs similar to California’s ("DOL Factsheet: Paid Family And Medical Leave - 
U.S. Department Of Labor").  
California’s paid family leave program was passed in 2002 and implemented in 
2004. It provides up to six weeks of leave with partial wage replacement for eligible 
workers to bond with a new child (through birth or adoption) or take care of a sick child, 
parent, spouse or registered domestic partner.4 When on leave workers receive 55% of 
their wages up to a maximum benefit (which was $1,104 in 2015 and is adjusted to 















employees. Unlike FMLA, California’s PFL program does not place strict eligibility 
requirements on employees and applies to all employers regardless of size. Therefore this 
program is available to virtually all private sector employees in California (Milkman & 
Appelbaum, 2013; Rossin-Slater, et al, 2013). However it does not provide leave-takers 
with job-protection and therefore in order for the employee to be guaranteed to return to 
their pre-leave job it must be used concurrently with the Family Medical Leave Act or 
California’s Family Rights Act (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). 
Arguments For & Against Paid Family Leave 
The proponents of paid family leave argue that demographics, labor patterns, and 
economic realities have changed dramatically in recent decades, increasing the need for 
paid leave. Among these changes, the ones that have contributed most to the increased 
need for paid leave are (1) a dramatic increase in female labor force participation, 
especially among mothers of young children, (2) the increasing portion of US households 
that are headed by a female breadwinner, either married or single, (3) the increasing 
proportion of households that are headed by single parents, (4) men’s increased 
involvement in family life and all types of unpaid care work and (5) the aging of the 
population that has an increasing need for eldercare (Han et al, 2009; Milkman & 
Appelbaum, 2013; Wells, 2004) . 
It was not too long ago that the majority of US families with children consisted of 
one parent (usually the father) who worked in the labor market and one parent (usually 
the mother) who, if they happened to be in the labor force before the arrival of any 
children, withdrew from the labor market in order to do any unpaid caregiving that was 




families have changed dramatically and more and more mothers with young children 
continue to remain in the labor force. The labor force participation rate for women with 
children under the age of three almost doubled between 1975 and 2010, from 34% to 
61% (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013, Wells, 2004). And today, mothers are more likely to 
be participating in the labor force than women in general (US Department of Labor, 
2010a).  
This change has a lot to do with the fact that an ever-increasing portion of US 
families is headed by a single mother (Lofquist et al., 2012; Wells, 2004). And even in 
dual income households the share of income that is earned by a woman is increasing and 
families are relying more and more on mothers’ incomes. However women continue to 
do the lion’s share of caregiving, for both children as well as aging relatives (Gornick & 
Meyers, 2003). According to the American Time Use Survey, in families with young 
children (under six), mothers still spend 2.5 times more time providing basic childcare 
and almost 2.0 times as much for all childcare activities relative to fathers, and in terms 
of eldercare women did 50% more unpaid eldercare compared to men in 2011 (Klerman 
et. al, 2012; Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). With more and more families relying on 
women’s earnings, but with women still shouldering the majority of the unpaid 
caregiving burden, not having access to paid leave is putting an increasing amount of 
stress on American families, and American women in particular. 
However it is not just women that need or want paid family leave. Social norms 
are shifting so that more and more fathers are taking on more childcare responsibilities at 
home, and more men are responsible for caring for their elderly relatives. To a large 




unpaid care work compared to earlier generations. Many of these young men express a 
desire to be even more involved and face growing demands from their wives and partners 
to take on a more active role in family life (Gerson, 2009). Unfortunately even when they 
express the desire to participate more equally in these caregiving responsibilities, men 
find it difficult to do so because of the traditional gender norms at work, as well as 
inflexible work schedules (Raley et al, 2012). And while on average men receive a wage 
premium for fatherhood status, when they have to take time off for caregiving 
responsibilities they are penalized even more than women, presumably because this goes 
against socially acceptable gender norms (Kelly, 2005). Therefore younger generations of 
men are also feeling an increased level of conflict between their work and their family 
life, leading to an increased need for paid leave for male workers as well. 
Proponents of paid family leave also argue that under current national legislation, 
access to paid leave, or any job-protected leave at all, is highly unequal. This is because 
for workers that are covered by FMLA, whether or not they are paid during their leave is 
up to their employer. And for those 41% of workers who are not protected by FMLA, 
whether they are able to have their job back at all after taking leave is entirely determined 
by company policy. Access to any paid time off is highly skewed along income and 
gender lines. (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). Data from the March 2011 National 
Compensation Survey show that among all workers, 11% of employees in the private 
sector have access to paid family leave and 77% had access to some sort of paid time off 
(vacation, sick leave, short-term disability, etc). However access to these benefits 
increases substantially with income levels. Those with the lowest wages are least likely to 




access to any paid time off. However among workers with the highest wage levels, 19% 
had access to paid family leave and 89% had access to some kind of paid time off 
(Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013).  
These statistics indicate that those workers with the lowest wages have the least 
access to paid time off. These workers are also the least likely to have the economic 
resources to manage a decrease in income due to taking unpaid leave. Those workers 
with high incomes, and therefore more likely to have the economic resources to deal with 
any unpaid time off, are the group most likely to have paid leave. And while women are 
still expected to bear the majority of the caretaking responsibilities at home, they are less 
likely to have access to paid leave when compared to men (Milkman & Appelbaum, 
2013). Proponents of paid family leave legislation argue that it would eliminate this 
unequal access to paid leave, as well as provide access to those that need it the most. 
There has always been broad popular support for laws that seek to address 
problems that workers face when it comes to achieving work-family balance, and a law 
mandating paid leave is no exception. While, like most issues, there are small variations 
in support along the lines of political orientation, gender, race, age, etc, the vast majority 
of all parts of the population support legislation that would give all workers some access 
to paid family leave. In two nationwide surveys in 2007 and 2010 more than two thirds of 
respondents favored expanding FMLA to include some sort of wage-replacement 
provision (Ness, 2008; Institute For Women’s Policy Research, 2010). However, while 
there is broad public support on this issue, any sort of extension on workers’ ability to 
take time off faces an earnest and organized opposition from the business community. 




benefits, including requiring access to any sort of paid leave, is costly to employers and 
therefore likely to be “job killers” (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). 
When California’s Paid Family Leave law was proposed in 2002 it faced sizable 
and organized opposition, led primarily by the California Chamber of Commerce. Their 
argument was that the program would impose serious financial burdens on California 
businesses, and as a result would inflict severe economic loss to the state in the form of a 
reduction in jobs (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). In fact this pressure from the Chamber 
of Commerce and other business interests greatly reduced the benefits available in the 
original drafting of the legislation and almost failed to pass. It was only due to a 
concerted effort by The Work and Family Coalition, the AFL-CIO, local unions and even 
celebrities that the bill was able to get passed and signed by the governor (Firestein, 
O’Leary & Savitsky, 2011). 
California’s Paid Family Leave program was not the only family policy to face 
opposition on the grounds that it would be a financial burden to employers and therefore 
ultimately reduce employment. When FMLA was passed in 1994 it was also heralded as 
a “job killer” and most mandated employer benefits have faced similar opposition. 
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that any future paid family leave programs will also 
face this kind of opposition on their way to becoming law. Since the national initiative for 
paid family leave is using California’s program as a model for what should be done on a 
national level, it is important to understand how the program has ultimately impacted the 
state’s economy, particularly in regards to its impact on businesses and employment. The 




program has impacted employment in the state, so we can better understand the potential 
impact of future paid leave policies implemented in the United States. 
Theoretical Framework 
In terms of economic theory there are two competing theoretical perspectives 
regarding how any leave legislation would impact firms and any resulting aggregate labor 
market outcomes. The first proposes that family leave legislation may benefit employers 
by preserving employer-employee relationships (Ruhm, 1997). This would be especially 
advantageous to firms in situations where permanent separations are costly to the 
employer due to high turnover costs. Studies have shown that family leave legislation, 
such as the FMLA, is successful at increasing the rate at which women return to their 
previous jobs after the birth of a child. Using data on individuals, they show that women 
are more likely to return to their pre-childbirth jobs if they are eligible for job-protected 
maternity leave (Waldfogel, 1998; Hofferth & Curtin, 2006). However there are very few 
studies on how the legislation impacts firms since most of the focus has been on how 
maternity leave legislation affects employee behavior.  
Family leave statutes may be beneficial to firms in the case of imperfect 
information regarding the likelihood of workers needing leave. On the firm side, they 
may be unwilling to voluntarily provide the benefit, thinking that it may unwittingly 
attract a disproportionate number of workers that would use it, since this fringe benefit 
would be more attractive to these “high risk” workers. If this happens the firms offering 
the benefit would be forced to lower wages in order to remain competitive, and therefore 
would be less attractive to the average worker who needs less leave than these “high risk” 




caused by this sorting behavior. On the employee side, having incomplete information 
regarding their future need for leave, or not having adequate information on how leave 
benefits themselves and the person being cared for, may make it so that workers bargain 
too little for this benefit.  
Another theoretical positive effect of a firm providing leave is that it means that it 
would not have to pay full wages to an employee that is possibly less productive during a 
time where there is an increased need for care work at home (Klerman & Leibowitz, 
1997). While a long-term absenteeism may disrupt the normal production process and 
reduce a firm’s productivity, the worker may be less productive while on the job due to 
the physical and emotional toll of childbirth, taking care of a newborn, or caring for a 
seriously ill family member. Therefore allowing the worker to take leave (either unpaid 
or paid through the state’s PFL fund) may actually represent a cost-savings to the firm 
that would have seen a drop in productivity regardless of whether the worker took leave 
or not. 
The second theoretical perspective regarding family leave legislation and the firm 
suggests that it provides for a suboptimal outcome for employers. This perspective argues 
that if firms wanted to preserve their employer-employee relationships due to high 
employee replacement costs, they would voluntarily offer family leave, with the length 
and pay being negotiated between the employer and the employee individually to achieve 
an optimum outcome. Therefore family leave legislation could force the firm to offer 
leave to employees they would not have voluntarily offered leave to, or the legislation 
may encourage workers to take longer leaves than they would have without the law. This 




firm-specific human capital requirements or when the cost of employee turnover is low 
(Baum, 2003). 
Along those same lines, while existing federal and state legislation does not 
require companies to directly pay their employee while on job-protected leave, there are 
other associated costs to having an employee absent from work for long periods of time 
(Baum, 2003; Ruhm, 1997; Wells, 2004; Klerman & Leibowitz, 1997). For instance in 
some cases an employer may have to continue to pay for the employee’s health care 
benefits. Or if an employee is out for an extended period of time the firm may have to 
pay the costs of hiring and training a substitute worker. If a substitute worker is not hired, 
productivity may decline, or worker morale may suffer if other employees are asked to do 
extra work to make up for an employee being absent.  
Overall any leave legislation will increase a firm’s costs if it changes employees’ 
behavior so that those who would not have taken leave without the law now do so.5 Or, 
along the same line, costs will increase if a family leave policy increases the likelihood of 
employees taking longer leaves than the company would have faced without the law. 
Studies using data on individuals have shown that indeed family leave legislation slightly 
increases the likelihood that new mothers will take leave, so that some mothers that 
would/could not have taken leave without the law, are now doing so (Waldfogel, 2003). 
Other studies have shown that being eligible for job-protected maternity leave delays a 
mother’s return to work. Mothers who would have returned to their prebirth employer at 









maternity leave are now postponing their return to sometime during the third month 
(Baum, 2003). And as mentioned previously, studies on California’s Paid Family Leave 
have show that workers are taking more and longer leaves because of the new program 
(Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013; Baum & Ruhm, 2014; Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, & 
Waldfogel, 2013). 
These studies of individuals show workers are indeed altering their behavior after 
having access to mandated family leave benefits. However none of these studies are able 
to show if these laws are changing the behavior of firms in response to the new behavior 
of their employees. If, in fact, these laws create a suboptimal outcome for employers 
because the altered behavior of their employees creates additional costs, firms may alter 
their own behavior. Because of these additional costs, firms may have to reduce 
employment or lower wages (Wells, 2004).  
How any increases in costs due to a family leave mandate could theoretically 
impact employment and wages can been seen in a simple dynamic supply and demand 
model put forth by Christopher J. Ruhm (1997) in a literature review of studies on 
FMLA. If the mandate does indeed increase labor costs (or reduces labor’s productivity) 
then this would decrease the demand for labor (from D1 to D2 and C is the added labor 
cost created by the mandate in Figure 1 below). However since employees receive 
benefits from the mandate this would simultaneously shift the labor supply curve to the 
right (from S1 to S2). Therefore the model would predict that a leave program would 
cause a decrease in wages and any change in employment could be either positive or 






Figure 1: Labor market effects of mandated benefits 
Source: Ruhm, 1997 
 
If however firms receive any sort of productivity benefits or cost-savings from the 
leave mandate (perhaps due to lower turnover rates, holding onto more employees and 
their firm-specific human capital, falling costs of training new workers or increased 
worker morale) then firms could see an increase in their marginal product of labor, 
causing the demand curve to shift back to the right (D2 to D3). This would mitigate some 
of the decrease in wages and employment due to the costs of implementing the policy, or 
even cause wages and employment to rise depending on what happens to the absolute 
level of productivity and hence the magnitude of the shifts. Therefore the effect a family 
leave policy would have on the demand for labor, and therefore equilibrium employment 
and wages, is theoretically ambiguous. 
It may also be the case that the fear of increased costs and decreases in 
productivity due to an increase in absenteeism of a certain group of employees may lead 
some firms to look for employees who will not use the benefit (Lester, 2005). For 

















disruptive than other types of absenteeism (such as vacation, personal days, or sick time) 
because they tend to be longer and more likely to be unplanned (Klerman, et al, 2012). 
And while all workers have a similar probability of getting sick or wanting to take a 
vacation, women are much more likely to need time off because of caretaking 
responsibilities (Waldfogel, 2001a). The economic theory of statistical discrimination 
postulates that when making decisions regarding hiring and wages, firms make 
assumptions about a worker’s productivity based on stereotypes of groups of workers 
(Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). Therefore employers may discriminate on the basis of sex 
because, on average, women have lower labor force attachment rates compared to men 
due to traditional gender norms surrounding care work. It is then the case that women are 
associated with higher turnover costs, making employers less likely to hire women for 
specific jobs or may offer them lower wages.  
Along the same lines, if California’s PFL program increased the incidence and 
length of leave, and the majority of leave takers continue to be women, employers may 
be more likely to statistically discriminate against women, either by hiring fewer female 
employees, or offering them a lower wage, due to their expectations that the policy will 
cause that particular group of workers to take more leave and therefore reduce their 
potential future productivity (Ruhm & Teague, 1997). If this is the case then a mandated 
leave policy would hurt the group of workers that are the most likely to need it by 
decreasing female employment and wages. 
However if, in fact, family leave legislation increases the likelihood that a woman 
will remain at her job after she is finished with her caretaking responsibilities, thereby 




beneficial to the firm, female employment will remain the same or in fact increase 
because statistical discrimination is reduced. 
While there is existing literature on how family leave affects both the incidents 
and length of leave in the US (for both unpaid leave and California’s PFL program), and 
a few studies on how unpaid leave policies have affected aggregate labor market 
outcomes, there are no studies on how a paid leave mandate would affect labor market 
outcomes in the US. There are even less studies on how these paid leave policies impact 
employers, and those that do exist rely on small cross-sectional samples that measure 
attitudes rather than outcomes.  
This chapter expands on the existing literature on how paid leave programs in the 
US may affect aggregate labor market outcomes and employer behavior. This research is 
important because any expansion of paid maternity leave in the US, either on the Federal 
or the State level, faces serious opposition from the business community on the grounds 
that the direct or indirect costs it would impose would hurt their ability to hire workers, 
decrease their productivity of labor, lower their profitability, and perhaps increase the 
incidents of statistical discrimination against women. Studying how California’s PFL 
program affected employment levels will give us insight as to how employers respond to 
mandated benefits like this program. 
Existing Research on Paid Family Leave 
California’s Paid Family Leave Program has been in place for almost a decade 
and there have been a few studies showing how the program has affected both families 
and businesses. The program’s utilization grew steadily in the first few years after its 




to over 202,000 in fiscal year 2012-2013 (Baum & Ruhm, 2013). The vast majority of 
these claims (87%) were for bonding with a new baby and only about 1 out of every 8 
claims were for taking care of sick relative (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013).  
In terms of the rates of usage among new mothers, Zigler, Muenchow, and Ruhm 
(2012) estimate that the claims represented 24 out of every 100 live births in 2005 and 
grew to about 30 out of every 100 births in 2009. However while usage of the program 
has increased steadily over the last decade (with a slight drop in 2010 attributed to the 
recession), an extensive survey conducted in 2009 and 2010 by Appelbaum and Milkman 
(2011) showed that a large percentage of employees in California may be unaware of the 
program or their eligibility. They found that a little more than half of all respondents 
(51%) were completely unaware of the program. Individuals that were unaware of the 
PFL program tended to be younger, non-white, less educated, have lower incomes/wages, 
and had no access to employer-based leave benefits. Arguably the respondents that 
tended to be unaware of the program are also those that would benefit most from it. Of 
those respondents that did know about the program a third responded that they did not 
use the program because the wage replacement was too low, and still others did not take 
leave because they did not think they were eligible for the program or they feared their 
employer would retaliate if they took the leave. 
However while awareness and usage of the program has been lower than 
expected, studies have found that it has indeed altered leave-taking behavior of 
employees in California, specifically those taking leave after the birth of a child. A study 
by Baum and Ruhm (2014) using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth show that 




found that after the program was instituted the average mother increased her leave by 2.4 
weeks, from 7.8 weeks to 10.2 weeks (a 30% increase). Another study by Rossin-Slater, 
Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2013) found similar results. The study used Current Population 
Survey data to study mothers’ leave-taking between 1999 and 2010 and found that 
California’s PFL program increased leave-taking for the average mother by 3.2 weeks. 
The data also found that the program has had a positive impact on fathers’ leave-taking 
after the birth of a child, with the number of claims increasing by 12% and the length of 
leave increasing by slightly less than one week (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). While 
one week is a small increase in absolute terms, it is relatively large when you consider the 
fact that before the program men only took an average of two weeks off. Therefore the 
program has increased the average length of leave by fathers by almost 50%. 
Little research has been done on how California’s PFL program has impacted 
employers, either in terms of their productivity or their employment behavior. The most 
comprehensive study, done by Milkman & Appelbaum, relied on small cross-sectional 
samples of California firms that asked about employer attitudes and perceptions towards 
the policy rather than measuring changes in outcomes like profitability and employment 
(2013). This small survey found that the vast majority of firms (90%) said that the law 
had either a positive effect or no effect on their business (using such indicators as 
profitability, productivity, morale, and costs). Most firms also said they had very few 
issues with fraudulent claims and most did not need to hire additional temporary 
replacement workers since they were able to assign the work to other existing employees. 
These finding are in line with surveys of employers after the implementation of FMLA. 




10%) reported problems after the implementation of FMLA when it came to outcomes 
such as profitability, absenteeism, turnover, and productivity (Klerman, et al, 2012). 
The limitations with the research to-date on California’s PFL program is that it 
has largely be unable to measure its effect on certain outcomes such as employer 
behavior, employment and earnings. Research on how the program has affected leave-
takers has focused on incidence and length of leave and has paid little attention to how 
this has impacted aggregate employment levels, female employment rates, or wage rates 
in California. This research hopes to expand on the existing literature by shedding light 
on how California’s PFL program has affected these aggregate outcome measures. 
While there has been no research on how California’s program has affected 
aggregate employment outcomes in the State, there have been several previous studies 
that have looked at the aggregate effects of unpaid leave policies in the US as well as 
paid leave polices in other countries.  
Studies of the effects of leave legislation on labor market outcomes in the United 
States have had mixed results. In a study of state maternity leave mandates using 1980 
and 1990 Census data, Klerman and Leibowitz (1997) found that state-level leave 
mandates increased the employment of new mothers. The laws were also correlated with 
an increase in leave-taking. However the authors acknowledge that this correlation may 
be seen because states with booming economies, and hence have higher levels of 
employment, may be more likely to enact maternity leave mandates. Therefore it is 
impossible to say if the leave policies contributed to higher levels of mothers’ 
employment or was a consequence of it. Another study by Waldfogel (1999) used CPS 




study found that there was no impact on women’s wages but there was a modest increase 
in the employment of women. However this result was highly sensitive to the 
specification of the model, with some specifications leading to negative employment 
effects.  
While these studies give us some indication of how California’s PFL program 
could have impacted women’s labor market outcomes, each study had its own 
shortcomings and the policies in question only provided unpaid leave. California’s PFL 
program may have different effects on aggregate labor market outcomes because the 
wage replacement may allow those families with financial hardships the ability to take 
more time off. Combined with the fact that the eligibility rules of the law allows for 
almost universal coverage of private-sector employees means that California’s PFL 
program may have an entirely different effect than previous unpaid leave mandates 
(Bartel, et al, 2014; Rossin-Slater et al., 2013).  
Studies on paid leave policies in other advanced industrial countries have also had 
mixed findings. Most of these studies find that short -to -medium durations of paid leave 
policies in these countries have had positive effects on female employment (Ruhm, 1997; 
Ruhm & Teague, 1997; Buddig, Misra & Boeckmann, 2015). However several studies 
found that very long leaves (over a year) had negative impacts on maternal labor market 
outcomes, at least in the short-term (Schonberg & Ludsteck, 2014; Lalive & Zweimuller, 
2009). However these studies may not shed much light on the effects of California’s PFL 
program because these policies are very different. They tend to be longer, include job 
protection, and the wage replacement is higher and therefore the usage of these policies 




may also play a large role in how they affect employee and employer behavior (Bartel, et 
al, 2014; Misra, Moller & Budig , 2007; Budig, Misra & Boeckman, 2012; Misra, Budig 
& Boeckmann, 2011). In countries where the government or the business culture provides 
for more family-friendly work policies (longer paid vacation time, more flexible working 
schedules, options of part time work schedules), changes in paid leave mandates may not 
have as much of an effect on aggregate outcomes when compared to those in economies 
where these kinds of leave policies are seen as “groundbreaking.” 
Data & Methodology 
One of the more important business outcomes that is a good indicator of 
competitiveness is employment. Therefore studying any changes in employment that 
could be attributed to California’s PFL program would be a good indicator of how it 
impacted businesses after its implementation. If this piece of legislation was a “job 
killer”, as opponents of the program argued, then we should see different employment 
patterns in establishments in California after the law was implemented when comparing 
them to establishments in states that do not have a paid leave law. 
I used difference-in-difference fixed-effects models with various specifications to 
test the impact of California’s paid family leave on establishment level employment. The 
treatment is the implementation of the law (a dummy variable for establishments that are 
located in the state of California in 2004 onwards). The control group is a group of 
establishments that are located in states without the law. The basic econometric model is 
as follows: 




Where Eist is the employment level of establishment i in state s in time t. CAPFLst 
represents the treatment of California’s PFL program and is a dummy variable that is 1 
for observations of establishments in CA in years 2004-2009 and zero for all other 
observations. Therefore the coefficient of interest is d, which represents the effect of the 
implementation of CA’s PFL program on establishment level employment. If d>0 then 
the policy is correlated with an increase in employment and if d<0 it is correlated with a 
fall in employment. If d=0 then the program was a “non event” for employment levels in 
CA. In order to control for employment trends over time fixed-effect dummies for year 
(bs) and industry (ct)6 are also included and eist is the error term.7 
The data for this research comes from the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and covers the years 2000 until 2009. This data set was chosen 
because it has detailed employment statistics on firms that employ over half of private 
sector employees in the US. And these years were chosen because it includes several 
years before the law was implemented as well as several years after.  
As required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC collects 
employment data on establishments with over 100 employees, and those with over 50 
employees if they have federal contracts of more than $50,000. Each establishment must 
file separately and includes employment data by race, sex and occupational category. The 













possible to track changes in employment on the establishment level over time and control 
for firm characteristics such as establishment size, federal contractor status, and the 
demographic and occupational characteristics of their employees. For the years between 
2000 and 2009, after removing establishments that reported zero employment, there are 
observations for 430,241 unique establishments. Of these establishments 47,644 are 
located in California. 
Not all establishments exist in the data for all 10 years, so the number of total 
observations is 2,130,232. The majority of establishments exist in the data for either a 
short period of time (1-3 years) or the entire time period in question, as shown in the table 
below. There is no significant difference between CA and the rest of the sample in this 
respect. 






Other States Percentage 
1 10118 21.24% 76801 20.07% 
2 6545 13.74% 50415 13.18% 
3 6882 14.44% 52932 13.83% 
4 3403 7.14% 26748 6.99% 
5 2584 5.42% 22192 5.80% 
6 2498 5.24% 20236 5.29% 
7 2491 5.23% 18647 4.87% 
8 1939 4.07% 15579 4.07% 
9 2346 4.92% 19011 4.97% 
10 8838 18.55% 80036 20.92% 
Total 47644 100% 382597 100% 
 
Because this data set only includes establishments with more than 100 employees 
(50 or more for federal contractors), the mean employment in establishments is larger 
than for the US in general. For all years the mean employment for CA establishments is 
199 employees, and 211 for establishments in all other states. During the 10 years 




and the rest of the country. However this pattern has been observed among all firms in 
the US (Choi & Spletzer, 2012).  
Table 2: Mean establishment-level employment  
Year CA 
Standard 
Deviation Other States 
Standard 
Deviation 
2000 202.72 388.96 224.03 493.2 
2001 200.52 396.06 220.83 482.41 
2002 198.78 384.25 215.93 470.65 
2003 204.34 430.86 217.35 513.2 
2004 202.22 419.79 214.55 505.88 
2005 199.79 396.02 211.31 460.45 
2006 200.02 406.42 209.21 457.13 
2007 197.64 404.85 206.49 445.9 
2008 193.62 398.46 202.97 438.78 
2009 190.87 526.02 197.21 437.47 
All Years 198.72 418.66 211.32 469.16 
 
In 2009 this data included almost 47 million employees, which is roughly 34 
percent of all workers in the US (Bureau of Labor Statistics). This number was expected 
considering it does not include employees that work in small establishments or those who 
work in the public and non-profit sectors. The representation for CA alone is slightly 
smaller, with almost 5 million employees representing 30% of total employment in that 
state in 2009. In 2009, women represented 46% of employees in the CA sample and 49% 
in all other states. This is consistent with recent national employment statistics, since in 
2010 women comprised 47% of the total workforce in the United States (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics). 
Results 
Figure 2 shows the mean of establishment level employment in California relative 
to all other states for the years in our data. As mentioned above, the national mean 




increase between 2002 and 2003 and California is no different. Employment patterns in 
CA seem to follow national trends, even after the implementation of the Paid Family 
Leave program in 2004, which is represented by the horizontal line on the graph. Visually 
the law seems to not be associated with a particular drop in employment, and in fact the 
mean employment for California seems to be converging with the national average by 
decreasing at a smaller rate. 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean establishment-level employment 2000-2009 
 
The results from the baseline regression model using all establishments in states 
other than California as a control group indicate that California’s paid family leave policy 
has had a small but positive effect on establishment level employment (Table 3). This is 
true for all specifications of the model and all results are significant at the 5% level. In 
the basic model that does not control for year or industry (Model 1) the policy is 


















included (Model 2), the correlation increases to 5.26 employees.8 When adding in the 
control variables for industry (Model 3) the coefficient increases only slightly to 5.27.9 In 
the years before the law’s enactment, the mean employment for those establishments in 
California was 201, therefore an additional 5 employees represents a 2.5% increase. 
Table 3: Fixed-effects regression results for policy effects on establishment level 
employment (Sample: establishments in all US states) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Est. All Est. All Est. Est. In All 
10 Years 
Est. with > 
100 Emp. 
Est. with <= 
100 Emp. 
CAPFL 0.13* 5.26* 5.27* 7.5113* 8.1439* 1.2002* 
 (3.13e-14) (1.26) (1.26) (1.53) (1.87) (0.14) 
Controls:       
Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2130232 2130232 2130232 888740 1178923 951309 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically significant 
results denominated by * (p<0.05). 
 
This basic model was also used to analyze the effects of the law on certain 
subsamples in the data. This was done in order provide us information on how the law is 
affecting different kinds of establishments. First, the model was used to analyze the effect 
on firms that were in all 10 years of the data (Model 4). This included almost 90,000 
unique establishments, (9,000 of which were located in California) which represents 20% 
of the total sample. Among these firms the implementation of California’s paid family 












these firms had a mean employment level of 259, therefore this represents a 2.9% 
increase in total employment. 
Testing the model on subsamples of the data that includes establishments with 
less than 10 years of observations in the data show that the effects of the law are smaller 
for these firms. When this model was used for firms that were in the data set for more 
than 5 years but less than 10, it showed a 1.5% increase in employment (this result was 
also significant at the 5% level). However using the same model on firms that were in the 
dataset for less than 5 years yielded a negative but insignificant result (0.2% decrease). 
This result would indicate that for very new establishments, or ones that were about to 
close or drop out of the data set due to lower than threshold employment levels, this 
policy did not have the same positive effect it had on the other establishments.
Since many opponents of this law argued that it would be more of a burden for 
smaller businesses, the same model was used to analyze the effect of this policy on 
establishments of different sizes. Among those establishments with greater than 100 
employees (Model 5), the policy was associated with an increase of 8.1 employees and 
represents a 2.5% increase, based on a mean employment level of 319 employees before 
the policy change. Among firms with 100 employees or less, the policy was associated 
with an additional 1.2 employees (Model 6). While the increase associated with the 
policy is much smaller for small establishments in absolute terms, it represents a 1.8% 
increase in mean employment. Therefore we can conclude that the paid family leave 
program has had a positive effect on firms in our sample, no matter their size, however 




Taken together these regressions show that in our sample, California’s Paid 
Family Leave program has had a positive impact on employment for most of the 
establishments in that state. These results show that the fears opponents had that this law 
had huge potential costs, which would cause employers to lay off workers or hire fewer 
new ones, did not materialize. These results also are consistent with the small-scale 
survey findings that polled firms’ attitudes towards the law. Milkman and Appelbaum 
(2013) found that in their sample, 87% of respondents said that the law had not resulted 
in any cost increases. And in fact 9% responded that the law had generated cost savings 
by reducing costs associated with employee turnover and their own benefit programs 
(meaning that some companies actually had to pay out less in paid leave benefits because 
their employees had access to the program). Their survey also showed that the vast 
majority of firms view the law as having no effect on their workers in terms of 
productivity, turnover or morale, and a small percentage actually thought the law has a 
positive impact on these outcomes. Therefore these small but positive results on 
employment found in the EEOC data are consistent with Milkman and Appelbaum’s 
findings (2013). 
One of the other arguments against paid family leave programs is that they might 
harm the group that the program is supposed to benefit the most, specifically female 
employees, due to an increase in statistical discrimination. In order to test whether 
employers are hiring fewer women because of this program, the same basic model, along 
with the different specifications, were used, the only difference being that the dependent 
variable was total female employment in each establishment (Table 4). Similar results 




positive effect on the number of female employees within establishments. The most basic 
model (Model 1) indicated that the law is correlated with a small decrease in female 
employment (-0.18). However once time trends are controlled for (Model 2) the 
coefficient is positive and significant, with the policy correlated with an increase of 1.84 
female employees. When controlling for state, year, and industry, the law is correlated 
with an increase of almost two female employees and the coefficient was significant at 
the 5% level (Model 3). When the model was used on establishments in all 10 years of 
the data (Model 4) the policy was significantly correlated with an increase of just over 2.5 
employees. 
Table 4: Fixed-effects regression results of policy effects on female employment 
(Sample: establishments in all US states) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Establishments All Establishments All Establishments 
In All 10 
Years 
CAPFL -0.18* 1.84* 1.85* 2.53* 
 (3.48e-14) (0.52) (0.52) (0.67) 
Controls:     
Year No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2130232 2130232 2130232 888740 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically 
significant results denominated by * (p<0.05). 
 
A change in the absolute level of female employment may not tell us if employers 
in California have started to discriminate against women because of the new law. This is 
because if the law caused an increase in total employment, they may be hiring both men 
and women, however because of statistical discrimination they may be hiring relatively 
more men. To test for this it is necessary to look at the program’s effect on the proportion 




the dependent variable being the percentage of an establishment’s employees listed as 
female (Table 5). Similar results are obtained, with the base model (Model 1) associated 
with a very small decrease in percentage of workers that is female. However once time 
trends are controlled for (Model 2) the coefficient turns positive and represents slightly 
more than a 0.1% increase in percentage female employment. The effect only increases 
slightly when industry controls are added (Model 3). For establishments in all 10 years 
the effect is slightly larger are 0.18% (Model 4). 
Table 5: Fixed-effects regression results of policy effects on proportion of employment 
that is female (Sample: establishments in all US states) 









all 10 Years 
CAPFL -.0004055* .0011621* .0011755* .0018153* 
 (5.84E-17) (0.0004606) (0.0004614) (0.0005339) 
Controls:     
Year No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry No No Yes Yes 
Observations 2130232 2130232 2130232 888740 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically 
significant results denominated by * (p<0.05). 
 
These results indicate that California establishments have not changed their hiring 
behavior because of the law. It would also suggest that the law has not caused a dramatic 
increase in hiring discrimination against women. This is consistent with the previous 
findings on how the law has not had a negative impact on total employment. If this law 
has not increased costs to businesses, they have no reason to change their hiring behavior 
in order to hire less people who are more likely to take leave. This positive and 
significant result may be due to the fact that the paid leave policy has reduced turnover 




more likely to return to their job after an extended period at home if they had access to 
job protected (and in this case paid) leave. If this is the case then the law may have 
reduced the incidence of statistical discrimination against women, making employers 
more likely to hire female workers. 
The results above show that the law is correlated with a positive and significant 
change in establishment level employment. However it could be the case that the policy 
variable in this analysis is picking up the impact of some other measure that is impacting 
establishment level employment in the state of California, giving results that are positive 
and significant but spurious. In order to attempt to reduce this possibility the same 
analysis was conducted with various different control groups that contain establishments 
in states that have similar economic conditions as the state of California. The economic 
conditions of interest are those that would impact employment. In a study of several 
Business Climate Indexes, Kolko, Neumark and Mejia found that measures that were 
most likely to predict both economic growth and increases in employment were those that 
were based on government intervention, taxes and the cost of doing business (2013). 
Knowing this I chose two appropriate available indexes to make new control groups: the 
Small Business Survival Index and Forbes’ Best States for Business rankings10.  
The Small Business Survival Index (SBSI) ranks all 50 states, as well as the 













create the index it assesses each state’s business climate in terms of its regulatory 
environment and the amount of government intervention businesses face. States that have 
a similar regulatory environment as the state of California may provide a better control 
group than the United States as a whole. Therefore the same difference-in-difference 
analysis was conducted with the states that have the most similar SBSI rankings relative 
to California used as the control group. The states that are most closely ranked with 
California on the 2009 SBSI are Iowa, Hawaii, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
Maine, Vermont, New York and New Jersey. Therefore the control group for this 
analysis is made up of establishments from these states. As can be seen below the results 
are similar to the previous analysis (Table 6). California’s Paid Family Leave program is 
correlated with a positive and significant change in employment, with an increase of 
almost 6 employees (Model 1). The coefficient increases to almost 8 employees for 
establishments in the data for all 10 years (Model 2). For large establishments there is an 
increase of 8.5 employees (Model 3) and for smaller establishments the policy is 
correlated with an increase of slightly less than 1 employee (Model 4) and all are 
statistically significant. 
Table 6: Fixed-effects regression results for policy effects on total employment for states 
with similar SBSI rankings 





all 10 years 
Greater than 100 
Employees 
100 Employees or 
Less 
CAPFL 5.865487* 7.831477* 8.457168* 0.9288651* 
 (0.7052) (1.3472) (1.1648) (0.1953) 
Controls:     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 579524 239750 324506 255018 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically 




Another set of rankings that was used to create possible appropriate control 
groups was Forbes’ Best States for Business. This ranking measures several categories 
that have a significant impact on business performance, and therefore would have an 
impact on employment. They include business costs, labor supply, regulatory 
environment, current economic climate, and growth prospects. The states that are similar 
to California in terms of Forbes’ overall Best for Business Rankings in 2007 include 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Arizona, Ohio, Hawaii, Mississippi, Maine, 
Alaska and Kentucky. Using establishments in these states as the control group, the 
results are similar to the previous analysis; California’s Paid Family Leave policy is 
correlated with a positive and significant change in establishment level employment 
(Table 7). For all establishments the policy is correlated with an increase of 6 employees 
(Model 1). For establishments in all 10 years of the data that effect increases to 8 
employees (Model 2).  And for the policy is associated with an increase of 8.8 employees 
for larger establishments (Model 3) and 1.3 employees for smaller establishments (Model 
4) 
Table 7: Fixed-effects regression results for policy effects on total employment in states 
with similar Forbes rankings 





In all 10 years 
Greater than 100 
Employees 
100 Employees or 
Less 
CAPFL 6.184005* 8.156356* 8.773065* 1.299519* 
 (2.53369) (2.822355) (3.671473) (0.2313531) 
Controls:     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 721901 302150 404164 317737 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically 





I then made control groups using a few of the most relevant individual 
components that go into determining the Forbes overall rankings. Using a control group 
based on the costs of doing business in each state, which includes the cost of labor, 
energy and tax burden, led to similar results as the previous analysis. This was also true 
for those states with similar rankings based on the states’ Regulatory Environment, which 
considers governmental influence such as labor regulations, benefit mandates, the tort 
system as well as other laws that regulate business. The positive and significant results 
were also obtained using a control group based on states with similar rankings based on 
Economic Climate, which includes growth in measures such as jobs, income and gross 
state product, as well as the average unemployment rate for the past 5 years.11 
However different results are obtained when using a control group that consists of 
states that have similar rankings when it comes to labor supply. This measure ranks 
states’ labor supply based on college and high school degree attainment, net migration 
over the past five years, the projected population growth over the next five years, as well 
as union representation. California was ranked 22nd when it came to its labor supply so 
create the control group I took the 5 states ranked below and the 5 states ranked above 
California.12 The same difference-in-difference analysis yields positive but insignificant 
results, which are reported below (Table 8). The policy is correlated with an increase of 
3.4 employees in all establishments (Model 1), 6 employees for those in all 10 years of 
the data (Model 2), and 6.5 employees for larger establishments (Model 3). This result 










picking up changes in employment levels due to changes and trends in the labor supply, 
since the significance disappears when comparing California to states that are similar in 
these respects.  
Table 8: Fixed-effects regression results for policy effects on total employment in states 
with similar Forbes Labor Supply rankings 





In all 10 years 
Greater than 100 
Employees 
100 Employees or 
Less 
CAPFL 3.386235 6.043743 6.472858 0.7271723* 
 (2.684693) (3.14255) (3.841682) (0.2457385) 
Controls:     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 655490 261950 358989 296501 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically 
significant results denominated by * (p<0.05). 
 
Of special interest is the result for smaller businesses (Model 4). It is small but 
positive, representing an increase of less than one employee (0.73) after the program was 
implemented, and is significant at the 5% level. This result is actually in line with a result 
of Milkman and Appelbaum’s small-scale survey of California businesses (2013). They 
report that smaller firms were actually more likely to report that the law has a positive 
impact in their businesses relative to larger firms. These two findings go against the 
popular argument held by the opposition that the program would have especially adverse 
affects on small businesses and may indicate that smaller business may benefit the most 
from this Paid Family Leave program. It may be that smaller business that offered paid 
leave before the program benefit greatly because their costs are now reduced, since they 
no longer have to pay for the leave themselves. Or perhaps they have had gains due to 




taken leave due to financial hardships but would be relatively unproductive on the job 
due to their responsibilities at home are now doing so. Another possible avenue for 
increasing worker productivity may be that smaller firms that were unable to offer paid 
leave before the program are now able to attract more productive employees now that 
they are able to provide the benefit at no cost to themselves. It could also be the case that 
since a substantial cost-savings are likely coming from a reduction in turnover, small 
businesses suffer from more turnover, or are more affected by the costs associated with it. 
To further test the previous results the same analysis was done on a more local 
level. Drawing from previous literature on the employment effects of state and local 
minimum-wage laws (Dube, Naidu & Reich, 2007; Card & Krueger, 2000; Neumark & 
Wascher, 1995) a significantly smaller dataset was created from the original that 
consisted of business establishments that were located relatively close to the California 
State border as well as a number of establishments located across the border in another 
state that does not have a paid family leave law. This was done for two reasons: (1) 
looking at establishments that are in the same geographical area and part of the same 
“local” economy may better control for unobserved economic conditions that may have 
an impact on employment but cannot be controlled for in this analysis. This is especially 
true since I am using a difference-in-difference approach, which assumes that the trends 
between the two groups are the same absent the effects of the treatment. And (2) it may 
also reduce the likelihood of a Type I Error, since it greatly reduces the number of 
establishments relevant to the observations of the coefficients.  
Unfortunately due to the geography and terrain of the state of California there are 




considered for this analysis: the Greater Sacramento area, the counties of San 
Bernardino-Riverside, and the northern county of Del Norte. The Greater Sacramento 
area was chosen because it had enough business establishments in all 10 years to conduct 
a reliable statistical analysis (which Del Norte did not) and it also had the benefit of being 
part of the US Census CA-NV Combined Statistical Area. This statistical area consists of 
not only 7 counties in Northern California but also 1 county in Nevada (Douglas County).  
According to the US Census, Combined Statistical Areas consist of areas that “have 
substantial employment interchange”. The OMB states that these CSAs are created based 
on economic and social ties as well as commuting patterns between the individual 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas within the CSA. Therefore establishments within these 
counties provide a quasi-experimental context for testing the employment effects of 
California’s Paid Family Leave Policy, and since the establishments in both the treatment 
and the control group are from the same combined statistical area, they are likely to 
provide a closer comparison than the other control groups used previously13. The areas 
that are included in this analysis are shown below. 
Taking establishments from this area between the years 2000 -2009 yielded 
19,299 observations with just over 4,000 unique establishments. Since the majority of the 
CSA is in California (both geographically as well as population) the majority of the 
establishments (approximately 75%) are located in California, and this holds true for all 









are slightly smaller than establishments in the United States as a whole, with an average 
of 189 employees. 
 
Figure 3: Counties used in local analysis 
Source: http://www.policom.com 
 
Using the same difference-in-difference approach used in the previous analysis, 
while also controlling for year and industry, the policy is shown to have a positive but 
insignificant effect on total employment for most model specifications. These results are 
shown below (Table 9). When looking at the three subsamples of establishments, the 
same can be said for firms that are in the dataset all 10 years (Model 4) as well as those 
firms employing 100 or less employees (Model 6). However for larger firms the 
coefficient is negative, but also insignificant (Model 5). This “local” analysis would 
indicated that for firms with the CA-NV Combined Statistical Area the implementation of 
California’s Paid Family Leave program has been a non-event in terms of employment. 
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Table 9: Fixed-effects regression results for the policy effects on establishments in the 
CA-NV Combined Statistical Area 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Est. All Est. All Est. Est. In All 
10 Years 
Est. with > 
100 Emp. 
Est. with <= 
100 Emp. 
CAPFL -0.9462 4.5274 4.4813 2.1859 -4.9567 0.8209 
 (3.3733) (7.2831) (7.2808) (9.4449) (13.2780) (0.8436) 
Controls:       
Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19299 19299 19297 6970 9895 9402 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically significant 
results denominated by * (p<0.05). 
 
The results are similar when looking at the analysis of changes in female 
employment (Table 10). For most model specifications the effect the policy has had on 
female employment is positive but insignificant. However one particularly interesting 
result is the one obtained from those establishments that employ 100 workers or less 
(model 6). This analysis shows that the policy had a positive and significant effect on 
female employment in these firms. The law is associated with an additional 1.4 female 
workers.  
Like the result from the analysis on total employment, this result is in line with 
the Milkman and Appelbaum study where businesses with less than 100 employees were 
more likely to report positive outcomes than firms with more employees. This result 
could indicated that small businesses have benefited most from the cost-savings created 
by the program, either because of a decrease in turnover among their female employees 
or because they no longer have to pay for any leave taken (with the employee instead 





Table 10: Fixed-effects regression results for policy effects on female employment in the 
CA-NV Combined Statistical Area 





In all 10 years 
Greater than 100 
Employees 
100 Employees or 
Less 
CAPFL 4.634246 3.287273 0.4061686 1.369328* 
 (3.443678) (6.681518) (5.779372) (0.4867202) 
Controls:     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19297 6970 9895 9402 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically 
significant results denominated by * (p<0.05). 
 
The results from the analysis on the policy’s impact on the portion of the 
workforce that is female are also positive, and significant at the 5% level, for all 
specifications of the model (Table 11). This means that the policy is correlated with an 
increase in the portion of the workforce that is female for all firms. While some 
opponents of the policy feared that it would have a disproportionately negative impact on 
women, since they are more likely to take leave, causing employers to statistically 
discriminate against this group of workers, this result would indicate that this has not 
happened. For all establishments the policy is associated with a 0.4%-0.8% increase in 
the portion of their workforce that is female (Model 3). This would indicate that 
statistical discrimination against women may have actually been reduced, perhaps 
because the law has increased women’s attachment to their jobs and reduced turnover 
costs or because the monetary costs of any previously provided paid leave is no longer 






Table 11: Fixed-effects regression results for policy effects on percentage female 
employment in the CA-NV Combined Statistical Area 





all 10 years 
Greater than 100 
Employees 
100 Employees or 
Less 
CAPFL 0.0039188* 0.0079194* 0.0050129* 0.0078078* 
 (0.0019815) (0.0024427) (0.0021763) (0.0034214) 
Controls:     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19050 6959 9895 9155 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically 
significant results denominated by * (p<0.05). 
 
Conclusions 
While arguments against the passage of California’s Paid Family Leave Act 
centered on how the program would be harmful for businesses, and would therefore 
reduce employment in the state of California, this does not seem to have been the case. In 
most model specifications the implementation of the program is correlated with a positive 
and significant change to establishment level employment, and in some specifications it 
is still positive but insignificant. This study would indicate that the program was 
beneficial to employment as best, and at worst a non-event for most California businesses 
when it came to employment decisions. There is also no indication that the law has been 
the cause of any increase in statistical discrimination against women, since they are more 
likely to make use of this program relative to their male counterparts, and in fact it may 
have actually reduced the incidence of discrimination against women. 
The most interesting results may be those for smaller establishments with 100 
employees or less. While opponents to the law were especially concerned that the 




indicate the exact opposite. The program seems to be positively and significantly 
correlated with total and female employment levels in these smaller establishments in 
virtually all specifications and control groups. This collaborates the findings of Milkman 
& Appelbaums (2013) finding that these smaller businesses were more likely to self-
report positive impacts from the law. However there may be large differences between 
firms that employ close to 100 workers and those that employ 5-10 workers. Limitations 
in the data used here prevent an analysis of how this law has impacted the smallest of 
firms, therefore more work in this area is needed using different data. 
A few caveats to this study must be mentioned. First, as previously stated, studies 
have shown that the implementation of this program was not as widespread as its 
proponents had hoped for. In the years following its implementation surveys revealed that 
roughly half of workers surveyed where not aware that they had access to this program. 
In 2009, the last year of this study, only a third of all women who gave birth in California 
actually used the program, and the percentage was even lower for pervious years 
(Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). Therefore the full impact of the law may not have been 
felt by California businesses by 2009, the last year in the data. 
It is also the case that the law was designed so that employees have access to the 
program through their employer (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). Therefore it is also 
possible that those that are being made aware of the law are employees at firms that 
would see some benefit from the law. This is likely to be employees at establishments 
that had paid leave policies before the law was enacted, and their employer is taking 
advantage of the cost savings by having their employees on leave paid, at least partially, 




treatment variable. It is therefore possible that as more and more people become aware 
of, and use, the program business may face additional costs and less cost-savings, which 
could impact employment. This study would benefit greatly by additional data from the 
past 5 years to see if this has happened. 
Secondly, it is entirely the case that these results could apply only to the state of 
California either because (1) these policy coefficients are picking up some other event or 
characteristic on the state level that could not be controlled for in the analysis or (2) a 
similar policy could have different effects in different states due to disparities in business 
culture or economic conditions. Therefore this analysis would be greatly enhanced by 
studying the impact of New Jersey’s paid family leave act, which was implemented in 
2009. Gaining access to the last 5 years of this data would also allow for this to happen. 
And lastly, changes in the demand for labor due to changes in mandated benefits 
such as those in the California’s Paid Family Leave program not only have an impact on 
employment, but they could also impact wages. It may be the case that rather than reduce 
employment, firms have passed any costs associated with the program onto their 
employees in the form of lower wages. This analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter 






THE IMPACT OF PAID FAMILY LEAVE ON WAGES IN THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA 
Introduction 
While paid family leave is prevalent throughout the world, the economic impact 
of such policies is not entirely understood. This is especially true in the United States, 
which has no federal paid leave mandate, and only three states (California, New Jersey, 
and Rhode Island) have recently implemented some form of mandated paid family 
leave.14  Even among the OCED countries with existing laws, while similar in scope and 
design, paid family leave mandates have had varying effects on labor market outcomes, 
especially for women. 
Some studies have shown that these policies are associated with higher labor force 
participation rates and lower unemployment rates, especially among women and income-
insecure families (Ruhm, 1998; Ruhm & Teague, 1995; Waldfogel, 1998; Waldfogel, et 
al, 1999). Others have shown that employers may also benefit from higher employee 
retention rates and an associated reduction in turnover costs (Zigler et al, 2012; 
Appelbaum & Milkman, 2011; Dube & Kaplan, 2002; Boushey & Glynn, 2012). Those 
in favor of these policies argue that women in particular can benefit from paid leave 
policies after the birth of a child, since they encourage women to return to their pre-birth 
employer, retaining firm or occupation specific human capital, thereby making them 
more likely to earn their pre-childbirth wages (Waldfogel et al, 1999; Waldfogel, 1998; 







leave and are able to return to their prebirth employer they spend less time out of the 
labor force, which has the potential to increase wages (Hofferth & Curtin, 2006). 
Therefore leave policies have the potential to increase women’s earnings and promote 
gender equality (Waldfogel, 1998). 
However opponents argue that mandating employers to provide certain benefits to 
their employees distorts the labor market and creates inefficiencies. In the case of paid 
leave, opponents worry that such policies will encourage employee absenteeism and 
therefore firms could experience an increase in labor costs and a reduction in 
productivity. If this is the case then economic theory would predict that employers will 
likely reduce their demand for labor, causing a reduction in both wages and employment. 
Others argue that human capital theory would also predict that women would be 
especially adversely affected. This is due to the fact that paid leave would encourage 
workers, especially women who still do most of the necessary unpaid care work, to spend 
more time out of the workforce, leading to a depreciation in their human capital and a 
resulting fall in wages (Albrecht et al, 1999; Anderson et al, 2002). It is also the case that 
if a paid leave policy encourages women to take more or longer leaves, employers may 
value female employees less, relative to their male counterparts.15 This could increase the 
level of statistical discrimination women face on the labor market if employers respond 
by hiring fewer women or by lowering their wages (Ruhm, 1998; Gruber, 1994; Blau & 
Kahn, 2000). 
The previous chapter showed that there were no reductions in employment due to 








showed that the policy was correlated with an increase in establishment level 
employment. There was also no evidence that the policy led to an increase in statistical 
discrimination against women through lower female employment levels. However, as 
shown in the previous chapter, the standard model of the supply and demand for labor 
would suggest that the impact of any mandated benefit on both employment and wages is 
ambiguous. Therefore, while California’s Paid Family Leave program seems to have not 
had an adverse effect on employment, it is still possible that firms have been able to pass 
along any costs due to the program onto their workers in the form of lower wages. And 
since the benefit is primarily used by female employees, the mandate could have had a 
particularly adverse effect on the wages of women in the state of California. 
To date there have been very few studies on the labor market impacts of 
California’s Paid Family Leave program, and even fewer have looked at any effects on 
wages. The studies that do look at how the program may have impacted employment and 
wages have focused on mothers and how the law impacted their employment and 
earnings after the birth of a child. There are no studies that look at how the law has 
impacted the overall wage levels in California, or the wages of all women. This chapter 
seeks to fill in this knowledge gap by studying how the new Paid Family Leave program 
impacted wages, specifically the wages of women, in the state of California. Not only 
would studying the wage effects of CAPFL be interesting in its own right, but it would 
increase our understanding of the economic consequences of mandated benefits, 






This chapter uses a dynamic labor supply and demand model of the impact of an 
extension of mandated benefits (Ruhm, 1997; Summers, 1989; Gruber, 1994). I pay more 
attention to relative shifts of labor supply and demand between men and women due to 
the law, and therefore look at any resulting changes in relative wages. Below are the 
supply and demand curves for both female and male labor and the possible dynamic 
effects due to a paid family leave mandate (Figure 4).  
For simplicity, I assume that the initial supply and demand for labor are the same 
for both men and women, and therefore male and female wages are identical before the 
mandate. While this is obviously not the case, this assumption does not impact our 
analysis of changes in relative wages. It can be seen that the ultimate change in the 
relative wages between men and women will be determined by the magnitude of the 
relative shifts of both supply and demand caused by the mandate. Using the economic 













































































According to economic theory, since employees will gain some benefits from a 
paid family leave program, more people will want to work, since the value of working 
has increased. Therefore the labor supply curve will shift to the right for both men and 
women, from S1 to S2 on both graphs (Summers, 1989; Ruhm, 1997). The magnitude of 
the shift (the vertical distance between S1 and S2) is the amount equal to the value the 
workers place on the benefit. From what is known about the usage of family leave 
benefits, the magnitude of the shift in supply is likely to be greater for women. It has 
been well documented that women are much more likely than men to take leave and are 
more likely to be out of the labor force due to family responsibilities in general. To date, 
data collected on California’s Paid Family Leave program has shown that this continues 
to be true in California, with the majority (70%) of total leave in the program being taken 
by women (Appelbaum & Milkman, 2011; Hauser & Vartanian, 2012). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the mandate has had a greater impact on female labor supply, 
shifting their supply curve by a greater magnitude. If this were the only impact on the 
market for labor of this particular policy we would see an increase in the employment of 
women but a reduction in their relative wages.  
However, we know that there may also be dynamic effects on the supply of labor 
brought about by changes in social norms. Unpaid leave programs, like the federal 
Family and Medical Leave Act, have been shown not to cause changes in the leave rates 
among men (Waldfogel, 1999). However as mentioned previously, as with any paid leave 
program, the California Paid Family Leave program has increased the incidence and 
length of the parental leave taken by fathers (Appelbaum & Milkman, 2011; Ray et al, 




social norms surrounding who takes time off of work when there is a greater need for 
care work at home, creating more general equality in leave and work disruptions 
(Boushey et al, 2013; Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). If this were to happen, then 
theoretically men and women would start to benefit from paid leave more equally, 
meaning that the shifts in their supply of labor would be more equal and therefore 
decrease the fall in women’s relative wages. These changes in social norms may also 
have an effect on employer behavior by reducing the statistical discrimination against 
women. If men and women had more similar leave patterns, then the cost of hiring a 
female employee would be similar to that of hiring a male employee, and therefore firms 
would be less likely to engage in statistical discrimination against women. 
Paid leave programs can also have an impact on the demand for labor. If the 
policy has any negative impact on a firm’s cost or productivity of labor, then their 
demand for labor will fall. As a result the labor demand curve will shift by the magnitude 
of the increase in costs (C). Business interests have long argued that extending any leave 
benefits to employees would increase the cost of labor and reduce productivity (Milkman 
& Appelbaum, 2013). While California’s firms face no direct costs when it comes to the 
wage replacement provision, they may face increased labor costs if the program 
encourages workers to take more and longer leaves, increasing the rate of employee 
absenteeism that a firm faces. This could increase the costs of hiring temporary or 
replacement workers, or reduce labor productivity if the absent employee’s work is 
passed on to the remaining employees. If these costs are real and substantial, then the 





However, men and women may not face the same decrease in the demand for 
their labor, due in part to statistical discrimination. Under typical circumstances, when a 
firm hires an employee it will be impossible for them to know for certain whether or not 
that employee will take family leave in the future, let alone when that leave will be taken 
and for how long. Therefore a firm will be unable to calculate the cost of the mandate (C) 
for any given employee. In the case of family leave benefits, where a demographically 
identifiable group takes the majority of the leave, in this case women of childbearing age, 
it could result in statistical discrimination because the estimated marginal cost of hiring 
these employees is greater than others (Ruhm, 1998; Gruber, 1989; Ruhm, 1997; 
Summers, 1989). An increase in statistical discrimination may cause employers to 
demand less female labor because they will assume that for any female employee, 
specifically women of childbearing age, the estimated cost of the mandate is greater than 
for all men (CW > CM). Therefore the decrease in demand would be greater for female 
employees, causing their relative to wages to fall. 
However, it is possible that family leave policies can have dynamic effects in the 
demand of labor, particularly for women. Overall, having a leave policy could actually 
decrease labor costs and increase productivity. Costs could be reduced if (1) the firm had 
a paid leave policy in place before the mandate was implemented and are now paying out 
less in benefits, since employees are now utilizing the state program to replace at least 
part of their wages while on leave.16 And (2) the program could mean that more workers 








reduces turnover costs for firms.17 These two cost savings could mitigate, or even 
surpass, any associated costs of the program, especially considering the costs are 
estimated to be quite low (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013; Dube & Kaplan, 2002). 
It is also the case that if a paid maternity leave benefit makes it so that women are 
more likely to return to their pre-leave employer, or less likely to drop out of the labor 
force due to her caretaking responsibilities, then firms would experience less turnover 
among their female employees. This would necessarily cause a reduction in turnover 
costs associated with hiring women, which would likely reduce the incidence of 
statistical discrimination. It is also the case that the average marginal product of labor for 
female workers would increase as they would retain more of the previously invested 
firm-specific human capital. Therefore the increase in the demand for labor due to these 
dynamic effects (D2 to D3) would be larger for women than men, since they will benefit 
more from the leave mandate. If this is the case, then the program has the potential to 
raise wages, as well as raise the relative wages of women. 
Therefore, the impact a paid family leave program has on overall wage levels, or 
the relative wages of women in particular, is theoretically ambiguous. Wages for both 
men and women could increase or decrease depending on the magnitudes of the shifts in 
both the supply and demand curves. Women’s relative labor market position could 
decline if they continue to value the program more than men, causing female labor supply 
to increase significantly more than men’s. Or they could see their relative wages fall if 
there is an increase in statistical discrimination against women because of the program. 







overall wage levels in California, but also in women’s relative wages since they are likely 
to benefit from the program the most and it could decrease in the incidence of statistical 
discrimination. The goal of this chapter is to use available data to analyze the impact of 
the California Paid Family Leave program on the aggregate wage levels as well as 
women’s wages. 
Existing Research on Mandated Benefits and Wages 
Existing studies on how mandated employee benefits impact wages find 
drastically different results. However the overall findings tell us that the impact on wages 
depends largely on the cost of the benefit to employers and how much the benefit 
changes the behavior of the employees. Mandates that place substantial costs on 
employers and do not drastically increase the leave taken by its employees tend to have a 
large impact on wages. Mandates that do not place substantial costs on employers or 
drastically increase the time employees are away from their job seem to have no effect on 
the labor market. By studying how previous mandates have impacted employee wages, 
some insight can be gained as to what we can expect from a policy like California’s Paid 
Family Leave Act. 
One obvious mandate that is similar to the one in question is the federal Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993.  While it does not include a paid provision, FMLA is 
similar to CAPFL in many ways. The intentions of the programs are the same, in that 
they are both intended to provide support to employees when their caretaking 
responsibilities mean they have to temporarily stop working. The Family and Medical 
Leave Act does this through providing job protection and CAPFL does so with wage 




employers, in that the FMLA does not require firms to provide any wage replacement and 
CAPFL is financed entirely through an employee payroll tax. Studies have also shown 
that FMLA and CAPFL have had similar impacts on leave usage by raising the incidence 
and lengths of leave among eligible employees, the most increases occurring among 
women of childbearing age (Waldfogel, 1999; Appelbaum & Milkman, 2011; Houser & 
Vartanian, 2012). Therefore, studying how FMLA impacted wages, specifically the 
wages of female employees, may give us some insights as to how CAPFL may have 
affected wages in California. 
In a 1999 study of the FMLA program using Current Population Survey data, Jane 
Waldfogel found the program to have a slightly positive effect on employment and zero 
net wage effects for most workers.18 Waldfogel argues that wages were likely unaffected 
by FMLA due to the low costs of the program for employers. At the time of the 
program’s implementation, studies showed it would cost employers around $250 for each 
employee that used the leave.19 Since employers do not pay for the wage replacement 























A 2006 paper by Hofferth and Curtin found that FMLA was correlated with 
women returning to work more quickly after the birth of a child, and a higher likelihood 
of women returning to their prebirth employer. However, in some models, they found that 
FMLA was associated with a decrease in women’s wages after the birth of a child and the 
authors argued that women were trading off increases in wages for leave and workplace 
flexibility. However the authors concede that this may only be a short-term result, since 
their data included only women who gave birth between 1993 and 1995. Therefore they 
were unable to see any medium-to-long terms effects of more women remaining with 
their employees pre-birth employer. One other problem with this analysis is that the 
authors could not identify who was eligible for FMLA based on employer size, and 
therefore used returning to the same employer as a proxy. However this strategy may not 
be useful, since qualifying for FMLA and returning to the same employer are not 
mutually exclusive. It could be possible that employees that did not qualify for FMLA 
returned to their same employer, however the employer was not required to give the 
employee the same job with the same wage. If these employees are returning to jobs with 
lower wages, and considering the number of employees that are not covered by FMLA in 
the US is significant, this could bias the authors results downward.  
While Waldfogel’s 1999 paper also looked at the short-run impact of FMLA on 
wages due to limitations of the data (using 1992-1995 CPS), her analysis was able to 
determine who was eligible for FMLA using data of firm size and the work history data 
collected and therefore her results are less likely to be biased. Fortunately, the structure of 
CAPFL means that almost all private sector employees in the state of California qualify 




However the different results obtained using the same policy mean that the literature has 
not reached a consensus about how a leave mandate impacts US labor markets, and 
therefore this research can further our understanding in this way. 
Studying the impact of other state leave laws may also give us some 
understanding as to what to expect under CAPFL. Before the passage of FMLA, 11 states 
had their own unpaid family leave laws that gave some workers the right to take unpaid 
family leave before the federal law was enacted in 1993. In a 2003 paper, Charles L 
Baum II uses this state variation, as well as the passage of FMLA, to study how maternity 
leave legislation affects employment and wages. Using NLSY data he found that 
maternity leave legislation had no effects on the employment and wages of women of 
childbearing age. He argues that the leave mandated under these laws is relatively short 
(3 months or less) and that because the leave is unpaid many women would have to return 
to work even sooner due to financial constraints. Baum argues that for these reasons the 
costs to employers were limited, and therefore there was no need to pass along the costs 
of the program in the form of reduced employment or wages. 
There are several reasons why CAPFL may have had different effects on wages 
relative to its unpaid state and federal counterparts, the most relevant being that since it is 
a paid mandate, it may dramatically increase usage and therefore costs to employers. 
Since the wage provision is not paid by employers, we can expect that the per person/per 
day cost of the leave to be similar to that of FMLA. However overall costs for employers 
will be higher if (1) more people take leave and/or (2) people take longer leaves. Because 




those who were unable to take leave due to financial constraints are now doing so, 
increasing the overall cost of leave to employers (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013).20 
It is also important to keep in mind that the per person cost of leave has most 
likely increased dramatically since the passage of FMLA and when these studies were 
conducted. This increase in costs most likely come from the fact that maintaining health 
insurance coverage for the average worker has increased dramatically since the passage 
of FMLA in the early 1990s.21 The average premiums for employer-sponsored family 
health insurance plans rose from $5,232 in 1993 to $9,249 in 2003 to $16,029 in 2013 
(Gabel et al, 1994; Collins et al, 2014). A 2001 report on the costs of a potential 
extension of FMLA, written by the National Federation of Independent Businesses, found 
that a person taking the maximum amount of leave under FMLA (12 weeks), would cost 
employers $1600 in health insurance premiums alone. Since premiums have almost 
doubled since 2001, we would expect that cost to be around $3,000 now (Phillips, 2002).  
It is also the case that FMLA includes both leave for an employee’s own sickness 
(which tends to be relatively short) as well as family leave (which is significantly longer 






















specifically targets family leave would likely be more expensive in two ways. Not only 
would longer leaves cost more, just by the fact that they are longer, but it is also the case 
that they could cost more because employers are more likely to hire temporary employees 
or redistribute the workload when the leaves are longer. The 2001 NFIB report estimated 
that each worker who takes 12 weeks of leave would cost their employer on average 
approximately $9,600 in employee replacement costs or overtime pay for existing 
workers (Phillips, 2002). Therefore while employers bear no direct cost of the wage 
replacement aspect of California’s Paid Family Leave program, they may incur more 
indirect costs from employees taking more and longer leaves due to this increase in the 
cost of health insurance premiums and employee replacement costs. It could be the case 
that since CAPFL has the potential to be more costly than its unpaid counterparts, it may 
have a more negative effect on wages. It would therefore be prudent to look at how other, 
more costly, mandated benefits have impacted wages in the US. 
There are several such state and federally mandated programs that provide 
benefits to employees at significant cost to employers, just as paid family leave may do. 
One such program is mandated employer-provided workers’ compensation insurance. 
Workers’ compensation insurance provides payments, as well as medical benefits, to 
cover expenses employees incur due to a work-related injury or illness. Workman’s 
compensation laws are instituted on the state level, meaning there is significant variation 
in requirements and eligibility. Generally any firm that falls under the state’s rules must 
either buy insurance from a 3rd party or maintain a fund to self-insure its employees, and 




The theory of compensating wage differentials predicts that a worker’s wage will 
increase with the amount of risk the job entails. A large amount of risk in a job or 
occupation is undesirable to most workers, and therefore a higher wage must be paid in 
order motivate workers to perform it. Part of the risk in these types of jobs is the 
possibility that any injury sustained while working may prevent them from returning to 
work, which reduces their potential future income. Workman’s compensation insurance 
ensures that if the worker is injured and cannot work, they will be provided with wage 
replacement and medical benefits. Therefore, workers’ compensation insurance reduces 
the risk of these jobs, meaning workers are willing to accept a lower wage in return 
(Moore & Viscusi, 1990). In a paper using the state variation in workman’s compensation 
policies, Jonathan Gruber and Alan B. Krueger found that any increases in the cost of this 
particular mandate were almost completely offset by a decline in wages, with very little 
impact on employment (1991). 
One large difference between workman’s compensation benefits and paid family 
leave is the fact that the former involves a demographically identifiable group that is 
more likely to use the benefit relative to other workers. The risk of workplace injury and 
therefore workman’s compensation costs varies by occupation and job duties, not the 
demographics of the employee. Therefore, employers are more likely to be able to pass 
along any increase in the cost of workman’s compensation to their employees in the form 
of lower wages. They are able to do so because (1) the workers are willing to accept 
lower wages or a reduction in the risk of losing future income and (2) there are usually no 
legal constraints reducing an employer’s ability to lower wages based on occupation or 




These two conditions do not hold for benefits that target a certain group of 
workers, and therefore employers may have less scope for the free adjustment of wages. 
In terms of mandated paid family leave, the employees most likely to use the benefit are 
women of childbearing age. Workers who do not intend to use the benefit, namely men 
and older women, while technically covered by the mandate, may not be willing to accept 
lower wages. It is also the case that employers may be unable to pass along all costs of 
the mandate onto just women of childbearing age if there are barriers to relative wage 
adjustment, such as antidiscrimination laws (Gruber, 1994; Summers, 1989). These wage 
rigidities can cause negative impacts on employment, specifically for the group that is 
most likely to use the benefit (Summers, 1989).  
Studies on mandates that benefit certain demographically identifiable groups have 
shown that relative wages may be flexible when it comes to policies that affect men and 
women differently. In a 1994 study of state and federal mandates that required employer 
sponsored health insurance to have comprehensive childbirth coverage, Jonathan Gruber 
found that employers were able to shift the majority of the cost of these mandates to 
married women of childbearing age. While this finding supports the economic efficiency 

















not be socially efficient, since they have the potential to increase the wage discrimination 
faced by those that are the targeted beneficiaries of the program.  
Studies of paid family leave mandates from other OECD countries support the 
findings that any costs associated with the policy may be shifted from the employer to 
female employees in the form of lower wages, with more costly programs reducing the 
labor market position of women in these countries. In a 2008 review of the existing 
literature on the leave polices of the Nordic countries, Gupta et al found that while most 
of the studies found that these countries exhibit relatively high female labor force 
participation rates, especially among mothers, having paid leave polices that are both 
long in duration, as well as specifically targeted towards mothers, has had a negative 
impact on their wages in the form of a flatter wage profile during their childbearing years, 
even when controlling for all observable individual characteristics. The authors call this a 
“system-based glass ceiling”.  They argue that in these countries, where maternity leave 
policies are particularly generous and where they are specifically targeted towards 
mothers, women suffer from lower wages in the private sector due to particularly long 
maternity leaves laws that promote long gaps in their employment.  
The authors also saw that this flatter wage profile does not impact only mothers, 
but rather all women of childbearing age, which they attribute to statistical 
discrimination. Since the policies encourage women to have long absences from the 
workplace when a child is born, and men take relatively little leave even when it’s 
available to them, employers may see all childbearing women as less valuable employees 
relative to their male counterparts (Gupta, Oaxaca & Smith, 2006). The extent of the 




experiencing more negative effects of these policies. The authors argue that this may be 
because the jobs that these women typically have require higher adjustment costs when a 
worker takes long leaves. Therefore the level of statistical discrimination against women 
is higher in these positions. 
In a study of paid maternity leave policies in 9 European countries between 1969 
through 1993, Christopher  J. Ruhm found that paid maternity leave policies that are short 
in length, of around 3 months, were not associated with any change in wages (1998). 
However longer leaves, of around 9 months, were associated with an approximately 3 
percent decline in hourly wages for women of childbearing age. In a 2014 study of 
Germany’s expansion on paid maternity benefits, Schonberg & Ludsteck found that 
significantly longer leaves in Germany were associated with a 1-3 percentage point 
reduction in the labor market income of mothers who were employed 76 months after the 
birth of a child. And several other studies found that in many European countries, long 
paid maternity leave provisions tend to help women on the bottom of the wage scale, but 
tend to hurt women’s wages at the top (Gupta et al, 2006; Ruhm, 1998).  
Misra, Budig, & Boeckmann use cross-national survey data to look at the 
generosity of maternity leave policies and their impact on mothers’ wages (2011). They 
find that there is a curvilinear relationship between the motherhood penalty and the 














high wage penalty for having children and, consistent with previous findings discussed, 
so too are very generous leave policies. The authors also found that policies that allow for 
leaves of moderate length are associated with smaller wage penalties for having children. 
The authors argue that this may be due to the fact that both no leave and very long leaves 
are associated with lower labor force attachment rates of mothers, but leaves of moderate 
length allow women to maintain employment after giving birth and therefore reduce the 
penalty of having children. 
The findings presented in the above studies on comparing leave polices in other 
OECD countries would suggest that short to moderate paid leaves are less likely to 
impact wages than longer leaves, either because workers do not experience significant 
human capital depreciation or because they are more likely to encourage labor force 
attachment among mothers. It may also be the case that these types of leaves are not 
costly to employers and therefore do not increase the statistical discrimination women of 
childbearing age face on the labor market. These findings would suggest that CAPFL 
may have no or even a positive impact on the labor market outcome of employees, 
especially for women. Since the maximum length of leave under the program is 6 weeks 
(12 if used in conjunction with CA’s TDI program), and the average length of leave taken 
in association with the law is less than three months (Bartel, et al, 2014), Ruhm’s study 
would suggest that it could have no significant impact on wages (1998). And Misra, 









may even be a positive impact on wages if the law increases the labor force attachment 
rates of mothers (2011). 
However, while shorter leaves had no impact on wages in European countries 
(Ruhm, 1998), we must consider the institutional environment in which these leaves are 
occurring. In general employees in these countries are entitled to more benefits, including 
more paid time off (vacation, sick leave, etc) (Ray et al, 2013). However in the US, time 
off for employees is not mandated by the government, and is therefore left up to 
individual firms to make their own policies. Currently the average US worker received 
roughly half of the paid time off that their European counterparts are guaranteed by law, 
and 1 in 4 have no access to paid time off at all (Ray et al, 2013).  
Given these institutional difference between the US and Europe when it comes to 
time off, it may be the case that employee absenteeism, for any reason, is less accepted in 
the US. In an environment where taking time off for any reason is less expected or 
accepted, even the relatively short leaves taken under California’s Paid Leave program 
may have a negative impact on the wages of those that are most likely to take them. In 
fact, in a multi-country analysis on how family policies impacted the motherhood pay 
gap, Budig, Misra & Boeckmann found that cultural attitudes affected the impact 
maternity leave polices had on wages (2012). They found that those who lived and 
worked in a cultural setting that was supportive of maternal employment appeared to 
benefit from family policies such as job-protected maternity leave and publicly funded 
childcare in the form of higher wages. These same policies are associated with less 
positive and sometimes negative effects on mothers’ earnings if they occur in a more 




surrounding work and childcare. Therefore while a paid leave policy may have positive 
effects on women’s wages in more supportive countries, the same policy could have the 
opposite effect in the United States. However since US culture is generally supportive of 
maternal employment (even when its policies are not), Budig et al.’s research could 
indicate that a paid family leave policy could lead to a positive impact on mothers’ 
earnings. 
The existing literature suggests that paid family leave mandates that are short in 
duration will not cause a decrease in wages, and may in fact have a positive impact. 
However studies of various US employee mandates that significantly increase the cost of 
labor or that cause workers to take exceptionally long leaves, show that they have a 
negative impact on wages, and may disproportionately impact women. Therefore, given 
the existing literature, the expected impact of CAPFL on wages, particularly women’s 
wages, is unknown. This chapter will use the “natural experiment” of the implementation 
of the Paid Family Leave Act in California to study how the mandate impacted the wages 
of workers in the state, and the wages of women in particular. By better understanding 
how this law impacted the workers of California, we will better understand how paid 
leave legislation impacts US labor markets.  
Data & Methodology 
This chapter uses data from the March Current Population Survey Annual 




Series (IPUMS) and uses the years 1995-2014.24 When weighted the data is a large, 
nationally representative sample collected from a different pool of respondents each year, 
that provides extensive information regarding leave-taking and other labor market 
outcomes, including weeks and usual hours worked, and income in the previous year. It 
also provides extensive information regarding the respondent’s demographics such as 
age, state of residence, race and level of education. The CPS has long been used to study 
wages in the United States. 
I employ a difference-in-difference (DD) design comparing changes in the natural 
log of hourly wages for California employees (adjusted for inflation) to corresponding 
changes in a comparison group that should not have been affected by the program. 
Different appropriate control groups are used and include workers in all other states, 
those in states that have a Temporary Disability Insurance program similar to 
California’s, workers that reside in the next three largest states (Florida, New York, and 
Texas25) and those in states that have similar economic climates according to the business 
indices that were used in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. These models are used to analyze 
the impact, if any, of the policy on overall wages in California. If firms experienced 
substantial labor costs due to the implementation of paid leave, then we would expect the 
















Using this DD approach I estimate a basic human capital earnings function as 
follows: 
Wi = β0 + β1CAPFLi + β2Xi+ β12statei + β13yeari + εi  (Equation 3.1) 
Where, for individual i, W is the natural log of hourly wages (adjusted for inflation using 
the IPUMS CPI measures and represent 2012 dollars). CAPFL represents the treatment 
variable, which is a dummy variable with a value of one for employees in the state of 
California in years after the implementation of CAPFL in 2004 and zero for all other 
observations. X is a vector of explanatory variables,26 State and Year represent the 
inclusion of state and year dummies, and ε is the error term.27 The coefficient β1 tells us if 
California’s Paid Family Leave program had any impact on the level of wages relative to 
wages in states without the program. If the coefficient is positive, then the program had a 
positive impact on aggregate wage levels, most likely due to an increase in the demand 
for labor due to cost savings brought about by the program, which would also explain the 
modest increases in employment that were found in the previous chapter. If the 
coefficient is negative then we know that the program reduced wages due to a 
combination of an increase in the supply of labor and a reduction in the demand for labor 
due to increased labor costs and/or reduced productivity. 
The same model is used to analyze the program’s impact on the wages of those in 













have shown that the vast majority of the paid leave taken under the law has been parental 
leave, those that were more likely to have used the program are parents that have had 
children born since the law was implemented. Therefore I compare the wages of workers 
with children who have been born since 2004 to the wages of all other workers in 
California. I will also use various other treatment and control groups as specification 
tests, for instance comparing mothers with eligible children to all other mothers in 
California. Equation 3.2 below is the same as the Equation 3.1, except now it includes a 
dummy variable, EC, which is 1 if the respondent has a child born in 2004 or after and 
resides in the state of California. 
Wi = β0 + β1CAPFLi + β2ECi +  β3Xi+ β4Statei + β5Yeari + εi     (Equation 3.2) 
Therefore β2 represents the impact the policy has had on parents who were eligible to take 
family leave after the law was implemented. 
In order to alleviate some of the potential bias, I also use a difference-in-
difference-in-difference model (DDD).28 This model requires finding one or more control 
groups that are not affected by the law, but may be affected by similar time variant trends 
as the treatment group. Equation 3.3 below is similar to the DD design in Equation 3.2, 
except for the inclusion of a new variable Z, which represents the additional control 
group in the DDD model consisting of all workers in other states that had a child in 2004 
or later. 
Wi = β0 + β1CAPFLi + β2ECi + β3Zi + β4Xi+ β5Statei + β6Yeari + εi    (Equation 3.3) 
While the policy should not have impacted these workers, time variant national trends 







same trends would bias the coefficient for CA parents in the same direction. Therefore 
the DDD estimate, which is the difference between these two coefficients (β2 – β3), is the 
unbiased estimator for how the policy has impacted the wages of parents in the state of 
California . 
 Another goal of this analysis is to understand how this policy affected the relative 
wages of women in California in order to study how the paid leave program may have 
impacted statistical discrimination against female workers in that state. The same DD and 
DDD models are used, using an interaction term between being female and the CAPFL 
policy variable. Therefore the β2 coefficient in these models show how the policy 
impacted female wages. However this coefficient may also suffer from potential sources 
of bias. In particular, if the labor market position of women has changed over time and 
not adequately controlled for in the DD model, then the coefficient will reflect these 
changes and be biased upward (or downward depending on the trend). Therefore these 
women will be compared to all other female workers in the dataset in 2004 and onwards, 
represented by the variable Z. Therefore the DDD estimate will again be the difference 
between these two coefficients and will reflect the unbiased effect of the policy on 
women’s wages. 
Results 
After limiting the sample to respondents who were of typical working age (18-
64), the data included approximately 1.6 million respondents who worked a positive 
number of hours in the last year. Those with extremely low wages of less than $2/hour 
were excluded as well as those with hourly wages greater than $250. Roughly 140,000 of 




observations were taken before the law was implemented and 52% were taken after. The 
means for the variables of interest can be found below in column 1 of Table 13.  
As can be seen in Table 12, for most survey years California has a higher average 
wage relative to the rest of the United States. And while there seems to be some pattern to 
this difference (the difference in the average wage grew before 2007 and then fell 
thereafter), it does not seem to be correlated with the implementation of California’s Paid 
Family Leave Law in 2004. It could be the case that the effects of the program could have 
taken a few years to show up in wages. This possibility is supported by the fact that the 
program has had problems with information dissemination and less-than-optimal usage 
rates (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013).  
 
Table 12: Difference in mean wages for California workers compared to the rest of the 
US, 1995-2014 (in 2012 dollars) 
Survey Year CA Other Difference 
1995 20.45 19.71 3.75% 
1996 21.07 20.18 4.41% 
1997 20.89 20.92 -0.14% 
1998 21.41 20.75 3.18% 
1999 22.12 21.38 3.46% 
2000 22.09 21.45 2.98% 
2001 23.92 22.40 6.79% 
2002 24.59 22.94 7.19% 
2003 24.05 22.85 5.25% 
2004 24.79 22.96 7.97% 
2005 24.41 23.12 5.58% 
2006 24.83 22.99 8.00% 
2007 25.64 23.21 10.47% 
2008 25.56 23.22 10.08% 
2009 25.09 23.04 8.90% 
2010 25.59 23.62 8.34% 
2011 24.24 22.97 5.53% 
2012 24.25 22.79 6.41% 
2013 24.39 22.71 7.40% 





It is also impossible to say anything significant by comparing average wages. 
There are many differences between California’s population and the rest of the United 
States that could have an impact on relative average wages. There are also significant 
time trends that make the population of California before the law was passed significantly 
different than after. Relative wages may also be determined by state-specific labor market 
conditions such as unemployment, differences in industry and state economic policies. 
Table 13 shows that the mean hourly wage for all years in California is 
statistically higher compared to the rest of the United States. Some of the difference can 
be explained by the statistically significant differences in the explanatory variables. For 
instance workers in California are more likely to be male, not have children and live in a 
metropolitan area, all of which are associated with higher wages. Table 13 also shows 
that other significant differences in the average of the human capital variables would 
work in the opposite direction, pushing the wages of California downward. For instance, 
workers in California are less likely to be white, more likely to have not finished high 
school and, on average, have less potential experience. Therefore it is quite possible that 
California’s wages are changing relative to the rest of the country, not because of the law, 
but due to changes in the level of human capital in the state’s workforce. And indeed, 
Table 13 also shows that the mean levels of these explanatory variables are changing over 
time. Consequently, it is necessary to control for these human capital variables when 
studying how the policy has impacted wages in California relative to the rest of the 





Table 13: Means for variables of interest between states and over time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







Log of Hourly Wage 2.8629 2.8918* 2.8602 2.926* 2.8414 
 
(.000545) (.001947) (.000567) (.002543) (.003012) 
Potential Experience 19.4708 18.7241* 19.5418 19.3104* 17.858 
 
(.009432) (.031382) (.009887) (.041453) (.047658 ) 
Average Hours/Week 39.5693 39.0058* 39.6229 38.8495* 39.2365 
 
(.008866) (.028739) (.009315) (.037464) (.044766) 
Percent Female 48.7094 46.4268* 48.9265 46.5123 46.3005 
 
(.000396) (.001339) (.00041) (.001735) (.002108) 
Percent Married 59.616 56.6734* 59.8958 56.6393 56.7238 
 
(.000388) (.001331) (.000406) (.001723) (.002094) 
Percent Parent 51.7425 51.2577* 51.7886 51.4706 50.9432 
 
(.000395) (.001342) (.000414) (.001738) (.002113) 
Education (%)  
    Less than HS 10.6863 18.2073* 9.9711 16.5994* 20.5824 
 
(.000245) (.001036) (.000248) (.001294) (.001294) 
HS Graduate 29.8155 22.9559* 30.4678 22.4912* 23.6424 
 
(.000362) (.001129) (.000381) (.001452) (.001796) 
Some College 20.3514 21.4589* 20.246 20.9771* 22.1704 
 
(.000319) (.001103) (.000333) (.001416) (.001756) 
Associate's Degree 9.5594 8.6731* 9.6436 8.781 8.5138  
 
(.000233) (.000756) (.000244) (.000984) (.00118) 
Bachelor's Degree 19.6839 19.6034 19.6916 21.0364* 17.4866 
 
(.000315) (.001066) (.000329) (.001417) (.001606) 
Master's Degree 7.148 6.4188* 7.2173 7.146* 5.3448 
 
(.000204) (.000658) (.000214) (.000896) (.000951) 
Professional/Ph.D. 2.7556 2.6826 2.7625 2.9689* 2.2597 
 
(.00013) (.000434) (.000136) (.00059) (.000628) 
Race (%) 
     White 82.2709 79.1051* 82.5719 77.5898* 81.3433 
 
(.000302) (.001092) (.000314) (.00145) (.001647) 
Black 10.2431 5.5758* 10.6869 5.4735* 5.7271 
 
(.0002399) (.0006162) (.0002558) (.000791) (.0009821) 
Other 7.4861 15.3191* 6.7412 16.9368* 12.9296 
 
(.000208) (.000967) (.000208) (.001304) (.001418) 
Ethnicity (%)      
Hispanic 15.1809 42.1475* 12.6165 42.5082* 41.6149 
 
 (.000284) (.001326) (.000275) (.001719) (.002083) 
Observations 1596896 138670 1458226 82690 55980 




Table 14 shows the OLS results from regressions looking at how California’s Paid 
Family Leave program impacted the wages of all workers in the state of California. The 
treatment variable is CAPFL, which is a dummy variable that is one for workers in 
survey years 2005 and onwards and the control group is all California workers surveyed 
before 2005. Model 1, which does not include human capital variables or control 
variables for each year, tells us that the CAPFL program is correlated with a statistically 
significant increase in wages of about 6%. When human capital control variables are 
included in the model (Model 2), this correlation falls to 3.3%, indicating that some of the 
wage increase is due to changes in the human capital of workers in CA. Once all 
explanatory variables are included the policy is correlated with a 3.7% increase in wages 
and is statistically significant (Model 3).  








However, this model is most likely inadequate in showing the unbiased effect of 
the policy on wages, since simple OLS regressions may not adequately control for time-
varying trends in wages. Therefore the next models will use a difference-in-difference 
design, taking advantage of the “natural experiment” that the law provides, since it 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
CAPFL 0.0597*** 0.0333*** 0.0371*** 
 
(0.00428) (0.00346) (0.0118) 
Human Capital 
Controls No Yes Yes 
Year Controls No No Yes 
Constant 2.887*** 2.567*** 2.528*** 
 
(0.00316) (0.0224) (0.0233) 
    Observations 138,670 131,481 131,481 
R-squared 0.002 0.401 0.403 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for human capital explanatory 
variables and year controls not shown. Statistically significant results 




should only impact workers in California and not workers in other states. This DD design 
will compare changes in the outcomes (wages) of the treatment group (workers in 
California) to the changes in the outcomes of those in other states. 
Table 15 shows the results from the difference-in-difference regressions using 
workers in all other states as the control group. The baseline model with no control 
variables (Model 1) shows that the law is correlated with a 9.2% increase in the wages of 
California workers and is significant at the 1% level. Model 2 includes the human capital 
control variables, which decreased the policy impact to a 6.4% increase in wages. So 
does adding control variable for each year (Model 3), with the increase in wages 
dropping slightly to 5.9%. And when all explanatory variables are included, as well as 
dummy variables each state (Model 4), the effect is smaller but still positive and 
significant, with the policy being correlated with a 2.3% increase in wages. This last 
model would indicate that indeed some of the increase in wages we saw in Model 1 was 
due to unobserved state-specific characteristics, but not all. This analysis would indicate 
that the law has not had a negative impact on the wages of workers in California, and in 
fact seems to indicate that it has had a small but positive and significant impact on wages 





Table 15: Difference-in-Difference results of policy effects on the log of hourly wages 
(Sample: All workers) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CAPFL 0.0919*** 0.0636*** 0.0586*** 0.0225*** 
 
(0.0136) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.00412) 
Human Capital 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Controls No No Yes Yes 
State Controls No No No Yes 
Constant 2.855*** 2.640*** 2.588*** 2.522*** 
 
(0.0136) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0140) 
     Observations 1,596,879 1,514,772 1,514,772 1,514,772 
R-squared 0.001 0.382 0.384 0.387 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for human capital explanatory variables 
and year controls not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** 
(p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
The same model was then used using different control groups and these results are 
shown in Table 16. The first control group consists of states that have a Temporary 
Disability Insurance Program in place that some workers are able to use after the birth of 
a child.29 These states may provide a more adequate control group because the presence 
of some amount of paid leave has made maternity leave patterns in these states similar to 
those in California before the law was passed, relative to states without any access to 



















similar to the previous models with the law being correlated with a 2.2% increase in 
wages, and this result is significant at the 1% level. Table 16 also shows the model that 
used the next 3 largest states as a control group (Model 2). Again the law is associated 
with a small (1.4%) but significant increase in the wages of California workers. 
Table 16: Difference-In-Difference results of policy effects on the log of hourly wages 
using various control groups 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
TDI States Big States SBSI Forbes 
CAPFL 0.0221*** 0.0143* 0.0230*** 0.0255** 
 
(0.00342) (0.00563) (0.00294) (0.00818) 
Human Capital 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.539*** 2.581*** 2.502*** 2.521*** 
 
(0.0344) (0.0354) (0.0280) (0.0136) 
     Observations 289,482 349,129 396,973 401,678 
R-squared 0.394 0.389 0.392 0.393 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for human capital explanatory variables, year and 
state controls not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** 
(p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
The models above have shown that rather than having a negative impact on 
California’s workers, the Paid Family Leave program is correlated with a small but 
significant increase in wages. Nevertheless, it may be the case that the coefficient on the 
treatment variable is not reflecting the impact of the law, but rather picking up changes in 
California’s economy that has affected the state’s supply and demand for labor, which 
has caused the observed increase in the relative wages of California workers. Therefore 
the same model was used using control groups that consist of workers in states with 
similar economic/business climates. To be consistent I used the same business indices 




(Model 3)30 and Forbes’ Best for Business Rankings31 (Model 4). These results are shown 
in Table 16, with both models showing that CAPFL is correlated with a small but 
significant increase in wages (2.3% and 2.6% respectively).  
All of the models used in this analysis thus far have consistently shown that 
California’s Paid Family Leave program has not led to a decrease in wages. Rather, this 
law has likely had a positive impact on wages, which is small but significant (between 
1.4% and 3%). Thus far the analysis has focused on aggregate wages in the state of 
California. However it may be informative to understand if this increase in wages is 
being experienced by all workers, or if the increase is being driven by certain groups, 
namely those that are most likely to be impacted by the law. This is because the law can 
theoretically impact the demand for labor in various different ways that would impact 
different groups of individuals. On the aggregate level, if the law reduced the overall cost 
of labor, then an increase in the demand for labor would cause the average wages of all 
California workers to increase. However the law could also impact those who utilize the 
law in a separate way. If the law makes it so that mothers are more likely to return to their 
pre-birth jobs, then this would have a positive impact on their wages, separate from the 
aggregate cost-reduction effect of the law, due to a larger increase in their labor demand 
curve. 
In this next model I apply a policy treatment to the group that most likely used the 
law and compare them to all California workers before the law was enacted as well as 
those workers who were less likely to have been impacted by it after. Since studies have 








would be the group that has most likely been affected by the law (Milkman & 
Apllebaum, 2013). Therefore I created an interaction term between CAPFL and a dummy 
variable that is one for workers whose youngest child was born during or after 2004.32 
This model may also eliminate some of the potential bias that may be present in the other 
model, since it is less likely that another event occurred in California that impacted only 
workers with children born after this date, other than the implementation of paid leave.  
Table 17: Difference-in-Difference results of policy effects for workers in California with 
eligible children (Sample: Workers in California) 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
 
All Workers Women Men 
CAPFL 0.0239** 0.00642 0.0406** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0170) (0.0165) 
Eligible Child 0.0571*** 0.101*** 0.0157* 
 
(0.00672) (0.0101) (0.00898) 
Human Capital Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.529*** 2.380*** 2.571*** 
 
(0.0233) (0.0334) (0.0324) 
Observations 131,481 59,872 71,609 
R-squared 0.403 0.369 0.422 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for human capital explanatory variables and 
year controls not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** 
(p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
The OLS results are presented in Table 17 and show that having an eligible child 
is correlated with a 5.3% increase in wages and this is significant at the 1% level (Model 
1). Interestingly, the coefficient of the CAPFL dummy variable is positive and similar in 
magnitude to the previous analysis (2.4%), and is still statistically significant. This would 









California, separate from the wage effects of those most likely to use the policy. This is 
most likely due to the significant cost savings firms experience from the law in the form 
of decreased turnover costs and a reduction in the costs of their own paid leave policies. 
Considering mothers are much more likely to use parental leave relative to 
fathers, I broke down the same difference-in-difference analysis by sex. When comparing 
women who have an eligible child to both all women before the law was enacted as well 
as women who did not give birth after the law was implemented (both childless women 
and mothers who had their children before the law) I found that the law is associated with 
an 10.1% increase the wages of these eligible mothers (Model 2). The same analysis for 
men (Model 3) revealed a much smaller and less significant increase in the wages for 
those fathers with an eligible child (1.6%). 
The same analysis was then done using the control groups from the previous 
analysis (all workers, workers in TDI states, etc.) and these results are presented in Table 
18. In all model specifications having an eligible child is associated with an 
approximately 5% increase in wages. It is also the case that in the coefficient on the 
policy variable is smaller, however still significant in most model specifications. This 
would continue to indicate that the California policy has had both an aggregate effect as 





Table 18: Difference-in-Difference results of policy effects for workers in California with 
eligible children using different control groups 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All States TDI States Big States SBSI Forbes 
CAPFL 0.0153*** 0.0143** 0.00645 0.0157*** 0.0181** 
 (0.00414) (0.00314) (0.00557) (0.00287) (0.00792) 
Eligible Child 0.0521*** 0.0561*** 0.0565*** 0.0526*** 0.0543*** 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.522*** 2.540*** 2.581*** 2.503*** 2.522*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0340) (0.0350) (0.0277) (0.0133) 
      
Observations 1,514,772 289,482 349,129 396,973 401,678 
R-squared 0.387 0.394 0.390 0.392 0.393 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for human capital explanatory variables and year and state controls 
not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
However the model above suffers from potential sources of bias. First of all the 
models may suffer from endogeneity. California may have passed the law because more 
women, especially mothers, were entering the labor market and their labor market 
positions were improving at the same time they were demanding more leave. Therefore, 
the passage of CAPFL may not be completely exogenous. It could also be the case that 
the estimates are biased because the law was correlated with some other labor market 
trend that impacted wages over time, and this was not adequately controlled for in the 
model or with the various control groups. This is especially the case for the how the law 
impacted those with an eligible child. All eligible children were born during the later part 
of the data set, in data representing 2004 and after. It may be the case that the labor 
market positions of parents, especially mothers, have improved over time and that is what 




To address these potential sources of bias, I use a difference-in-difference-in-
difference methodology (DDD). In this analysis I use workers in other states that have 
children born after 2004 as the additional control group. These workers should not have 
been impacted by the law, however they are potentially impacted by the change in the 
labor market position of parents. The results of these DDD regressions are presented 
below in Table 19. 
The DDD estimate for having an eligible child is represented by the difference 
between the coefficient on the treatment group (parents with eligible children in CA) and 
the new control group (parents with children born after 2004 in all other states). For all 
workers this is 1.75% (Model 1). Therefore California parents have seen their wages 
increase by a small but statistically significant amount due to the passage of paid leave. 
However we know that these laws can impact mothers and fathers differently, therefore 
the DDD regressions were done for men and women separately. These regressions, which 
are also shown in Table 19 show a more nuanced picture of the impact of the law on 
parents. The law is correlated with a 3.5% increase in California mothers’ wages 
compared to all mothers in all other states in the same years, and this difference is 
statistically significant (Model 2). Fathers of eligible children have seen their wages 
increase by only 0.5% relative to fathers in all other states in the same years (Model 3). 
This difference between the law’s impact on mothers and fathers can be explained by the 
fact that mothers are much more likely to utilize the law and take maternity leave after 
the birth of a child, therefore they would be ore likely to benefit from the law.  
To see if the effects during the year of birth is the driving force behind these 




leave during the survey year (their youngest child was < 1). The results are also presented 
in Table 19 and are represented by models 4, 5, and 6. In these models “eligible infant” 
means that the worker had a child in the survey year and was therefore eligible to take 
paid leave under the new program. These results would indicate that overall the wages of 
parents that had a child in the survey year saw their wages increase by 2.5% (Model 4). 
For mothers that increase was 4.6% (Model 5) and for fathers it was 2.1% (Model 6). 
Table 19: Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference results of policy effects for workers in 
California with eligible children and infants (Sample: All workers) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All workers Women Men All Workers Women Men 
CAPFL 0.0200*** 0.0185*** 0.0205*** 0.0218*** 0.0217*** 0.0210*** 
 
(0.00410) (0.00357) (0.00481) (0.00413) (0.00346) (0.00497) 
Eligible Child 
(CA) 
0.0581*** 0.0960*** 0.0192***    
 
(0.00184) (0.00225) (0.00240)    
"Eligible" 
Child (Other) 
0.0406*** 0.0607*** 0.0117***    
 
(0.00311) (0.00519) (0.00380)    
EC Unbiased 
Coefficient 
0.0175*** 0.0353*** 0.0049*    
Eligible 
Infant (CA)    
0.0659*** 0.129*** 0.0240*** 
    (0.00141) (0.00154) (0.00187) 
“Eligible” 
Infant (Other)    
0.0406*** 0.0833*** 0.00276 
    (0.00449) (0.00923) (0.00581) 
EI Unbiased 
Coefficient    




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.523*** 2.406*** 2.506*** 2.522*** 2.406*** 2.506*** 
 
(0.0138) (0.0158) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0160) (0.0141) 
Observations 1,514,772 727,367 787,405 1,514,772 727,367 787,405 
R-squared 0.387 0.352 0.396 0.387 0.352 0.396 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for human capital explanatory variables and year and state controls 





When looking at Table 19 a few things can be seen. First of all, the result for 
mothers of eligible infants (4.5%) is within the realm of possibility given the amount of 
wage replacement the law provides. If all mothers used all 6 weeks of leave provided 
under the law, and received the maximum 55% wage replacement rate, then it would 
represent 6% of a woman’s full-time yearly wages. However since not all women took 
leave under the program, and among those that did use the program not all received the 
maximum benefit, this 6% represents an upper bound for the program’s effects on new 
mothers’ wages due to wage replacement alone. Since most studies of the program found 
that it increased the length of leave in CA by around 3 weeks, a more likely impact of the 
wage replacement provisions would be around 3%. The additional 1.5% increase in new 
mothers’ wages could be due to an increase in the likelihood of mothers returning to their 
prebirth job, and therefore a return to her prebirth wages. 
 It can also be seen in Table 19 that for mothers, not all of the increase seen in 
model 2 is driven by the effects of the program on their wages in year after the birth of a 
child. The portion of workers with eligible children where the child was born in the 
survey year is small, especially in the later years, yet the policy is still correlated with a 
3.5% increase in wages (Model 2). This may indicate that the law has created lasting and 
positive wage effects for mothers that extend beyond the year of the child’s birth, 
possibly because the law is allowing more women to remain at their pre-birth employer, 
and therefore see the benefits of retaining firm-specific human capital.  
The reasons behind the results obtained for California fathers are less obvious. In 
the year an eligible child is born, fathers see a wage increase of 2.1% (Model 6). 




0.5%). This is most likely due to the fact that fathers are much less likely to quit or lose 
their job in order to take leave after the birth of a child. Therefore this law is not likely to 
change their behavior when it comes to their attachment to their prebirth employer. 
Therefore the law is less likely to have any effect on their wages past the year of a child’s 
birth. 
The same models used above could be used in order to look at how women’s 
wages have been affected by the law in order to see if there has been any increase in 
statistical discrimination since its implementation. Table 20 shows the results from a 
model that included and interaction term between the CAPFL dummy variable and the 
sex dummy variable (Female*CAPFL). This interaction term was 1 for women in 
California in the years after the law was implemented and 0 for all other workers. This 
model was included because opponents of the law argued that any negative effects could 
disproportionately affect women due to an increase in statistical discrimination. However 
these results show that women have been the largest beneficiaries of the law, with a 
correlated 5.1% increase in their wages. In fact in this model the coefficient for the policy 
variable is significantly smaller and insignificant, indicating that the law has not 
significantly affected men’s wages. This result is consistent with the fact that family 
leave laws have historically benefited female employees more than their male 
counterparts, since they continue to provide the majority of any care work that would 






Table 20: DD and DDD of policy effects for women workers in California (Sample: All 
workers) 
Model (1) (2) 
 
All Workers All Workers 
CAPFL 0.00143 0.00692* 
 
(0.00380) (0.00402) 
Women in CA after 2004 0.0467*** 0.0569*** 
 
(0.00383) (0.00571) 
Women not in CA after 2004 - 0.0211*** 
 
 (0.00450) 
Unbiased Coefficient  0.0358 
Human Capital Controls Yes Yes 
Year Controls Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes 
Constant 2.524*** 2.529*** 
 
(0.0131) (0.0138) 
Observations 1,514,772 1,514,772 
R-squared 0.387 0.387 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for human capital explanatory variables and 
year and state controls not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by 
*** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
However, this model may suffer from the same potential bias that was previously 
discussed. To control for this potential bias I used the same difference-in-difference-in-
difference methodology, with the additional control group being all women after 2004.  
The law should not have impacted the wages of these women, but they would be affected 
by any national time-trends that impacted women’s wages or could have been correlated 
with the passage of the law. The DDD estimate would be the difference between the two 
groups’ coefficients, which is 3.6% and statistically significant. This would further 
indicate that all women, not just mothers, have benefited from the law in the form of 
slightly higher wages. This could be that firms have seen a reduction in their maternity 
leave costs, and therefore are willing to hire more women. There is no evidence in this 




implementation of paid leave in California, and in fact this positive and significant result 
would suggest that statistical discrimination against women has been reduced. The 
coefficient on the CAPFL treatment variable is still small but is now significant, 
indicating that men in California have seen their wages increase by 0.7% relative to the 
rest men of the US. 
The results presented so far indicate that paid family leave is positively correlated 
with the wages of California employees. Not only is the program correlated with an 
aggregate increase in wages of approximately 1.5%-3% in most model specifications, it 
has also increased the wages of parents, mothers in particular, as well as the relative 
wages of women. However, it could be the case that rather than changing to wages of the 
workers of CA, the law changed the composition of the employees in CA so that it 
includes more workers with higher wages or those with low wages are leaving the labor 
market. And since we only observe the wages of respondents that reported working usual 
hours in the last year, this selection problem would create bias in our treatment 
coefficients. 
There are a few reasons why I do not think that this analysis suffers from a 
selection problem. The first is that the benefits of the program are relatively small. If an 
employee, who works full time year round, took the maximum number of weeks allowed 
under the program (6 weeks), and received the maximum benefit (55% of wages), it 
would only represent 6% of their yearly income. And considering many do not take the 
maximum number of weeks, this represents the upper bound. In reality most studies have 
found that the average length of leave in CA has increased by about 3 weeks due to the 




receive around 3% of their yearly income in benefits. This is a relatively small benefit, 
and therefore less likely to cause major changes in the composition of the labor force. It 
is also the case that a 2013 study by Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, & Waldfogel, which analyzed 
the changes in leave usage after the passage of the law using the same data (March CPS) 
from 1999-2010, found that there was no evidence that the law caused people to select 
themselves into their treatment groups (in this case mothers). 
However, while a selection problem seems unlikely, as a robustness check I 
utilized the Heckman Two-step procedure on four of the models presented above and 
present the results below in Table 21. Model 1 represents the most basic OLS model on 
the sample that contains only California workers, and indicates that the law is correlated 
with a positive and significant change in the natural log of hourly wages. The magnitude 
and the significance of the law is the same as the results above (Table 14, Model 3), 
which would provide evidence that the original model does not suffer from selection 
problems. Furthermore, the treatment variable had no significance in the select regression 
(where the dependent variable was having any hours/wage to report in the last year).  
The same can be said for all of the other models in Table 21. Model 2 shows that 
even when correcting for potential selection bias, the law is still correlated with an 
approximately 2% increase in wages for California workers when using all other US 
workers at the control group (compare to Table 15, Model 4), and again the policy 
variable was not significant in the selection regression. Model 3 corrects for selection 
bias on the DDD model that compares mothers with CAPFL eligible children to all other 
women, (both in states without the law, childless women, and mothers in CA before the 




model that does not correct for selection bias (presented in Model 2 of Table 19) and the 
policy variable is not significant in the select regression. And again, Model 4 shows that 
when correcting for selection bias in the DDD model comparing the impact of the law on 
women in California to those in other state, the coefficients are similar to their previous 
counterparts (presented in Model 2 of Table 20) and the policy coefficient is insignificant 
in the select regression. The only difference is that the CAPFL coefficient is no longer 
significant, indicating that women have seen most of the wage benefits from the law. 
These robustness checks would indicate that the law has not changed the composition of 
the labor market in California and the results obtained in this analysis are not due to 
selection bias as a result of the law. 
Table 21: Heckman Two-step regression results correcting for selection bias 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Workers in CA 
All Workers in 
All States 
Women in All 
States 
All Workers in 
All States 
CAPFL 0.03142*** 0.02072*** 0.01475*** 0.00315 
 (0.03150) (0.00307) (0.004553) (0.003610) 
Eligible Child (CA)   0.08843***  
   (0.008107)  
Eligible Child (Non CA)   0.06028***  
   (0.002651)  
Unbiased Coeff. for EC   0.02815  
Women in CA after Law    0.05548*** 
    (0.00414) 
Women not in CA after 
law    0.01612*** 
    (0.001763) 
Unbiased Coeff.    0.03936 
HC & Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Controls NA Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.977*** 2.5084*** 2.3586*** 2.5138*** 
 (0.168) (0.00580) (0.00802) (0.005817) 
Observations 139,394 1,583,288 765239 1583288 
Wald chi(df) 93108.14(65) 969251.67(116) 395943.59(117) 969612.60(118) 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for human capital explanatory variables and year controls not 




Discussion and Conclusions 
Taken together, these results would indicate that California’s Paid Family Leave 
Program has increased the wages of many workers. These results are most likely driven 
by the increase in the wages of women, and mothers in particular. The results in this 
analysis are consistent with the many studies that have shown that women’s labor market 
positions tend to be improved by the passage of family policies. When women have 
access to leave they are much more likely to return to their previous employer and earn 
relatively higher wages than women who do not, since job-specific human capital is 
preserved (Laughlin, 2011; Waldfogel, 1998; Zigler et al, 2012). If the California Paid 
Family Leave Program gave more women access to leave, which increased the likelihood 
of returning to their pre-birth employer, then this would increase the wages of women 
with eligible children compared to those mothers that gave birth before the law. But it 
may also improve the situation for all women if statistical discrimination was reduced, 
perhaps because the cost of providing maternity leave benefits was reduced. 
It is also the case that this analysis has shown that this law may have positively 
impacted the wages for those workers that were less likely to use the program (childless 
workers and parents with children born before the law). Even when having an eligible 
child was included in the model the policy was consistently correlated with a small and 
sometimes significant increase in the wages of California workers (approximately two 
percent). This increase could represent an increase in the demand for labor due to the cost 
savings firms have reported experiencing from the program. Part of it can also be 




Therefore a small number of workers are remaining at their pre-leave jobs when they 
would have had to quit or would have lost their job prior to the program. 
Taken with the results of the first chapter of this dissertation, which showed that 
the program was consistently correlated with an increase in establishment-level 
employment, these positive wage results would indicate that California’s Paid Family 
Leave law has had a positive impact on California’s labor market. Since employment is 
also increasing, as shown in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, this would indicate that 
CAPFL is correlated with an increase in the demand for labor. This would be consistent 
with firms experiencing substantial labor cost savings due to the program as well as firms 
experiencing positive effects in productivity and worker morale (Milkman & Appelbaum, 
2013; Dube & Kaplan, 2002). 
It is also the case that there is no evidence that these policies have had a negative 
impact on those workers this law was meant to help. In fact these results consistently 
show that the law is correlated with a positive impact on the labor market outcome of 
women, mothers in particular.  Chapter 2 found a small but significant increase in the 
portion of establishment employment that is female, and Chapter 3 indicated that the law 
was correlated with an increase in women’s relative wages. These two findings would 
indicated that the demand for female labor has increased more relative to men due to the 
law. It may be the case that this program has reduced the statistical discrimination against 
women as more women are returning to their pre-birth employer. Or perhaps 
discrimination was reduced as firms saw the costs of their maternity leave benefits 
decrease. These findings support the idea that family friendly policies have a positive 












LABOR FORCE ATTACHMENT AND MATERNITY LEAVE TAKE-UP RATES 




In recent decades families in the United States have undergone various 
demographic changes in characteristics such as composition, economic stability, and 
diversity. Among these trends one of the most dramatic changes has been in the relative 
number of households and families that are maintained by heterosexual cohabiting, rather 
than married, couples. These are different-sex couples that have chosen, for a variety of 
different reasons, to live together but not get married and therefore not obtain many of the 
economic and social rights of a legally married couple. Since the percentage of families 
that fall into this family type has been increasing at a rapid rate over the past few decades, 
it is becoming more and more important to understand how these families make 
economic decisions. 
The goal of this chapter is to better understand the working and economic lives of 
cohabiting households. Specifically, do differences in relationship stability and family 
structure cause cohabiting couples to make different decisions regarding their labor 
supply relative to their married counterparts? This dissertation chapter provides insight 
into this question by analyzing the labor supply decisions of mothers after the birth of 







According to adjusted US Census data, there were about 1.8 million cohabiting 
couples in 1980 and by 2010 that number had increased considerably to over 7.5 
million.33 The greatest increase occurred in the last decade, with the absolute number of 
households with opposite-sex cohabiting couples almost doubling in the 10 years 
between 2000 and 2010. A different way of understanding this trend is by looking at the 
percentage of US households headed by cohabiting couples rather than their absolute 
numbers. This gives a better picture of the relative number of US families and households 
that fall into this category. In 1960 these types of households made up less than 1% of 
total US households. By 2010 over 6% of US households were maintained by cohabiting 
couples, and their proportion is expected to continue to increase rapidly. 
It is also the case that an increasing number of children are being raised in 
families maintained by cohabiting couples. In fact, “estimates suggest that between 25 
and 40% of children will live in a family headed by a cohabiting couple some time during 
childhood” (DeLeire, 2002) and an increasing number of children will experience this 
type of household structure in their lifetime (Manning & Lamb, 2003). While the 
majority of these children are in a cohabiting household because of a change in the 
relationship status of a parent (divorce, single parent’s partner moves into the home, etc.), 
an increasing number of children are born into this family structure and continue to live 










early 1980s were to cohabiting couples, 20% of children born in 2007 were born into this 
type of household (Waldfogel et. al, 2010). 
The increase in the rate of cohabitation in the US has been correlated with the 
increase in the age of first marriage. Between 1960 and 2010, the median age at which an 
individual first enters marriage has increased by almost 6 years for both men and women 
(US Census). This trend can also be understood by looking at the percentage of men and 
women who ever marry by a certain age. Census data show there has been a decline in 
the percentage of both men and women who have ever been married by all ages in more 
recent cohorts. But the most dramatic decreases have been in those that have been 
married by the age of 25. Among those born between 1940 and 1944, 66% of men and 
89% of women were married by the age of 25. But in the youngest cohort, individuals 
born between 1975 and 1976 only 34% of men and 47% of women were ever married by 
the age of 25. However demographic data suggests that while couples are choosing to 
delay marriage, most are not choosing to delay relationship formation. The Census data 
on first unions and cohabitation suggests that many people still choose to live with their 
partner and create a family under a single household starting in early adulthood. In fact, 
when age of first cohabitation is taken together with age of first marriage, the median age 
of first union has not increased very significantly over the past few decades (Bumpass, 
1990; US Census).  
However like most population trends, the rise in cohabitation cannot be linked to 
a single social force. Not only is it linked to American’s delaying marriage, it is 
correlated with more adults choosing to never marry at all. According to the US Census, 




research indicates that it is likely to decline even further (Wang & Parker, 2014). While 
the number of people who never marry in their lifetime has been consistent over the 50 
years, it is predicted that for the first time the percentage of people who choose to never 
marry, even into later adulthood, will increase dramatically. In 1960 8% of 64 year olds 
had never been married, and this figure decreased only slightly to 7% in 2012. However 
using Census data and large-scale polling regarding attitudes surrounding marriage, a 
Pew Research study estimates that when those who are currently in their 20s and early 
30s reach their 50s, possibly 25% will have never been married (Wang & Parker, 2014). 
And while these individuals are less likely to get married, they are more likely to use 
cohabitation as a substitute. 
While many Americans will experience cohabitation before marriage, or as a 
substitute to it, an increasing number will also experience cohabitation after a divorce. 
Roughly half of all first marriages begin with cohabitation, but that number is even 
higher for second marriages. Divorce rates in the US increased dramatically between the 
1960s and the 1980s and while they have fallen slightly since then, they have continued 
to remain relatively high, with 40-50% of marriages in the US ending in divorce.34 
Higher divorce rates can be correlated with higher rates of cohabitation as people learn, 
either through their own experience or by observing others in society, that marriage is no 
longer the long-lasting institution it had been in the past (Smock, 2000). Couples today 












people who have already experienced divorce first-hand are more likely to engage in this 
type of cohabitation (Heuveline & Timberlake, 2004). Overall people are spending a 
smaller proportion of their lives married, and more of their adult lives living with their 
unmarried partner (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002). Some of these individuals cohabitate 
before marriage, some cohabitate after a divorce, and some see cohabitation as an 
alternative to marriage (Heuveline & Timberlake, 2004).  
 Whether couples are cohabiting as a precursor to marriage or as an alternative to 
it, more and more couples are choosing this type of family and household formation 
because it is more socially acceptable to do so. Throughout history marriage has had 
many purposes depending on the social context. But in many cultures, and particularly in 
modern Western culture, marriage has been used to regulate sexual behavior (Coontz, 
2006). For centuries marriage was the only appropriate place for sex as well as having 
and raising children. However in the past half-century the West has been experiencing a 
“sexual revolution” that has effectively decoupled sex, and even the rearing of children, 
from marriage so that having sex and conceiving children outside of marriage is no 
longer considered taboo in many parts of US society. These shifting ideas of what is 
considered socially acceptable, as well as other long-term social changes (changes in the 
economy, changes in gender roles, improvements in birth control technology) have made 
it so that marriage is no longer the only socially acceptable possibility for most couples 
(Bumpass, 1990; Lesthaeghe & Surkyn, 1988; Popenoe, 1993; Rindfuss & 
VandenHeuvel, 1990; Cunningham & Thornton, 2006; Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 
2001). As having children outside of marriage, and cohabitation in general, is becoming 





The increases in the rates of cohabitation have also been reinforced by the 
changing realities of the economics of the family. Economics has traditionally viewed 
modern marriage as a way to capitalize on the comparative advantage of traditional 
gender roles (Becker, 1981). In his famous Treatises on the Family, Gary Becker argues 
that when a husband and wife specialize in the market and domestic spheres, 
respectively, they produce more together than they can apart, thereby taking advantage of 
“production complementarities.” 
However one can argue that Becker’s “production complementarities” are 
becoming less and less central to family life (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). The 
comparative advantage of specialization along traditional gender roles becomes less 
obvious as market substitution for household goods becomes more and more common 
and as women make gains in the labor market and even surpass men in educational 
attainment. It may also be the case that as households are increasingly using the market to 
supplement or replace goods and services that were typically produced in the household, 
the economic role of the family will continue to decrease (Lundberg & Pollak, 2007). 
And as life expectancy increases and fertility rates decline, people spend relatively less of 
their lives having and raising children. It is also important to note that over the past half-
century, rising inequality in male wages have made it necessary for women to enter the 
labor market, making household specialization less possible for some segments of the US 
population (Bernhardt, Morris, & Handcock, 1995). Therefore the economic need of 
marriage, or a lifetime commitment of any kind, is becoming less and less obvious, which 





It is also the case that while the economic gains couples get from living together 
are usually attributed to married individuals, cohabiting couples can also experience these 
gains. According to Gary Becker (1981) it is the act of living together that allows the 
individuals within the household to specialize, which leads to greater productivity, not the 
legal status of being married. Therefore couples who do not wish to marry may instead 
live together and benefit from Becker’s “production complementarities”. However it 
must be mentioned that it is riskier for cohabiting couple to do so, because (1) no legal 
structure is available to protect an individual’s economic investment in the household 
(such as time out of labor force and a resulting decline in future wages) and (2) 
cohabiting relationships are more likely to dissolve relative to marriage (Waldfogel et al., 
2010; Nordblom, 2004). Therefore they may be less likely to engage in household 
specialization, or at least not to the same extent as married couples (Gupta, 1999). But 
even without the gains from specialization, couples can also benefit from sharing 
economic and social resources, which can produce economics of scale as well as sharing 
any risk against unexpected events (Oppenheimer, 2000). Couples may choose to get 
these benefits of living together without actually getting married in order to avoid the 
risks of divorce and its associated costs.  
Less is known about the economics of cohabiting couples relative to traditional 
families. Are cohabiting couples living together without the legal status of marriage still 
behaving like a married couple when it comes to the economic decisions such as labor 
market participation, income and resource sharing, and investment in the household? Or 




because they are not married and have no legal rights to their partner’s future income 
should the relationship dissolve? Since this type of family formation is becoming 
increasingly common, it is important to not only understand the demographics of this 
trend, which undoubtedly has been the main focus of the research on cohabitation in the 
past few decades, but to also understand the economics of this type of household. More 
research is needed on how the economics of this family structure are different from or 
similar to traditional families. This chapter expands on the existing knowledge of the 
economics of cohabiting households by looking at the differences in the labor supply 
decisions of cohabiting couples compared to single and married households. In particular 
I look at how the labor supply of new mothers in cohabiting relationships differ from new 
mothers in married and single households. If it is indeed the case that cohabiting couples 
are less likely to engage in household specialization, new mothers in cohabiting 
relationship may take less maternity leave and may be less likely to leave the labor 
market after the birth of a child relative to married mothers. 
Theoretical Framework 
 One of the more important sets of research questions regarding the family are 
those surrounding labor force participation decisions. Market work typically provides the 
majority of a family’s income, and therefore is crucial to the health and survival of the 
family. Changes in who typically performs market work can indicate changes in gender 
norms within families. It can also provide insight into bargaining processes that takes 
place within the household. There are well-known correlations between labor market 
outcomes and major family changes, such as the decreased labor force participation rate 




men (Waite, 1995; Cohen, 2002; Mincer & Polachek, 1974). 
 However the majority of the research on this topic has focused almost exclusively 
on families that are headed by married couples. If other family types are considered they 
are usually grouped together based on the presence of children rather than the presence of 
another adult (single with children or single without children). Therefore relatively little 
research has been done on the labor market behavior of cohabiting couples. Considering 
that the proportion of US households that are headed by an unmarried couples is 
increasing rapidly, it is even more important for us to understand the behavior and 
decision-making processes of these families. Research that would lend us insight as to 
how cohabiting couples are different in terms of their labor force participation decisions 
will further our understanding of the economic behavior of these families, especially in 
relation to other family types. Not only is studying the economic behavior of cohabiting 
couples interesting as an economic question, it could also be crucial to our understanding 
of how public policy affects these families differently compared to traditional family 
structures. As families headed by cohabiting couples becomes more and more common in 
the US, family policy may need to change in order to better serve these families. For 
instance if cohabiting mothers rely on their partner’s income less and are less likely to 
engage in household specialization, then they may be less likely to take maternity leave if 
it is unpaid. Therefore a paid leave policy, like California’s Paid Family Leave program, 
may help cohabiting women take leave after the birth of a child. 
There are several economic and social factors that would perhaps make 
cohabiting mothers act like single mothers when it comes to decisions regarding working 




they do not have the option of filing their taxes jointly with their partner. Therefore their 
income would be taxed in a similar way as a single mother with the same income, which 
would potentially make their labor force participation look more like single women. In a 
similar fashion, they would be impacted by certain policy changes in the same way, such 
as the 1996 welfare reform act and any future changes to TANF. Like single mothers, 
cohabiting mothers may not have access to health insurance through a partner’s 
employment, therefore they may have to work in order to gain access to or afford good 
quality health care. Also cohabiting women do not have legal rights to their partner’s 
current or future income or any retirement or social security benefits if the relationship 
should dissolve. While most of the current economic literature regarding women’s labor 
supply does not specifically address how individuals in a cohabiting relationship would 
treat their partner’s income when it came to their labor supply decisions, for all of these 
reasons listed above one would expect that their labor supply would be much less 
responsive to their partner’s income compared to married couples (Henkens et al., 1993; 
Abroms & Goldscheider, 2002). This is also compounded by the fact that cohabiting 
relationships are much more likely to dissolve relative to marriage (Brown & Booth, 
1996; Bumpass & Lu, 2000; Osborne et. al., 2007). For these reasons cohabiting women 
may have a greater attachment to the labor market relative to married women. 
However there are also reasons why cohabiting women may act like married 
women in terms of their labor supply decisions. For instance, because they have a partner 
living in the home they are able to take advantage of economies of scale akin to married 
couples, reducing the per-person cost of living. It is also unreasonable to assume that 




income is positive and substantial and they contribute to the cost of maintaining the 
household, cohabiting women may want to reduce the number of hours worked in 
exchange for leisure or time spent taking care of children or the household, as married 
women continue to do. And if they believe that they are in a committed relationship and 
expect that the relationship will not dissolve, they may act more like married women 
when it comes to the impact of their partner’s current and future income and benefits on 
their own labor supply decisions. If this is the case then their labor supply decisions may 
resemble married women and their partner’s income will influence their choices 
regarding household specialization, especially after the birth of a child. It is at this time, 
when the demand at home are greater, than women are more likely to engage in 
household specialization and take time off from work. 
Therefore, theoretically there are many reasons why cohabiting women, and new 
mothers in particular, will be different than both married women and single women when 
it comes to their labor force participation decisions after the birth of a child. However 
until now the existing research on maternity leave has ignored this and has typically 
grouped them together with “single mothers.”35 The goal of this research is to further our 
understanding of cohabiting couples by studying the labor force participation decisions of 
cohabiting mothers after the birth of a child. 
For women, the point at which they are most likely to drop out of the workforce 
or decrease the number of hours worked is after the birth of a child. The physical and 
psychological effects of giving birth and taking care of an infant make it so that most 







labor force. Each woman has to decide (1) how long she wants to remain home and (2) if 
she wants to return to her pre-birth job after that time. A model of these decisions put 
forth by Klerman and Leibowitz (1997) argues that these decisions are determined by a 
woman’s preferences of work and leisure (time home with her new infant), her wage at 
her pre-birth job, her other employment opportunities and her employer’s leave policies. 
The model is shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5: Standard model of a mother’s decision to return to work 
 
The “reservation wage” represents the wage at which the worker is willing to go 
back to work after the birth of a child. It is downward sloping because it is assumed that 
unpaid labor is more valuable when the child is younger, but it declines slowly as the 
child gets older and market care becomes a more comparable substitute. The point at 
which the reservation wage equals the wage at her pre-birth job is the point when she will 
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return to work, when the child is 10 weeks old in the case above. However that is only the 
case if her employer offers at least 10 weeks of maternity leave. If her employer does not 
offer 10 weeks of maternity leave she must decide if she wants to quit her job to stay 
home longer or return to work before she would like. However if she chooses to quit her 
job she looses any wage increases she received at her previous job due to firm-specific 
human capital and therefore must accept a lower wage once she does return to work. 
If cohabiting households make labor supply decisions differently relative to their 
married counterparts, then perhaps this can be reflected in the model above. Since 
cohabiting relationships are less stable than marriages, mothers may have less access to 
their partner’s economic resources, and they have no legal rights to their partner’s current 
or future income, cohabiting new mothers may be less likely to invest in the 
relationship.36 This investment may include time spent out of the workforce caring for 
children or any financial resources used during unpaid leave. They also may be less 
willing to quit their pre-birth job in order to stay at home for as long as they would like. 
This can be shown in the model with a shift of the “reservation wage” to the left, as 
shown in Figure 6. This would mean that after the birth of a child, compared to married 
women, women in cohabiting relationships (1) will return to work earlier (for both their 
pre-birth job or a new place of employment) and (2) they may be less likely to quit their 















Figure 6: Model of a Mother’s decision to return to work including different reservation 
wages depending on marital status 
Previous Literature 
 
Income organization and spending habits are important aspects of family life. 
How income is made and distributed among family members is an important aspect of the 
economics of the household. Not only is it central in determining the material wellbeing 
of the members of the household, but it has also been linked to power and inequality 
between family members (Pahl, 1995; Kenney, 2006). For the purpose of this research, 
how cohabiting households make decisions regarding their income can lend insight as to 
how they are different than (or similar to) married couples. 
Using data from the 1994 Family and Changing Gender Roles II module of the 
International Social Survey Program, Heimdal and Houseknecht found that cohabiting 
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couples are more likely to keep their money separate than their married counterparts 
(2003). Catherine Kenney had similar findings using the Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing data (2006). Her analysis showed that family structure is significantly 
correlated with money management and control, even after controlling for income, race 
and ethnicity, and relative household contributions. She found that cohabiting couples, 
especially those without children, are significantly more likely than their married 
counterparts to choose to manage their money separately. However she also finds that the 
presence of children increases the likelihood of cohabiting households using a women-
controlled separate management system, where the couple pools some portion of their 
income for household use, which is then controlled by the women in the relationship. A 
1997 study by Anne E. Winkler found similar patterns using 1993 CPS data and a female 
labor supply model. Winkler also used the data from the 1987 National Survey of 
Families and Households to show that the income pooling of cohabiting couples depends 
on various couple characteristics. For instance the couple having a biological child 
increases the likelihood of income pooling, as well as the length of the relationship.  
The fact that cohabiting couples are less likely to pool income may mean that they 
have less access to each other’s economic resources. This may be an indication that these 
couples are engaging in less specialization, meaning less investment in the relationship 
relative to their married counterparts. The implication for labor supply may be that after 
the birth of a child, cohabiting mothers may be less likely to exit the labor force or may 
take shorter leaves. However Winkler’s findings that those that have biological children 
together are more likely to pool their income relative to those who do not may indicate 




may mean that the labor supply of new cohabiting mothers may not look much different 
than married new mothers. 
Existing studies on how cohabiting couples spend their money usually focus on 
spending on children and associated child wellbeing. Motivated by previous research that 
found that children living in households maintained by cohabiting couples tend to have 
worse outcomes than those living with married couples, DeLeire and Kalil use Consumer 
Expenditure Survey data to examine differences in spending habits between married and 
heterosexual cohabiting couples (2005). They find that compared to married couples, 
cohabiting couples are more likely to spend more on alcohol and tobacco and less on 
health care and education for their children. A 2008 study by Treas & Ruijter found that 
there was no difference between married and cohabiting couples when it came to the 
amount spent on the market substitutes for both male and female household tasks. 
However for married couples, the husband’s earnings had more of an influence on the 
spending on the market substitutes for “female tasks” than the influence of a cohabiting 
male partner. The authors say that this would indicate that cohabiting men are less willing 
to use their own personal income to decrease the housework burden for their partner.  
Using a modified precautionary savings model, Katarina Nordblom illustrates 
how savings and income sharing would likely be different in cohabiting couples due to 
differences in risk sharing between the two types of households. When future income is 
uncertain, both types of unions offer a kind of income insurance through mutual risk 
sharing. However formal marriage in a state with a common-property rule forces the 
couple to always share total income equally. This theoretically induces an efficient level 




common-property rule, risk sharing is totally voluntary and not enforced by the state and 
is fully dependent on the altruistic feelings between the two. This leads to an inefficient 
level of under-saving in cohabiting households because each partner will strategically 
under-save in the first time period in order to take advantage of their partner’s altruism 
and possible get a larger transfer in the second time period (Nordblom, 2004). She also 
acknowledges that while her model does not incorporate it, the behavior of cohabiting 
couples is also likely to be affected by the higher level of uncertainty due to a higher 
level of relationship dissolution compared to married couples. The higher risk of 
relationship dissolution not only makes future income even more uncertain for cohabiting 
individuals, but it also may make the decision making process different in these 
households (ex. labor force participation and the probability of traditional separate 
spheres specialization). 
Using data on from the Czech Republic, Dana Hamplova tests the hypothesis that 
financial transfers between cohabiting couples are different than between married couples 
because cohabitation represents a less stable bond and the investments into the 
partnerships are not legally protected (Hamplova, 2002). Hamplova argues that “since 
cohabitation provides less legal security and less of a possibility to enforce the contract it 
can be expected that the partners will be less willing to invest in the relationship” (785). 
She concluded that because of this, cohabiting households should be more egalitarian, 
since cohabiting individuals would be less likely to specialize in roles that would not be 
beneficial on the labor market. While she found that cohabiting couples in her data were 
not more egalitarian when compared to married couples, they did tend to depart from the 




relative to the married couples in her sample. 
The findings of the existing research on cohabitation and income suggest that 
couples whom cohabitate share and mange their resources differently than married 
couples. However it should be mentioned that limitations in the data have largely 
prevented researchers from understanding if these differences are caused by cohabitation, 
or are largely caused by inherent unobserved differences in the characteristics between 
those who choose to cohabitate and those who do not. For the purpose of this research, 
existing studies have had mixed results when it comes to the presence of children in 
cohabiting households. The research above would indicate that the economic lives of 
cohabiting households are different from those headed by married couples. They are less 
likely to pool their money and their spending and savings habits are different. However 
there is also some indication that, for at least some cohabiting couples, there are times 
when they act more like their married counterparts. For instance when there is a shared 
biological child present, cohabiting couples are more likely to pool their income. This 
would indicated that cohabiting couples are in a category of their own when it comes to 
the economics of a household. In terms of a mother’s labor supply decisions after the 
birth of a baby, this may mean that they may act like married women or they may act 
more like single women. This research extends our knowledge of the labor supply 
behavior of new cohabiting mothers. 
There have been long-standing and consistent findings that show significant 
differences between the labor market outcomes of married and single individuals. For 
instance married men enjoy an income premium when compared to single men even 




(Cohen, 2002). And historically, married women have been less attached to the labor 
market than unmarried women, although the difference has been decreasing over the past 
few decades (Cohen & Bianchi, 1999). In light of the recent increases in cohabitation, the 
question therefore becomes, do cohabiting and married couples have similar labor market 
outcomes? Or are cohabiting individuals treated like and behave similar to single 
individuals in the labor market? 
Using a multivariate analysis on women with young children (under 6), Abroms 
and Goldscheider found that cohabiting mothers worked 3 more hours per week than 
married mothers (2002). They also found that there was a positive relationship between 
partner’s work hours in a cohabiting relationship, but for married couples there was a 
negative relationship between the husband’s work hours and the mother’s. The authors 
argue that husbands appear to act as a provider in the household, supplying married 
mothers with long-term economic security, allowing them to decrease their working 
hours when young children are present at home. It is also an indication that married 
mothers with young children are able and willing to engage in more household 
specialization as their partner’s income increases. However this does not seem to be the 
case for cohabiting mothers, and the authors argue that it may be the case that they “do 
not enjoy a sense of long-term security in their living situation and work harder, as a 
result” (Abroms & Goldscheider, 2002). This is an indication that the lack of long-term 
security in their living situation may make cohabiting women less willing or able to 
engage in the kind of household specialization that married women do when they have 
young children at home. 




men has declined over time, Cohen uses Current Population Survey data to estimate the 
marriage premium taking into account the recent trend in cohabitation (2002). He finds 
that the estimation of the marriage premium for men over time is significantly affected by 
the way men who cohabitate are treated in the analysis. If cohabiting men are included in 
the “never married” category, the marriage premium is reduced. Therefore the decline in 
the marriage premium since the 1970s has been overstated due to the growing 
populations of unmarried cohabiting men included in the “never married” reference 
group (Cohen, 2002). This would suggest that while cohabiting men may not earn a wage 
premium on par with married men, they should not be treated the same as single men and 
there may in fact be some wage benefits for cohabiting men. 
Research on how cohabiting couples share the responsibilities of housework has 
been mixed. Most have found that both married and cohabiting women spend more time 
doing housework than their male counterparts, but women in cohabiting relationships do 
less housework than married women (Blair & Lichter, 1991; Shelton & John, 1993; 
South & Spitze, 1994). Others have found that men decrease the amount of time spent on 
housework when they enter either a cohabitation or marriage and women increase their 
time under the same circumstances, however the transition from cohabitation to marriage 
does not significantly change the amount time spent on housework done by either men or 
women (Gupta, 1999). Other studies have found that pre-marital cohabitation is 
associated with a greater level of equality in housework within marriage, suggesting that 
cohabiting may change the expectations former cohabiters bring to any subsequent 
marriages (Batalova & Cohen, 2002). 




changing rapidly, US family law has been slow to catch up. Rather than change the 
definition of family to be more inclusive of who can benefit from legislation supporting 
families, the US government has focused on ways to promote marriage in an effort to 
slow or reverse the trend of children being born out of marriage. Such policies include 
long-term welfare eligibility restrictions for unmarried mothers and strict parental child 
support laws and enforcement (Lundberg & Pollak, 2007). And while such policies have 
been shown to have only modest effects on marriage rates, they no doubt can have a 
significant economic impact on some families headed by cohabiting couples, especially 
those with children and with lower incomes. 
While most western nations are experiencing the dramatic increase in the number 
of cohabiting couples, the US is unique in that it has significantly lagged behind other 
developed countries in adapting its family and social policy to this demographic trend. 
While most developed countries provide job-protected paid maternity leave, the women 
in the US must rely on either their employer’s policy or the Family Medical Leave Act 
(which is unpaid and only applies under certain conditions). And if their employer does 
not offer paid leave, they must rely on their own savings or their partner’s income during 
any leave. Given the fact that the existing literature would suggest that the economics of 
the household differ between married and cohabiting couples, the fact that there is no 
federal paid leave law may impact these households in different ways, and therefore lead 
to different labor supply decisions after the birth of a child.  
The existing literature would suggest that cohabiting women have less access to 
their partners’ incomes and they are less able and willing to engage in specialization. This 




the birth of a child and may take shorter maternity leaves. This chapter tests this 
hypothesis by looking at the labor supply differences between cohabiting and married 
mothers with infants. If it is the case that cohabiting women take less time off after the 
birth of a child, this it would also suggest that a paid family leave law, like California’s 
Paid Family Leave program, may be especially helpful for these women, since access to 
their partner’s income during leave becomes less important when the leave is paid.   
It is also the case that having a better understanding of cohabiting couples could 
have important implications for research. In most studies on the family, cohabiting 
women are included in the “single” category. However if it is the case that changes in 
marriage and cohabitation patterns as well as social norms are causing cohabiting women 
to behave more like their married counterparts, treating them as single women in data 
analysis could distort any research findings, much like Cohen’s 2002 study of distorted 
findings of declining married premium. Therefore studying the behavior of an ever-
increasing group of individuals is not only interesting in its own right and crucial for the 
implementation of family policy, it is also important to future research on the economics 
of the family. 
Data & Methodology 
 
I use two sets of data, both of which have their own strengths and weaknesses 
when it comes to analyzing female labor supply after the birth of a child. The first data 
set I use is the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97). The NLSY97 is a 
panel data set that follows a representative cohort of 9,000 individuals who were between 




The NLSY97 is an appropriate dataset to use when it comes to female labor supply after 
the birth of a child because it contains a complete record of weekly work history 
information. It also asks several questions surrounding the reason for any gaps in 
employment, such as maternity leave status as well as any job searching activities.  This 
work history information, combined with the detailed information on household and 
family demographics, provide for a very rich set of information regarding timing, length, 
and reason for any career interruptions. This dataset is used to look at differences in the 
length of maternity leave and the timing of mothers return to work between married, 
cohabiting and single mothers. 
Since the primary focus of this chapter is looking at the return to work after any 
leave taken after the birth of a child, I estimate a series of models for the number of 
weeks that a woman began or resumed working after giving birth. In order to do this I 
constructed a dataset where each birth in the NLSY97 represents one observation, which 
was then linked to the mother’s work, marriage and cohabitation history, as well as a set 
of demographic variables.37 First I determined what her relationship status was at the time 
of birth, and that is how I categorized women into married, cohabiting, and single, since 
relationship status at the time of birth is more relevant than her relationship status at the 
time she was surveyed. I then created employment histories spanning the year before and 
after the birth. These work histories were created using three variables in the NLSY files: 
(1) a question asking the exact date for both the start and end of any paid pregnancy 









the employment status of the mother during each week of every year. Using these three 
variables, along with the child’s birth month, I was able to calculate whether a mother 
was attached to the labor force before the birth of a child and how many weeks off, if 
any, she took after. All women were included in the dataset, and were considered 
employed if they reported working during the month before birth. The statistics for the 
different groups of women separated by their attachment to the labor force are presented 
in Table 22 below.  
Table 22: Number of births in NLSY97 by relationship status and work history, 2000 - 
2011 
 
All Births Married Births 
Cohabiting 
Births Single Births 
 
N % N % N % N % 
1) All Births 3,970 100 1,606 100 1,067 100 1,297 100 
2) Employed in the month 
before birth 2,087 52.57 947 58.97 548 51.36 592 45.64 
3) Continuously employed 
6 months before birth 1,554 39.14 741 46.14 406 38.05 407 31.38 
4) Reported some work in 
6 months before birth 2,371 59.72 1,041 64.82 643 60.26 687 52.97 
 
I use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the rate at which mothers return 
to work during the first year after the birth of a child. The model is specified as follows: 
h(t;X) = h0(t) exp(x'b)   (Equation 4.1) 
where h(t;X) is the hazard at time t, h0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t, X the matrix of 
covariates, and b is the vector of parameters to be estimated. For all groups of women I 











The Cox proportional hazard model has been widely used to estimate women’s 
return to work post-birth because of the advantage that the distribution of the hazard need 
not be specified (Gustafsson et al, 1996; Hofferth, 1996; Ondrich et al., 1996; Berger & 
Waldfogel, 2004). I test separate models on different groups of mothers depending on 
their relationship status in the month of the child’s birth, as well as labor force attachment 
before birth. Since I only follow the women one year after the birth, mothers that have 
not returned to work 52 weeks after the birth are right censored. 
Each model includes several predictor variables in the covariate matrix (X). Since 
I am primarily interested in how relationship status impacts the timing of a woman’s 
return to work after birth, the main model includes two dummy variables, one 
representing a mother’s cohabitation at birth and the second representing a mother being 
single at birth (with mothers that were married at the time of birth being the reference 
group). All models include a group of maternal/family variables including dummy 
variables to control for race and ethnicity (controls for being African-American or 
Hispanic, with the reference category being non-Hispanic white or other), mother’s 
education and years of work experience (calculated using weekly work arrays since 
1980), mother’s age, the child’s parity (birth order), region of residence and household 
size. Since I am also interested in if their partner’s income affects their decision of when 













may influence the length of leave, a dummy variable for responded having any paid leave 
is also be included in all model specifications to control for this behavior.40 
One issue with using the NLSY97 to study maternity leave is that while the 
sample is representative of that cohort, it is not representative of births in the United 
States. The women in this sample are younger than the population of childbearing women 
in the US, and therefore their employment behavior may differ from US mothers as a 
whole.41 Consequently a second dataset is used to study the behavior of a nationally 
representative group of mothers. To do that I use the March Current Population Survey 
Annual Demographic Supplement (CPS), accessed through the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS) and will use the years 1995-2014.42 When weighted, the data 
is a nationally representative sample that provides extensive information regarding 
absences from work, as well as other labor market outcomes including weeks and usual 
hours worked in the previous year as well as income. It also provides extensive 
information regarding the respondent’s demographics such as age, state of residence, race 
and level of education. This dataset has also been extensively used to study mothers’ 
employment behavior. 
While this data has been used to study mothers’ employment behavior, there are 
















the child’s birthdate, or the exact timing of leave or exact length. Therefore, for this 
analysis I look at mothers with infants (age<1) and analyze two types of data provided; 
(1) whether the respondent was absent from work during the previous week for family 
reasons and (2) various measures of labor supply in the last year such as weeks and hours 
worked.  
The first dependent variable is a combination of two variables, the first being a 
question asking the respondent if they were absent from work the previous week. The 
second variable is a question that asks the respondent to provide a reason for the absence. 
For the purpose of this chapter I look at those mothers with infants that were absent from 
work due to (1) maternity leave, but also (2) vacation and personal days (3) own 
illness/medical problem (4) childcare problems (5) other family obligations and (6) 
other43. Therefore the dependent variable for the first CPS model is a dummy variable 
that is 1 if the mother was on leave for any of these reasons and a 0 if not. I then estimate 
the following econometric model: 
Yi = b0 + b1Ci + b2Si + b3Xi + ei        (Equation 4.2) 
Where for each individual i, C represents a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the 
respondent is currently cohabitating, S represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
responded reported being single, and Xi is a vector of control variables. 
Since my independent variable is dichotomous, the first model for the CPS 
analysis is a logit model looking at the likelihood of mothers with infants being on  leave 
for family reasons. These models include control variables for the mother’s age, race, 







work experience, as well as dummies for the year and state of residence. Mothers are then 
separated by their relationship status and these models include their partner’s income to 
see if the likelihood of being absent from work is different for cohabiting women relative 
to married women, and if their partner’s income effects the decision in different ways.44 
One of the advantages of using CPS data is that the mother’s state of residence is 
provided. Therefore it is possible to analyze whether having access to California’s Paid 
Family Leave program had an impact on the labor supply of mother’s with infants. 
Therefore in some model specifications a CAPFL policy variable is included which is 1 
for mothers in California after 2004 and 0 otherwise. By including this policy variable in 
the separate models based on relationship status, we can better understand how CAPFL 
impacted these groups of women differently. 
It may also be the case that relationship status may not only affect the timing of a 
mother’s return to work, but it may also affect her labor supply once back at work. 
Therefore the second set of dependent variables measure the respondent’s labor supply in 
the last year and include the number of hours worked in the previous week for all mothers 
with infants, the number of weeks worked last year and the usual number of hours 
worked per week she worked last year. Most regressions in this analysis use a Heckman 
Two-Step procedure, which consists of a probit model for labor force participation 
followed by a linear hours worked equation, corrected for sample selection. The linear 











worked between various subgroups of women. The following is a traditional labor supply 
function with the two dummy variables of interest (Cohabiting and Single) included: 
hi = b0  + b1lnWi + b2Ci + b3Si +  b4Xi + ei  (Equation 4.3) 
Where for each individual i, h is hours worked, W is the respondent’s hourly wage rate, C 
is a dummy variable representing cohabitation, S is a dummy variable representing being 
single and X is a vector of control variables.  
However in this analysis, since the effect of spouse/partner’s income on a 
woman’s labor supply is of particular interest, we must include this information. 
Therefore, the following model will be used to estimate female labor supply for married 
and cohabiting women separately: 
hi = b0 + b1lnWi+ b2PIi + b3Xi + ei   (Equation 4.4) 
In this equation PIi equals individual i’s partner’s income and X is a vector of control 
variables, which are the same as in the previous models45. 
There are 42,324 mothers with infants (children younger than 1) in the March 
CPS between the years 1995 and 2014, and 22,346 (53%) of the respondents were 
employed at the time of the survey. The vast majority of the respondents were married 
(77%), while 18% were single and 5% were cohabiting. The means of the variables of 












Table 23: Means of variables of interest for mothers with infants in March CPS data by 
relationship status, 1995-2015 
Variable All Married Cohabiting Single 
Observations 42,324 32,659 2,181 7,484 
Percentage of Data 100 77.16 5.15 17.68 
Human Capital     
Less than HS 0.1442917 0.1077498 0.2315452 0.2783271 
HS Degree 0.2613883 0.2276555 0.3489225 0.3830839 
Some College 0.1861355 0.1740408 0.2375057 0.2239444 
Two year degree 0.0926661 0.101779 0.0793214 0.0567878 
Bachelors Degree 0.2181032 0.2670014 0.0811554 0.0446285 
Master’s Degree 0.0744967 0.0932668 0.0165062 0.0094869 
Professional Degree 0.0229184 0.0285067 0.0050436 0.0037413 
Years of Potential 
Experience 0.0229184 9.889525 7.256763 6.755211 
Race      
White 0.8244022 0.8719802 0.8092618 0.6211919 
Black 0.097746 0.0500628 0.1127923 0.3014431 
Other 0.0778518 0.0779571 0.0779459 0.077365 
Ethnicity     
Hispanic 0.2020367 0.1879421 0.2324622 0.2546766 
Region & Metro Area     
Lives in Metro Area 0.7899773 0.7936557 0.7482806 0.786077 
Northeast 0.1826151 0.1863192 0.1930307 0.1634153 
Midwest 0.2415178 0.2425365 0.2677671 0.2294228 
South 0.2986485 0.2855262 0.265016 0.3657135 
West 0.2772186 0.2856181 0.2741862 0.2414484 
Child Birth Order     
Parity 2.081065 2.11568 1.930766 1.973811 
Employment Variables     
Employed 0.5279747 0.5415046 0.5171939 0.4720738 
Weeks Worked Last Year 40.13438 41.09491 38.53822 36.22302 
Hours Worked Last Week 14.72075 14.9406 14.64099 13.78461 
Usual Hours Worked Last 
Year 35.08658 35.2143 35.41401 34.38786 
Absent From Work Last 
Week 0.0798129 0.0865918 0.0724438 0.0523784 
Absent Due to Family 
Reasons 0.0793167 0.0861325 0.0719853 0.0517103 
Leave was Paid 0.0359607 0.0415506 0.0261348 0.0144308 
CAPFL Eligible 0.0484831 0.0486849 0.0623567 0.0435596 
Hourly Wage 23.25189 24.82524 18.49741 17.55325 
Partner Characteristics     




It can be seen that there are a number of differences between married and 
cohabiting couples in this dataset. The married women with infants in this dataset are 
more likely to be white, tend to be more educated, have higher wages, and are slightly 
more likely to be employed relative to cohabiting mothers. It is also the case that their 
spouses have significantly higher incomes relative to the partners of cohabiting mothers. 
Cohabiting mothers are also slightly less likely to be absent from work last week due to 
family obligations relative to married mothers. This paper seeks to understand if any of 
these differences, particularly the differences in partner’s income, leads to any 
differences in their labor supply decisions.	
Empirical Findings 
I first used the NLSY97 data to analyze the survival rates of mothers on leave 
after the birth of a child. Figure 7 below shows the Kaplan-Meier survivor function 
estimates of the proportion of women remaining home after birth. These survival rates are 
similar to those found in previous studies using different datasets (Berger & Waldfogel, 
2004). For all women, relationship status does not seem to effect survival rates, and a log-





Figure 7: Kaplan-Meier survivor function by relationship status for all women 
 
Since previous studies have shown that the primary determinant of how quickly a 
mother returns to work is her attachment to the labor force, below I show the survivor 
functions for only mothers who were employed before giving birth. This eliminates some 
of the selections bias we may see between mothers with different labor force attachment 
status. Figure 8 shows the survivor functions that reported some employment in the 
month before giving birth. As expected these survivor functions look different from the 
ones reported above of the entire sample, since women that are working before birth 
return to work more quickly that those who are not. It can also be seen that there appears 
to be significant differences based on relationship status, with single women much more 
likely to return to work within the first few weeks after giving birth. But again, a log-rank 



















Figure 8: Kaplan-Meier survivor function by relationship status for women employed in 
the month before birth 
 
However Figure 8 shows that while there seems to be no significant differences 
between women based on their relationship status when it comes to the risk of returning 
within the first year of birth, there seems to be differences in the patterns of returning to 
work, especially within the first 12 weeks. And in fact a log-rank test among those who 
returned within the first three months after birth indicate that there are statistically 
significant differences between married and single women, with single women much 
more likely to return to work quicker within the first three months after the birth of a 
child compared to their married counterparts. There were no statistically significant 
differences between married and cohabiting mothers or cohabiting and single mothers. 
Figure 9 below shows the survivor function for women who returned to work within the 


















return to work within the first few weeks. And the long-rank tests as well as the survivor 
function for cohabiting mothers indicates that their behavior is similar to married women 
during the first few weeks, but then they start to return to work at a quicker pace. This 
may indicated that cohabiting women are somewhere between married and single women 
when it comes to their leave behavior. 
 
Figure 9: Kaplan-Meier survivor function by relationship status for women employed in 
the month before birth and return to work within 12 weeks 
 
However considering the mean characteristics of women who are married are 
different from those who are not, we must control for these when understanding if 
relationship status effects the labor supply decisions of mothers. Therefore, in order to 
estimate the link between the differences between married and cohabiting mothers (such 
as a partner’s income) and how they may impact their leave-taking behavior, I estimate a 


















Model 1 includes all of the human capital, demographic and family controls that 
are normally included in maternity leave analysis and measures the risk of returning to 
work within the first year after the birth of a child. It can be seen that when we include all 
of the control variables, being both single and in a cohabiting relationship increases the 
odds of retuning to work within the first year, relative to married mothers. Cohabiting 
women are 23% more likely to return to work during the year after the birth of a child, 
and single mothers are 27% more likely to return to work. However once pre-birth 
employment status is controlled for (Model 2), there are no longer significant differences 
between married and cohabiting or single women when it comes to their risk of returning 
to work within a year of their child’s birth.  
Table 24: Risk of returning to work in the year after birth for all mothers by employment 





Employed in Month Before Birth 
 
Hazard Coefficient Hazard Coefficient 
Cohabiting 1.232*** 0.209*** 1.062 0.0604 
 
(0.0615) (0.0499) (0.0644) (0.0606) 
Single 1.269*** 0.238*** 1.106 0.101 
 
(0.0676) (0.0533) (0.0721) (0.0652) 
Own Income 1.000*** 1.04e-05*** 1.000* 4.14e-06* 
 
(1.87e-06) (1.87e-06) (2.14e-06) (2.14e-06) 
Observations 3,953 3,953 2,078 2,078 
Log Likelihood -22143.315 -22143.315 -13207.309 -13207.309 
Chi-Square(df) 819.57 (28) 819.57 (28) 95.93 (28) 95.93 (28) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital variables shown in 
Table 52 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown include region as well as year dummy 
variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
Table 25 presents a Cox proportional hazard models run separately by 
relationship status for all mothers. The results look at the determinants of the risk of 




cohabiting mothers. This shows that for both married and cohabiting women, an increase 
in their partner’s income decreases the likelihood of the mother returning to work within 
the first year of their child’s life, however for cohabiting women the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant.  
Table 25: Risk of returning to work in the year after birth for all mothers, by relationship 







Hazard Coefficient Hazard Coefficient 
Partner Income 1.000*** -7.42e-06*** 1.000 -5.04e-06 
 (1.87e-06) (1.87e-06) (3.89e-06) (3.89e-06) 
Own Income 1.000*** 1.42e-05*** 1.000** 1.31e-05** 
 
(2.97e-06) (2.97e-06) (6.30e-06) (6.30e-06) 
Observations 1,130 1,130 469 469 
Log Likelihood -5383.1279 -5383.1279 -1908.4098 -1908.4098 
Chi-Square(df) 263.42(27) 263.42(27) 121.62(27) 121.62(27) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital variables shown in 
Table 53 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown include region as well as year dummy 
variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
Table 26 looks at the same models for women employed before the birth. Again, 
for married women their partners’ income reduces their risk of returning to work within 
the first year of their child’s life and the coefficient is statistically significant. However 
for working cohabiting mothers the coefficient is positive and insignificant. This is an 
interesting result considering the results of Abroms and Goldscheider 2002 study on the 
labor supply of mothers with young children. They found that the partner’s incomes had 
opposite effects on the labor supply of married and cohabiting women, with married 
mothers decreasing their working hours as their partner’s incomes increased and 
cohabiting women increasing their hours worked. The results shown here would be 
consistent with their findings, however the coefficients are statistically insignificant for 




Table 26: Risk of returning to work in the year after birth for employed mothers, by 







Hazard Coefficient Hazard Coefficient 
Partner Income 1.000* -3.42e-06* 1.000 6.77e-06 
 (2.03e-06) (2.03e-06) (6.40e-06) (6.40e-06) 
Own Income 1.000 3.97e-06 1.000 2.61e-06 
 
(3.44e-06) (3.44e-06) (7.83e-06) (7.83e-06) 
Observations 709 709 264 264 
Log Likelihood -3787.5704 -3787.5704 -1165.5346 -1165.5346 
Chi-Square(df) 48.98(27) 48.98(27) 35.59(27) 35.59(27) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital variables shown 
in Table 54 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown include region as well as year 
dummy variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * 
(p<0.1). 
 
I next examine whether cohabiting women who return to work within the first 
year of birth consider their partner’s income when deciding the length of any leave. Table 
27 below shows the OLS results of predicting the length of leave after the birth of a child 
among all women who return to work within a year. Model 1 looks at all women 
regardless of their pre-birth employment status. Among the entire sample there is a 
statistically significant difference between married women and unmarried women when it 
comes to length of leave. The results show that both cohabiting and single women return 
to work about a week before their married counterparts. For those women who returned 
to work within a year, the mean length of leave was 13 weeks, therefore this represents an 
8.5% decrease in the length of leave for cohabiting and single women. However in Model 
2, which only looks at those that were employed in the month prior to giving birth, these 





Table 27: OLS results predicting length of leave after the birth of a child among women 






Cohabiting -1.138* -0.0867 
 
(0.598) (0.587) 
Single -1.120* -0.496 
 
(0.626) (0.627) 
Own Income -0.000108*** -4.00e-05* 
 
(2.38e-05) (2.12e-05) 
Constant 6.174* -1.690 
 (3.738) (3.883) 
Observations 2,911 1,928 
R-squared 0.093 0.072 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital 
variables shown in Table 55 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown 
include region as well as year dummy variables. Statistically significant results 
denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1).). 
 
Table 28 shows the results from the OLS regressions predicting a women’s length 
of leave among women who return to work within a year, broken down by relationship 
and pre-birth employment status. For both the entire sample and for those women 
employed in the month before birth, a husband’s income increases the length of leave and 
a non-married partner decreases it. This is again consistent with Abroms and 
Goldscheider’s findings that cohabiting partner’s incomes had opposite effects on the 
labor supply relative to married women. While married women are willing and able to 
increase their length of leave as their husband’s income increase, cohabiting women 
actually take less leave as their partner’s income increases. However the coefficients are 






Table 28: OLS results predicting length of leave after the birth of a child among women 









Partner Income 2.55e-05 -3.66e-05 1.03e-05 -5.74e-05 
 (1.97e-05) (5.60e-05) (1.74e-05) (5.32e-05) 
Own Income -0.000121*** -0.000151* -3.31e-05 -5.48e-05 
 (3.51e-05) (8.28e-05) (3.15e-05) (7.80e-05) 
Had Paid Leave 0.354 0.792 2.129*** 2.645* 
 (0.936) (1.764) (0.802) (1.564) 
Constant 0.0663 -8.804 -9.824 -7.342 
 (7.011) (11.03) (7.212) (11.43) 
Observations 854 350 660 245 
R-squared 0.134 0.165 0.109 0.153 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital variables shown in 
Table 56 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown include region as well as year dummy 
variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
Finally, since there seems to be consistent differences between those that are 
employed before birth and those that are not, I look at the likelihood that a woman is 
employed before birth based on relationship status and her partner’s income. The results 
are presented below in Table 29. The logit regression results indicate that both single and 
cohabiting mothers are much more likely to be employed in the month before birth 
(Model 1). Cohabiting women are 30% more likely to be employed in the month before 
birth compared to married women, while single women are over 40% more likely to be 
employed. 
When the regressions are broken down by relationship status we can see that for 
both married women and cohabiting women an increase in their partners’ income reduces 
the likelihood of employment in the month before birth. This result is interesting, given 
the results obtained in the other models in this chapter that would suggest that cohabiting 
women do not consider their partner’s income when making decisions about maternity 
leave. It may be that cohabiting women factor in their partner’s income when making 




for those that do remain employed their partner’s income becomes less relevant in their 
labor supply decisions.  
Table 29: Logit regression predicting a mother being employed in the mother before birth 
(Odds Ratios presented) 
 
I next turn to the March CPS data to analyze leave among a more representative 
sample of women. The logit results presented below in Table 30 show that for this data 
set, relative to married mothers with infants, single women are less likely to say they 
were absent from work last week for family reasons, with their odds of being absent 27% 
lower relative to married women. The odds of cohabiting women being absent from work 
due to family reasons are 11% less than married women, however this difference is not 












Cohabiting 1.324***   
 
(0.1359)   
Single 1.4772***   
 
(0.1565)   
Partner Income  .999986*** .9999829** 
  (4.17E-06) 8.48E-06 
Own Income 1.0001*** 1.0001*** 1.0001*** 
 
(-5.48E-06) (9.59E-06) 0.0000172 
Observations 3953 1130 469 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital 
variables shown in Table 57 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown 
include region as well as year dummy variables. Statistically significant results 




Table 30: Logit results for the probability of being on leave for family reasons for all 
employed mothers 
 
All Employed Mothers 
 
Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Cohabiting -0.117 0.890 
 
(0.0829) (0.0738) 
Single -0.312*** 0.732*** 
 
(0.0867) (0.0634) 
Wage 0.000579 1.001 
 
(0.000995) (0.000995) 
CAPFL 0.209*** 1.233*** 
 
(0.0394) (0.0486) 
Constant -1.916*** 0.147*** 
 (0.151) (0.0222) 
Observations 21,419 21,419 
R-squared 0.0183  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital 
variables shown in Table 58 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown 
include region as well as year and state dummy variables. Statistically significant results 
denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
Table 31 presents the results from logit regressions done separately for married 
and cohabiting women with the respondent’s partner’s income included. It shows that an 
increase in their spouses income causes a slight increase in the likelihood that married 
mothers would be absent from work, and is statistically significant. However for 
cohabiting women the coefficient on their partner’s income is negative and insignificant, 
indicating that as their partner earns more they are less likely to be absent from work due 
to family reasons. This is further evidence that as a group, cohabiting mothers do not 
consider their partner’s income in the same way as married mothers do. While married 
mothers with infants are more likely to be absent from work as their husband’s income 
increases, cohabiting mothers behave in the exact opposite manner by being less likely to 





Table 31: Logit results for the probability of being on leave for family reasons for all 
employed mothers by relationship status 
 
(1) 
Employed Married Mothers 
(2) 
Employed Cohabiting Mothers 
 
Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Wage -0.000115 1.000 0.00435 1.004 
 
(0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00930) (0.00934) 
Partner Inc. 2.08e-06*** 1.000*** -3.18e-06 1.000 
 
(2.87e-07) (2.87e-07) (2.73e-06) (2.73e-06) 
CAPFL 0.0310 1.031 1.291*** 3.635*** 
 
(0.0437) (0.0451) (0.268) (0.975) 
Constant -2.072*** 0.126*** -1.461** 0.232** 
 (0.194) (0.0244) (0.707) (0.164) 
Observations 16,592 16,592 1,035 1,035 
R-squared 0.0181  0.1152  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital 
variables shown in Table 59 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown 
include region as well as year and state dummy variables. Statistically significant results 
denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
Table 32 below presents the results for the Heckman Two-Sept regressions 
predicating the hours worked last week for mothers with infants. Model 1 includes all 
women and shows that both single and cohabiting mothers with infants worked roughly 
2.5 more hours than married women with infants in the week before the survey. And 
again, for married mothers who are employed their partner’s income makes a significant 
difference in their labor market supply. When their partner’s income increases, married 
mothers reduce the number of hours they reported working in the last week. For 
cohabiting women, the relationship is negative but also insignificant, indicating that their 





Table 32: Heckman Two-Step regression results predicting hours worked last week for 










Cohabiting 2.636***    
 
(0.899)    
Single 2.473***    
 
(0.604)    
Wage -0.0401*** -0.0322*** 0.00402 -0.0310* 
 
(0.00600) (0.00677) (0.0300) (0.0160) 
Partner Inc.  -1.81e-05*** -1.35e-05  
 
 (2.37e-06) (1.97e-05)  
Constant 3.794758 12.06** 9.392 27.95** 
 (5.961576) (5.906) (19.79) (12.96) 
Observations 41397 31566 2129 7,215 
Wald Chi2(df) 369.83(84) 438.7(83) 102.5(83)  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital variables shown 
in Table 60 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown include region as well as year and 
state dummy variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * 
(p<0.1). 
 
The same analysis was done for the usual number of hours the mothers with 
infants reported working each week during the last year and similar results were observed 
and presented in Table 33. Model 1 that includes all women shows that cohabiting 
women reported working roughly 4.5 hours more than married women, and single 
women reported working 1.5 more hours. Model 2 predicts married women’s hours 
separately and includes their husband’s income. These results show that when their 
husband’s income increases, married women with infants reduce their usual number of 
weekly working hours. However this is not the case for cohabiting women, who’s results 
are shown in Model 3. The coefficient is positive, indicating again that as their partner’s 
income increase, cohabiting women increase the number of hours they work. However 





Table 33: Heckman Two-Step regression results predicting usual hours worked last year 










Cohabiting 4.612***    
 
(0.728)    
Single 1.582***    
 
(0.425)    
Wage -0.0849*** -0.0783*** -0.0846*** -0.101*** 
 
(0.00425) (0.00513) (0.0112) (0.00679) 
Partner Inc.  -7.18e-06*** 1.10e-05  
 
 (1.96e-06) (9.92e-06)  
Constant 21.77*** 24.37*** 34.08*** 35.23*** 
 (2.215) (2.350) (3.510) (4.240) 
Observations 42,324 31,982 2,175 7,484 
Wald 675.35(84) 618.7(83) 189(83)  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital variables shown 
in Table 61 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown include region as well as year and 
state dummy variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * 
(p<0.1). 
 
Table 34 represents the same Heckman two-step model, however this time 
predicting the number of weeks worked in the last year. Model 1 shows that cohabiting 
women worked 1.3 more weeks in the last year relative to married women, and this 
difference are significant. Models 2 and 3 again show the interesting difference between 
cohabiting and married mothers. In Model 2 the results show that again, married mothers 
reduce the number of weeks they worked as their husbands’ income increased. Model 3 
shows the exact opposite behavior for cohabiting women and their partner’s income. As 








Table 34: Heckman Two-Step regression results predicting mothers’ weeks  










Cohabiting 1.253**    
 (0.623)    
Single -0.617*    
 (0.358)    







CAPFL -0.249 -0.893 -1.790 2.311 
 
(0.641) (0.728) (3.046) (1.706) 
Wage -0.150*** -0.122*** -0.219*** -0.250*** 
 (0.00392) (0.00445) (0.0170) (0.0107) 
Constant 26.42*** 27.38*** 29.47*** 33.98*** 
 (1.988) (1.980) (5.174) (6.697) 
Observations 42,324 31,982 2,175 7,484 
R-squared 0.0181  0.1152  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Results for demographic and human capital variables 
shown in Table 62 in Appendix C. Additional control variables not shown include region as well as 
year and state dummy variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** 
(p<0.05), * (p<0.1). 
 
The results using the CPS data presented above show that when it comes to their 
partner’s income, cohabiting mothers with infants do not consider their partner’s income 
in the same way as married mother with infants when choosing their labor supply. 
Consistent with previous research, married mothers with infants are willing and able to 
reduce their labor supply as their husband’s income increases. However for cohabiting 
mothers with infants, either their partner’s income does not significantly impact their 
labor supply or they actually increase their labor supply as their partner’s income 
increases. The fact that they are either unable or unwilling to reduce their labor supply as 
their partner’s income increases may be part of the reason that they consistently work 




The analysis of the CPS data also provides useful insights as to the benefits of 
California’s Paid Family Leave program. Table 30 shows that the program significantly 
increased the likelihood of all mothers with infants reporting that they were absent form 
work the previous week for family reasons. However when the logit regression is broken 
down by relationship status, presented in Table 31, it can be seen that the law had a much 
greater impact on cohabiting mothers relative to married ones. The affect on married 
mothers was insignificant, however for cohabiting women the odds of being on leave is 
over 3x greater if they had access to California’s Paid Family Leave program relative to 
those that did not46.  
It could be the case that before the law was passed, married mothers could rely on 
their spouses income and therefore were more likely to take longer leaves relative to 
cohabiting mothers. Therefore the law did not significantly change their behavior, due to 
length restrictions of the law (6 weeks under CAPFL). However since the evidence 
presented above suggests that for cohabiting women their partner’s income made no 
difference in their likelihood of being absent from work, the income replacement 
provision caused a large change in their behavior. This is providing evidence that the law 
is not only increasing the usage of leave among new mothers, but it is also achieving one 
of its other goals by making leave more equally available for traditional and 
nontraditional families (Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013). 
Table 34, which shows the results for the regressions predicting the number of 
weeks, worked in the past year shows that California’s Paid Family Leave program had 








the survey question, which asks respondent to treat any leave that is taken while still 
associated with an employer as a working week (vacation, sick days, paid leave etc.). 
Therefore even if CAPFL did cause mothers to take more leave this variable would not 
pick up this change since they were still attached to their employer. The rest of the 
regressions that predicted both hours worked last week and in the previous year did not 
include the CAPFL variable because theoretically it should not effect the number of 
hours a new mother works, because while it can be used intermittently, the research has 
shown that it is typically not used in that fashion for the purpose of maternity leave 
(Milkman & Appelbaum, 2013).  
The NLSY data also showed that when mothers took some amount of paid leave 
they increased their length of leave (Table 28). Employed mothers increased their length 
of leave by 2.1 weeks if some portion of their leave was paid. This represents a 16% 
increase in the average length of leave. For cohabiting women the increase in length of 
leave correlated with having used paid leave is 2.6 weeks, which is a 20% increase.  
Therefore, cohabiting women increased their length of leave by roughly half a week more 
than married women, which is a small but statistically significant difference. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Most of the results presented in this chapter support the hypothesis that as a 
group, cohabiting women do not consider their partner’s income when making labor 
supply decisions after the birth of a child. And, as the model presented in Figure 4 would 
suggest, this leads to a reduction in the number of weeks a mother will be away from 
work after the birth of a child. In the NLSY data, when controlling for all observable 




8.5%, shorter than for married women. They are also statistically more likely to return to 
work within the first year of a child’s birth. This could be an indication that cohabiting 
women are less willing or able than their married counterparts to engage in household 
specialization, even after the birth of a child.  
The CPS provides further proof of this, with cohabiting mothers in the sample 
working significantly more usual weekly hours than married mothers. When controlling 
for all observable characteristics, cohabiting mothers with infants reported working 4.6 
more usual weekly hours in the last year relative to married women, and 2.6 hours in the 
last week. Given the average weekly hours for married women this turns out to be a 13% 
in the hours worked last year and 17% increase in the hours worked last week. This is 
further evidence that cohabiting women are less likely to reduce their market work in 
order to specialize in household tasks, even when there is an increase need for caregiving 
at home after the birth of a child. 
As past research would suggest, there could be a number of reasons for this 
difference between married and cohabiting women. It could be that they engage in less 
income pooling and therefore cohabiting women have less access to their partner’s 
income and are less able to take unpaid leave (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003; Kenney, 
2006; Winkler, 1997). Or it could be that they feel less secure in the relationship and are 
not willing to invest in the household by engaging in specialization which leads them to 
take less leave (Abroms & Goldscheider, 2002). But it could also be the case that 
cohabiting couples are more egalitarian and are therefore less likely to conform to 
traditional gender norms within the relationship, meaning that cohabiting men and 




leave. Or the results could be driven by selection issues that could not be controlled for in 
this research, in that cohabiting women are inherently different in some way not observed 
which makes them less likely to take leave after the birth of a child. It is more likely that 
the results seen in this paper are driven by a combination of the reasons listed, since 
cohabiting couples are not a homogenous group and instead are made up of couples who 
are deciding to live together without getting married for wide variety of reasons. 
Whatever the reason may be, this research shows that among all women, when all 
observable characteristics are controlled for, cohabiting mothers are taking less leave 
after the birth of a child. However, this research also shows that when cohabiting women 
have access to paid leave they increase their incidence and length of leave after the birth 
of a child. In the NLSY data when cohabiting mothers were able to take paid leave their 
average length of leave was 2.7 weeks longer than those who did not, which represents a 
21% increase. And cohabiting mothers in the CPS data were more than 3x more likely to 
be on leave if they had access to California’s Paid Family Leave act, even when 
controlling for all observable characteristics. And in both samples cohabiting mothers 
responded to having paid leave by increasing their incidence and length of leave by a 
greater amount relative to married mothers. 
This has important implications for both policy as well as economic research.  An 
increasing number of children are being born to cohabiting couples, making it more 
important for policy makers to understand how family policy is, or is not, serving these 
families. If cohabiting mothers are less willing or able to take unpaid maternity leave 
after the birth of a new child, relative to their married counterparts, then it may be the 




making sure US women have the ability to take time off after the birth of a child. This 
research shows that when the leave is paid, such as under the California Paid Family 
Leave program, cohabiting women are more willing and able to take maternity leave. 
This analysis also has implications for economic research on the family. The 
results presented here indicate that in some cases women act more like married women 
than single women. For instance in their maternity leave survival rates in the first 12 
weeks of leave (presented in Figure 9), or by the fact that as their partner’s income 
increases they are more likely to not be working in the month before birth (presented in 
Table 29). However in some cases they act more like single women, with their partner’s 
income having no impact on their length of leave or number of hours worked in the usual 
week. Or if their partner’s income does have an impact it acts in the exact opposite 
direction as married mothers. This means that, at least when there is a child present, that 
it is not prudent to treat cohabiting women like single women for the purposes of family 
research. Even if it is true that a partner’s income does not effect cohabiting women’s 
behavior in the same way as a husband’s would, this research would suggest that, even if 
not completely understood, the presence of a partner in the household does in fact impact 
a mothers labor supply behavior. Therefore any study that ignores this by including 
cohabiting women in the same group as single women could bias their results. And this is 
a problem that could become even more important as the number of cohabiting household 
increase in the US. And not only do researchers need to be aware of these issues, but also 
those that are collecting the data. More and better quality data could lend insights as to 
how this ever-increasing portion of US households behaves and would improve US 
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Table 35: Fixed-effects regression results for policy effects on total employment for 
states with similar Forbes Business Cost rankings 





In all 10 years 
Greater than 100 
Employees 
100 Employees or 
Less 
CAPFL 5.1788* 7.9233* 7.6729* 1.0444* 
 (1.1182) (1.4761) (1.5656) (0.1706) 
Controls:     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 558549 226110 310793 247756 
Control group includes NH, MD, VT, ME, CT, NY, HI, MA. Standard errors in parentheses. 





Table 36: Fixed-effects regression results for policy effects on total employment for 
states with similar Forbes Regulatory Environment rankings 





In all 10 years 
Greater than 100 
Employees 
100 Employees or 
Less 
CAPFL 5.3248* 6.4170* 8.6394* 0.3124 
 (1.8602) (1.8976) (3.1871) (0.1706) 
Controls:     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 379708 158900 206450 173258 
Control group includes AR, ID, LA, WI, MT, AK, OR, SD, HI, VT. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically significant results 






Table 37: Fixed-effects regression results for policy effects on total employment for 
states with similar Forbes Economics Climate rankings 





In all 10 years 
Greater than 100 
Employees 
100 Employees or 
Less 
CAPFL 6.4989* 8.9551* 9.7144* 1.3359 
 (1.3681) (2.0630) (2.2903) (0.1874) 
Controls:     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 544630 225510 298411 246219 
Control group includes IA, GA, NE, AL, NH, WV, AK, KS, CT, IL. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically significant results 




Table 38: Fixed-effects regression results for the policy effects on establishments in the 
CA-NV-AZ borders 





In all 10 years 
Greater than 100 
Employees 
100 Employees or 
Less 
CAPFL 19.2121 18.9178* 24.0883 1.9849 
 (7.5536) (2.8329) (213.5649) (0.7010) 
Controls:     
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7737 2420 3985 3752 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry and year controls not shown. Statistically 








APPENDIX TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 3 
Table 39: List of explanatory variables for chapter 3 models 
Variable Name Explanation 
Log of hourly wage (dependent 
variable) 
The natural log of the worker’s hourly wage calculated by taking the 
worker’s income from last year and dividing it by their (usual hours 
worked per week x weeks worked). This variable is adjusted for 
inflation and represents 2012 dollars. 
CAPFL (treatment variable) A dummy variable that is one for California residence in survey years 
2005 onwards. 
Eligible Child A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent resides in CA 
and had a child that was born in 2004 or later. 
Eligible Infant A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent resides in CA, 
had a child during the survey year, and was surveyed in 2005 or later. 
Experience Is a measure of potential experience calculated by taking the 
respondent’s reported age and subtracting the number of reported years 
of schooling plus 6 years. 
Experience2 Is a variable equal the respondent’s potential experience squared. 
Female Represents a dummy variable that is one if the worker is female and 
zero if the worker is male. 
Parent A dummy variable that is one if own children are present in household. 
This is a proxy of parental status, since there is no direct measure of 
parental status 
Married A dummy variable that is one if the worker is married and zero 
otherwise. 
7 Education dummy variables Each dummy variable represents the highest level of education the 
worker has completed and include less than high school, high school, 
some college, two year degree, bachelors degree, masters and 
professional degree/Ph.D. 
Race Three dummy variables, white is equal to one if the worker identified 
their race as Caucasian, black is equal to 1 if the worker identified 
themselves as black, and other is equal to one if the worker identified 
as any other race. 
Ethnicity One dummy variable, Hispanic, which is equal to one if the worker 
identified as Hispanic 
Metro Area A dummy variable equal to one if the worker lives in an IPUMS 
defined metro area. 
Usual Hours Worked The usual number of hours the worker reported working last year 
during a typical workweek. 
Occupation 22 Dummy variables representing major occupations in the 1990 
Census Bureau occupational classification scheme and is comparable 
over all years of the data. 
Industry 12 dummy variables representing the major industries in the 1950 
Census Bureau industrial classification system and are comparable 
over all years of the data. 
Region 4 dummy variables representing the major regions of the US as defined 
by the 1990 Census regional and divisional classification system. 
Year Dummy variables representing each year of the data 
State 51 Dummy variables representing all 50 US states as well as the 







Table 40: Full OLS results of CAPFL effects on the log of hourly wages for workers in 
California 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
CAPFL 0.0597*** 0.0333*** 0.0371*** 
 (0.00428) (0.00346) (0.0118) 
Experience  0.0320*** 0.0321*** 
  (0.000601) (0.000599) 
Experience2  -0.000548*** -0.000551*** 
  (1.39e-05) (1.39e-05) 
Female  -0.170*** -0.171*** 
  (0.00401) (0.00400) 
Parent  0.0391*** 0.0389*** 
  (0.00417) (0.00416) 
Married  0.0828*** 0.0832*** 
  (0.00425) (0.00424) 
High School  0.194*** 0.195*** 
  (0.00551) (0.00550) 
Some College  0.293*** 0.293*** 
  (0.00618) (0.00617) 
Two Year Degree  0.344*** 0.345*** 
  (0.00764) (0.00762) 
Bachelors  0.543*** 0.543*** 
  (0.00732) (0.00730) 
Masters  0.693*** 0.693*** 
  (0.00980) (0.00978) 
Prof./Ph.D.  0.886*** 0.888*** 
  (0.0146) (0.0146) 
Black  -0.0956*** -0.0959*** 
  (0.00754) (0.00752) 
Other  -0.0650*** -0.0664*** 
  (0.00496) (0.00496) 
Hispanic  -0.117*** -0.119*** 
  (0.00409) (0.00409) 
Metro Area  0.155*** 0.149*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0161) 
Usual Hours Wkd  0.000583** 0.000517** 
  (0.000229) (0.000228) 
Industry Included No Yes Yes 
Occupation Included No Yes Yes 
Year Included No No No 
Constant 2.887*** 2.567*** 2.528*** 
 (0.00316) (0.0224) (0.0233) 
    
Observations 138,670 131,481 131,481 
R-squared 0.002 0.401 0.403 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation and year control 
variables not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** 






Table 41: Full DD results of CAPFL effects on the log of hourly wages for entiere US 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CAPFL 0.0919*** 0.0636*** 0.0586*** 0.0225*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.00412) 
Experience  0.0294*** 0.0293*** 0.0291*** 
  (0.000395) (0.000399) (0.000402) 
Experience2  -0.000483*** -0.000484*** -0.000481*** 
  (9.28e-06) (9.10e-06) (9.29e-06) 
Female  -0.202*** -0.202*** -0.202*** 
  (0.00451) (0.00438) (0.00441) 
Parent  0.0317*** 0.0323*** 0.0326*** 
  (0.00178) (0.00176) (0.00169) 
Married  0.0873*** 0.0879*** 0.0893*** 
  (0.00195) (0.00202) (0.00186) 
High School  0.161*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 
  (0.00718) (0.00757) (0.00777) 
Some College  0.249*** 0.248*** 0.247*** 
  (0.00801) (0.00852) (0.00861) 
Two Year Degree  0.315*** 0.313*** 0.313*** 
  (0.00734) (0.00804) (0.00788) 
Bachelors  0.502*** 0.499*** 0.496*** 
  (0.00921) (0.00990) (0.0102) 
Masters  0.644*** 0.641*** 0.636*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0116) (0.0121) 
Prof./Ph.D.  0.898*** 0.896*** 0.891*** 
  (0.00915) (0.00923) (0.00990) 
Black  -0.0710*** -0.0715*** -0.0802*** 
  (0.00506) (0.00509) (0.00381) 
Other  -0.0487*** -0.0513*** -0.0615*** 
  (0.00570) (0.00559) (0.00445) 
Hispanic  -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.120*** 
  (0.00815) (0.00807) (0.00804) 
Metro Area  0.134*** 0.133*** 0.112*** 
  (0.00677) (0.00678) (0.00569) 
Usual Hours Wkd  -0.000487** -0.000494** -0.000464** 
  (0.000194) (0.000188) (0.000190) 
Industry & Occ. No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Included No No Yes Yes 
State Included No No No Yes 
Constant 2.855*** 2.640*** 2.588*** 2.522*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0140) 
     
Observations 1,596,879 1,514,772 1,514,772 1,514,772 
R-squared 0.001 0.382 0.384 0.387 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation and year control variables not 






Table 42: All DD results of CAPFL effects on the log of hourly wages using various 
control groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TDI States Big States SBSI Forbes 
CAPFL 0.0221*** 0.0143* 0.0230*** 0.0255** 
 (0.00342) (0.00563) (0.00294) (0.00818) 
Experience 0.0304*** 0.0298*** 0.0298*** 0.0299*** 
 (0.00131) (0.00114) (0.00115) (0.000948) 
Experience2 -0.000505*** -0.000499*** -0.000497*** -0.000495*** 
 (3.42e-05) (2.66e-05) (2.82e-05) (2.37e-05) 
Female -0.181*** -0.187*** -0.184*** -0.190*** 
 (0.00765) (0.00937) (0.00679) (0.00894) 
Parent 0.0351*** 0.0295*** 0.0387*** 0.0359*** 
 (0.00361) (0.00429) (0.00361) (0.00309) 
Married 0.0876*** 0.0872*** 0.0871*** 0.0869*** 
 (0.00424) (0.00325) (0.00345) (0.00278) 
High School 0.191*** 0.170*** 0.188*** 0.182*** 
 (0.00515) (0.0162) (0.00669) (0.0124) 
Some College 0.281*** 0.263*** 0.274*** 0.271*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0168) (0.0122) (0.0145) 
Two Year Degree 0.329*** 0.325*** 0.326*** 0.331*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0138) (0.0118) (0.0130) 
Bachelors 0.531*** 0.520*** 0.521*** 0.520*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0186) (0.0137) (0.0155) 
Masters 0.690*** 0.670*** 0.675*** 0.656*** 
 (0.00383) (0.0218) (0.0125) (0.0204) 
Prof./Ph.D. 0.889*** 0.908*** 0.884*** 0.892*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0163) (0.00925) 
Black -0.0795*** -0.0785*** -0.0824*** -0.0795*** 
 (0.0121) (0.00763) (0.0108) (0.00996) 
Other -0.0692*** -0.0715*** -0.0700*** -0.0623*** 
 (0.00693) (0.00755) (0.00662) (0.00330) 
Hispanic -0.115*** -0.122*** -0.121*** -0.125*** 
 (0.00925) (0.00942) (0.0101) (0.00420) 
Metro Area 0.133*** 0.137*** 0.126*** 0.0912*** 
 (0.0168) (0.00611) (0.0169) (0.0141) 
Usual Hours  0.000300 -0.000314 0.000157 0.000202 
 (0.000236) (0.000479) (0.000222) (0.000228) 
Industry & Occu. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.539*** 2.581*** 2.502*** 2.521*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0354) (0.0280) (0.0136) 
Observations 289,482 349,129 396,973 401,678 
R-squared 0.394 0.389 0.392 0.393 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation, state and year control variables not 





Table 43: All DD results of CAPFL effects for workers in CA with eligible children 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 CA CA Women CA Men 
CAPFL 0.0239** 0.00642 0.0406** 
 (0.0119) (0.0170) (0.0165) 
Eligible Child 0.0571*** 0.101*** 0.0157* 
 (0.00672) (0.0101) (0.00898) 
Experience 0.0323*** 0.0312*** 0.0347*** 
 (0.000600) (0.000856) (0.000836) 
Experience2 -0.000549*** -0.000536*** -0.000600*** 
 (1.39e-05) (2.00e-05) (1.92e-05) 
Female -0.170***   
 (0.00400)   
Parent 0.0303*** -0.0146** 0.0547*** 
 (0.00431) (0.00590) (0.00649) 
Married 0.0808*** 0.0344*** 0.117*** 
 (0.00426) (0.00551) (0.00678) 
High School 0.195*** 0.170*** 0.208*** 
 (0.00550) (0.00882) (0.00707) 
Some College 0.294*** 0.265*** 0.299*** 
 (0.00617) (0.00971) (0.00810) 
Two Year Degree 0.345*** 0.332*** 0.334*** 
 (0.00762) (0.0112) (0.0107) 
Bachelors 0.544*** 0.532*** 0.527*** 
 (0.00730) (0.0110) (0.00990) 
Masters 0.692*** 0.676*** 0.681*** 
 (0.00977) (0.0143) (0.0135) 
Prof./Ph.D. 0.887*** 0.902*** 0.863*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0230) (0.0190) 
Black -0.0964*** -0.0502*** -0.138*** 
 (0.00752) (0.00990) (0.0112) 
Other -0.0663*** -0.0328*** -0.0900*** 
 (0.00495) (0.00697) (0.00703) 
Hispanic -0.119*** -0.0894*** -0.142*** 
 (0.00409) (0.00576) (0.00573) 
Metro Area 0.150*** 0.156*** 0.140*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0234) (0.0223) 
Usual Hours  0.000495** 0.000240 -0.000117 
 (0.000228) (0.000322) (0.000325) 
Industry & Occu. Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.529*** 2.380*** 2.571*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0334) (0.0324) 
Observations 131,481 59,872 71,609 
R-squared 0.403 0.369 0.422 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation and year control variables not shown. 





Table 44: All DD results of CAPFL effects on the log of hourly wages for workers in CA 
with eligible children using different control groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All States TDI States Big States SBSI Forbes 
CAPFL 0.0153*** 0.0143** 0.00645 0.0157*** 0.0181** 
 (0.00414) (0.00314) (0.00557) (0.00287) (0.00792) 
Eligible Child 0.0521*** 0.0561*** 0.0565*** 0.0526*** 0.0543*** 
 (0.00228) (0.00263) (0.00313) (0.00393) (0.00429) 
Experience 0.0292*** 0.0305*** 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 0.0300*** 
 (0.000418) (0.00136) (0.00119) (0.00120) (0.000994) 
Experience2 -0.000481*** -0.000505*** -0.000498*** -0.000497*** -0.000494*** 
 (9.25e-06) (3.35e-05) (2.61e-05) (2.77e-05) (2.33e-05) 
Female -0.202*** -0.181*** -0.186*** -0.183*** -0.190*** 
 (0.00445) (0.00784) (0.00953) (0.00694) (0.00908) 
Parent 0.0318*** 0.0306*** 0.0265*** 0.0354*** 0.0328*** 
 (0.00173) (0.00213) (0.00182) (0.00431) (0.00362) 
Married 0.0889*** 0.0862*** 0.0861*** 0.0860*** 0.0857*** 
 (0.00210) (0.00488) (0.00387) (0.00401) (0.00348) 
High School 0.161*** 0.191*** 0.170*** 0.188*** 0.182*** 
 (0.00777) (0.00504) (0.0162) (0.00659) (0.0123) 
Some College 0.247*** 0.281*** 0.264*** 0.274*** 0.271*** 
 (0.00869) (0.0107) (0.0170) (0.0122) (0.0146) 
Two Year 
Degree 
0.313*** 0.329*** 0.326*** 0.326*** 0.332*** 
 (0.00795) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0117) (0.0130) 
Bachelors 0.497*** 0.531*** 0.521*** 0.521*** 0.520*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0187) (0.0138) (0.0156) 
Masters 0.636*** 0.690*** 0.670*** 0.675*** 0.656*** 
 (0.0121) (0.00363) (0.0217) (0.0124) (0.0203) 
Prof./Ph.D. 0.891*** 0.889*** 0.908*** 0.884*** 0.892*** 
 (0.00989) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0162) (0.00918) 
Black -0.0803*** -0.0798*** -0.0787*** -0.0826*** -0.0797*** 
 (0.00381) (0.0123) (0.00765) (0.0109) (0.0100) 
Other -0.0616*** -0.0692*** -0.0716*** -0.0700*** -0.0625*** 
 (0.00445) (0.00702) (0.00757) (0.00665) (0.00328) 
Hispanic -0.120*** -0.116*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.125*** 
 (0.00811) (0.00917) (0.00933) (0.0101) (0.00418) 
Metro Area 0.112*** 0.133*** 0.137*** 0.126*** 0.0912*** 
 (0.00569) (0.0168) (0.00613) (0.0169) (0.0141) 
Usual Hours  -0.000466** 0.000287 -0.000322 0.000147 0.000193 
 (0.000189) (0.000230) (0.000472) (0.000216) (0.000223) 
Industry & 
Occu. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.522*** 2.540*** 2.581*** 2.503*** 2.522*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0340) (0.0350) (0.0277) (0.0133) 
Observations 1,514,772 289,482 349,129 396,973 401,678 
R-squared 0.387 0.394 0.390 0.392 0.393 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation, state and year control 
variables not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** 





Table 45: All DDD results for CAPFL effects on log of hours wages for workers with any 
eligible children born in years 2004-2014 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All States All Women All Men 
CAPFL 0.0200*** 0.0185*** 0.0205*** 
 (0.00410) (0.00357) (0.00481) 
Eligible Child (CA) 0.0581*** 0.0960*** 0.0192*** 
 (0.00184) (0.00225) (0.00240) 
"Eligible" Child 
(Other) 
0.0406*** 0.0607*** 0.0117*** 
 (0.00311) (0.00519) (0.00380) 
Experience 0.0294*** 0.0271*** 0.0335*** 
 (0.000403) (0.000497) (0.000425) 
Experience2 -0.000482*** -0.000463*** -0.000557*** 
 (9.08e-06) (9.72e-06) (9.82e-06) 
Female -0.202***   
 (0.00444)   
Parent 0.0263*** -0.0231*** 0.0524*** 
 (0.00170) (0.00223) (0.00255) 
Married 0.0875*** 0.0367*** 0.134*** 
 (0.00195) (0.00187) (0.00330) 
High School 0.162*** 0.145*** 0.171*** 
 (0.00773) (0.00679) (0.00827) 
Some College 0.248*** 0.221*** 0.253*** 
 (0.00860) (0.00802) (0.00898) 
Two Year Degree 0.313*** 0.309*** 0.296*** 
 (0.00784) (0.00759) (0.00838) 
Bachelors 0.497*** 0.479*** 0.488*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.00987) 
Masters 0.636*** 0.632*** 0.615*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.0137) 
Prof./Ph.D. 0.890*** 0.865*** 0.893*** 
 (0.00986) (0.0129) (0.0104) 
Black -0.0804*** -0.0441*** -0.122*** 
 (0.00380) (0.00458) (0.00410) 
Other -0.0617*** -0.0300*** -0.0842*** 
 (0.00442) (0.00345) (0.00741) 
Hispanic -0.120*** -0.0907*** -0.140*** 
 (0.00805) (0.00770) (0.00895) 
Metro Area 0.112*** 0.120*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00569) (0.00559) (0.00614) 
Usual Hours  -0.000476** -0.000236 -0.00192*** 
 (0.000189) (0.000198) (0.000252) 
Constant 2.523*** 2.406*** 2.506*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0158) (0.0140) 
    
Observations 1,514,772 727,367 787,405 
R-squared 0.387 0.352 0.396 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation, state and year control 
variables not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** 






Table 46: All DDD results for CAPFL effects on log of hourly wages of workers in CA 
with eligible children born in survey year 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All States All Women All Men 
    
CAPFL 0.0218*** 0.0217*** 0.0210*** 
 (0.00413) (0.00346) (0.00497) 
Eligible Infant (CA) 0.0659*** 0.129*** 0.0240*** 
 (0.00141) (0.00154) (0.00187) 
"Eligible" Infant (Other) 0.0406*** 0.0833*** 0.00276 
 (0.00449) (0.00923) (0.00581) 
Experience 0.0293*** 0.0270*** 0.0335*** 
 (0.000405) (0.000491) (0.000427) 
Experience2 -0.000483*** -0.000463*** -0.000558*** 
 (9.28e-06) (9.86e-06) (9.92e-06) 
Female -0.202***   
 (0.00442)   
Parent 0.0310*** -0.0170*** 0.0541*** 
 (0.00163) (0.00250) (0.00243) 
Married 0.0887*** 0.0378*** 0.135*** 
 (0.00190) (0.00179) (0.00329) 
High School 0.161*** 0.145*** 0.170*** 
 (0.00775) (0.00682) (0.00828) 
Some College 0.247*** 0.221*** 0.253*** 
 (0.00860) (0.00804) (0.00897) 
Two Year Degree 0.313*** 0.309*** 0.296*** 
 (0.00785) (0.00764) (0.00838) 
Bachelors 0.496*** 0.478*** 0.487*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.00986) 
Masters 0.636*** 0.632*** 0.615*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.0137) 
Prof./Ph.D. 0.891*** 0.865*** 0.893*** 
 (0.00989) (0.0130) (0.0104) 
Black -0.0802*** -0.0437*** -0.122*** 
 (0.00381) (0.00461) (0.00410) 
Other -0.0614*** -0.0295*** -0.0841*** 
 (0.00445) (0.00346) (0.00741) 
Hispanic -0.120*** -0.0897*** -0.140*** 
 (0.00804) (0.00772) (0.00894) 
Metro Area 0.112*** 0.120*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00569) (0.00557) (0.00614) 
Usual Hours  -0.000473** -0.000244 -0.00192*** 
 (0.000189) (0.000198) (0.000252) 
Constant 2.522*** 2.406*** 2.506*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0160) (0.0141) 
    
Observations 1,514,772 727,367 787,405 
R-squared 0.387 0.352 0.396 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation, state and year control variables not 






Table 47: All DD and DDD results for CAPFL effects on the log of hourly wages for 
female workers in California 
 (1) (2) 
 All States All States 
CAPFL 0.00143 0.00692* 
 (0.00380) (0.00402) 
Women in CA after 2004 0.0467*** 0.0569*** 
 (0.00383) (0.00571) 
Women not in CA after 2004  0.0211*** 
  (0.00450) 
Experience 0.0292*** 0.0292*** 
 (0.000409) (0.000406) 
Experience2 -0.000482*** -0.000482*** 
 (9.44e-06) (9.36e-06) 
Female -0.205*** -0.215*** 
 (0.00290) (0.00486) 
Parent 0.0326*** 0.0326*** 
 (0.00169) (0.00168) 
Married 0.0893*** 0.0893*** 
 (0.00185) (0.00185) 
High School 0.161*** 0.161*** 
 (0.00772) (0.00770) 
Some College 0.247*** 0.247*** 
 (0.00851) (0.00855) 
Two Year Degree 0.312*** 0.312*** 
 (0.00776) (0.00780) 
Bachelors 0.496*** 0.496*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) 
Masters 0.636*** 0.636*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0121) 
Prof./Ph.D. 0.891*** 0.890*** 
 (0.00988) (0.00988) 
Black -0.0801*** -0.0801*** 
 (0.00379) (0.00379) 
Other -0.0618*** -0.0617*** 
 (0.00443) (0.00442) 
Hispanic -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 (0.00799) (0.00802) 
Metro Area 0.112*** 0.112*** 
 (0.00569) (0.00569) 
Usual Hours  -0.000469** -0.000477** 
 (0.000187) (0.000189) 
Constant 2.524*** 2.529*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0138) 
Observations 1,514,772 1,514,772 
R-squared 0.387 0.387 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation, state and year 
control variables not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by 





Table 48: Heckman Two-step regression correcting for selection bias for OLS model for 
workers in California 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Regression Select Mills 
    
CAPFL 0.0316*** -0.0698  
 (0.0105) (0.178)  
Experience 0.0315*** -0.0335***  
 (0.000518) (0.00746)  
Experience2 -0.000538*** 0.000553***  
 (1.19e-05) (0.000186)  
Female -0.178*** 0.0303  
 (0.00351) (0.0585)  
Parent 0.0424*** -0.0303  
 (0.00375) (0.0674)  
Married 0.0753*** 0.0293  
 (0.00377) (0.0666)  
High School 0.192*** 0.00248  
 (0.00513) (0.0697)  
Some College 0.295*** 0.144*  
 (0.00564) (0.0749)  
Two Year Degree 0.350*** -0.0695  
 (0.00697) (0.125)  
Bachelors 0.547*** 0.0337  
 (0.00635) (0.103)  
Masters 0.699*** -0.00267  
 (0.00832) (0.185)  
Prof./Ph.D. 0.906*** 0.375  
 (0.0111) (0.242)  
Black -0.0988*** -0.0986  
 (0.00687) (0.104)  
Other -0.0681*** 0.0578  
 (0.00448) (0.0737)  
Hispanic -0.123*** -0.0421  
 (0.00380) (0.0602)  
Metro Area 0.143*** -0.0759  
 (0.0141) (0.233)  
Usual Hours  0.000242 13.11  
 (0.000158) (0)  
Lambda   -0.0661*** 
   (0.0143) 
Constant 1.977*** -6.413***  
 (0.168) (0.773)  
    
Observations 139,394 139,394 139,394 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation, state and year control 
variables not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** 









Table 49: Heckman Two-step regression correcting for selection bias for DD model for 
workers in all states 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Regression Select Mills 
CAPFL 0.0207*** 0.0489  
 (0.00307) (0.0519)  
Experience 0.0285*** -0.0191***  
 (0.000146) (0.00239)  
Experience2 -0.000472*** 0.000264***  
 (3.35e-06) (5.92e-05)  
Female -0.213*** 0.0676***  
 (0.00102) (0.0198)  
Parent 0.0348*** -0.0642***  
 (0.00104) (0.0214)  
Married 0.0832*** 0.0300  
 (0.00106) (0.0214)  
High School 0.162*** 0.0298  
 (0.00163) (0.0223)  
Some College 0.245*** 0.0405  
 (0.00178) (0.0253)  
Two Year Degree 0.310*** 0.0552  
 (0.00208) (0.0374)  
Bachelors 0.490*** -0.0652*  
 (0.00194) (0.0345)  
Masters 0.631*** -0.190***  
 (0.00243) (0.0628)  
Prof./Ph.D. 0.901*** -0.218**  
 (0.00323) (0.101)  
Black -0.0816*** -0.148***  
 (0.00154) (0.0249)  
Other -0.0577*** -0.0564*  
 (0.00178) (0.0295)  
Hispanic -0.114*** -0.153***  
 (0.00140) (0.0237)  
Metro Area 0.106*** -0.0518**  
 (0.00120) (0.0228)  
Usual Hours  -0.000682*** 8.557  
 (4.31e-05) (0)  
Lambda   -0.0903*** 
   (0.00452) 
Constant 2.508*** -1.651***  
 (0.00580) (0.117)  
Observations 1,583,288 1,583,288 1,583,288 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation, state and year control 
variables not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** 






Table 50: Heckman Two-step regression correcting for selection bias for DDD model for 
female workers with eligible children in all states 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Regression Select Mills 
CAPFL 0.0147*** 0.0669  
 (0.00455) (0.0721)  
Eligible Child (CA) 0.0884*** -0.184  
 (0.00811) (0.122)  
"Eligible" Child 
(Other) 
0.0603*** -0.138***  
 (0.00265) (0.0449)  
Experience 0.0257*** -0.0207***  
 (0.000203) (0.00324)  
Experience2 -0.000431*** 0.000312***  
 (4.70e-06) (8.00e-05)  
Parent -0.0174*** -0.0251  
 (0.00145) (0.0274)  
Married 0.0370*** 0.0388  
 (0.00137) (0.0260)  
High School 0.145*** 0.0370  
 (0.00249) (0.0301)  
Some College 0.219*** 0.0232  
 (0.00265) (0.0338)  
Two Year Degree 0.305*** 0.0439  
 (0.00300) (0.0471)  
Bachelors 0.473*** -0.0682  
 (0.00285) (0.0443)  
Masters 0.633*** -0.166**  
 (0.00346) (0.0773)  
Prof./Ph.D. 0.881*** -0.340**  
 (0.00500) (0.144)  
Black -0.0436*** -0.123***  
 (0.00204) (0.0327)  
Other -0.0284*** -0.0394  
 (0.00250) (0.0384)  
Hispanic -0.0856*** -0.191***  
 (0.00200) (0.0316)  
Metro Area 0.112*** -0.0598**  
 (0.00166) (0.0291)  
Usual Hours  -0.000528*** 8.655  
 (5.96e-05) (0)  
lambda   -0.0846*** 
   (0.00573) 
Constant 2.359*** -1.563***  
 (0.00802) (0.151)  
Observations 765,239 765,239 765,239 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation, state and year control 
variables not shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** 








Table 51: Heckman Two-step regression correcting for selection bias for DDD  model for 
workers in all states 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Regression Select Mills 
CAPFL 0.00315 0.0489  
 (0.00361) (0.0519)  
Women in CA after 2004 0.0555***   
 (0.00414)   
Women not in CA after 2004 0.0161***   
 (0.00176)   
Experience 0.0285*** -0.0191***  
 (0.000146) (0.00239)  
Experience2 -0.000472*** 0.000264***  
 (3.35e-06) (5.92e-05)  
Female -0.224*** 0.0676***  
 (0.00137) (0.0198)  
Parent 0.0348*** -0.0642***  
 (0.00104) (0.0214)  
Married 0.0833*** 0.0300  
 (0.00106) (0.0214)  
High School 0.162*** 0.0298  
 (0.00163) (0.0223)  
Some College 0.245*** 0.0405  
 (0.00178) (0.0253)  
Two Year Degree 0.310*** 0.0552  
 (0.00208) (0.0374)  
Bachelors 0.489*** -0.0652*  
 (0.00194) (0.0345)  
Masters 0.631*** -0.190***  
 (0.00243) (0.0628)  
Prof./Ph.D. 0.900*** -0.218**  
 (0.00323) (0.101)  
Black -0.0815*** -0.148***  
 (0.00154) (0.0249)  
Other -0.0579*** -0.0564*  
 (0.00178) (0.0295)  
Hispanic -0.114*** -0.153***  
 (0.00140) (0.0237)  
Metro Area 0.106*** -0.0518**  
 (0.00120) (0.0228)  
Usual Hours  -0.000692*** 8.557  
 (4.31e-05) (0)  
Lambda   -0.0903*** 




























    
Constant 2.514*** -1.651***  
 (0.00582) (0.117)  
Observations 1,583,288 1,583,288 1,583,288 
Standard errors in parentheses. Results for industry, occupation, state and year control variables 





APPENDIX TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 4 
Table 52: All results for risk of returning to work in the year after birth for all mothers by 





Employed in Month Before Birth 
 
Hazard Coefficient Hazard Coefficient 
Cohabiting 1.232*** 0.209*** 1.062 0.0604 
 
(0.0615) (0.0499) (0.0644) (0.0606) 
Single 1.269*** 0.238*** 1.106 0.101 
 
(0.0676) (0.0533) (0.0721) (0.0652) 
Black 1.129** 0.121** 1.089 0.0857 
 
(0.0574) (0.0508) (0.0676) (0.0621) 
Hispanic 1.164*** 0.151*** 1.139** 0.130** 
 
(0.0606) (0.0521) (0.0728) (0.0639) 
Parity 1.074*** 0.0715*** 1.123*** 0.116*** 
 
(0.0253) (0.0236) (0.0336) (0.0299) 
Paid Leave 1.587*** 0.462*** 0.965 -0.0354 
 
(0.0829) (0.0522) (0.0512) (0.0530) 
High School 1.128** 0.120** 1.103 0.0981 
 
(0.0541) (0.0480) (0.0697) (0.0632) 
Some College 1.352*** 0.301*** 1.150 0.139 
 
(0.123) (0.0909) (0.123) (0.107) 
College 1.171* 0.158* 1.135 0.127 
 
(0.105) (0.0894) (0.116) (0.102) 
Graduate 1.448*** 0.370*** 1.226 0.204 
 
(0.182) (0.126) (0.169) (0.138) 
Experience 1.182*** 0.167*** 1.061*** 0.0594*** 
 
(0.0124) (0.0105) (0.0148) (0.0140) 
Age 0.891*** -0.116*** 0.924*** -0.0791*** 
 
(0.0140) (0.0157) (0.0184) (0.0199) 
Family Size 1.019 0.0184 1.008 0.00809 
 
(0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0171) (0.0170) 
Own Income 1.000*** 1.04e-05*** 1.000* 4.14e-06* 
 
(1.87e-06) (1.87e-06) (2.14e-06) (2.14e-06) 
Observations 3,953 3,953 2,078 2,078 
Log Likelihood -22143.315 -22143.315 -13207.309 -13207.309 
Chi-Square(df) 819.57 (28) 819.57 (28) 95.93 (28) 95.93 (28) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Additional control variables not shown include region as well 






Table 53: All results for risk of returning to work in the year after birth for all mothers, 







Hazard Coefficient Hazard Coefficient 
Partner Income 1.000*** -7.42e-06*** 1.000 -5.04e-06 
 (1.87e-06) (1.87e-06) (3.89e-06) (3.89e-06) 
Black 1.235* 0.211* 1.067 0.0649 
 (0.140) (0.114) (0.155) (0.145) 
Hispanic 1.150 0.140 0.919 -0.0842 
 
(0.108) (0.0940) (0.133) (0.145) 
Parity 0.993 -0.00725 1.117 0.111 
 
(0.0511) (0.0514) (0.0856) (0.0766) 
Paid Leave 1.412*** 0.345*** 1.238 0.213 
 
(0.127) (0.0899) (0.210) (0.170) 
High School 1.194 0.177 1.298* 0.261* 
 
(0.136) (0.114) (0.178) (0.137) 
Some College 1.387** 0.327** 1.913** 0.648** 
 
(0.215) (0.155) (0.515) (0.269) 
College 1.333* 0.287* 1.718** 0.541** 
 
(0.200) (0.150) (0.473) (0.275) 
Graduate 1.528** 0.424** 2.023 0.704 
 
(0.281) (0.184) (0.964) (0.476) 
Experience 1.142*** 0.133*** 1.228*** 0.205*** 
 
(0.0191) (0.0168) (0.0415) (0.0338) 
Age 0.891*** -0.115*** 0.871*** -0.138*** 
 
(0.0266) (0.0299) (0.0453) (0.0520) 
Family Size 1.038 0.0376 1.065 0.0628 
 
(0.0341) (0.0328) (0.0505) (0.0475) 
Own Income 1.000*** 1.42e-05*** 1.000** 1.31e-05** 
 
(2.97e-06) (2.97e-06) (6.30e-06) (6.30e-06) 
Observations 1,130 1,130 469 469 
Log Likelihood -5383.1279 -5383.1279 -1908.4098 -1908.4098 
Chi-Square(df) 263.42(27) 263.42(27) 121.62(27) 121.62(27) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Additional control variables not shown include region as 
well as year dummy variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** 










Table 54: All results for risk of returning to work in the year after birth for employed 







Hazard Coefficient Hazard Coefficient 
Partner Income 1.000* -3.42e-06* 1.000 6.77e-06 
 (2.03e-06) (2.03e-06) (6.40e-06) (6.40e-06) 
Black 1.119 0.113 0.994 -0.00652 
 (0.145) (0.130) (0.185) (0.186) 
Hispanic 1.132 0.124 0.708* -0.345* 
 
(0.128) (0.113) (0.129) (0.183) 
Parity 1.085 0.0816 1.228* 0.206* 
 
(0.0716) (0.0660) (0.133) (0.108) 
Paid Leave 0.931 -0.0712 0.886 -0.121 
 
(0.0845) (0.0908) (0.155) (0.175) 
High School 1.331* 0.286* 1.169 0.156 
 
(0.197) (0.148) (0.214) (0.183) 
Some College 1.403* 0.338* 1.610 0.476 
 
(0.260) (0.186) (0.492) (0.306) 
College 1.416* 0.348* 1.037 0.0365 
 
(0.255) (0.180) (0.308) (0.297) 
Graduate 1.454* 0.374* 1.427 0.356 
 
(0.303) (0.208) (0.760) (0.533) 
Experience 1.033 0.0321 1.102** 0.0971** 
 
(0.0230) (0.0222) (0.0474) (0.0431) 
Age 0.919** -0.0843** 0.932 -0.0701 
 
(0.0322) (0.0351) (0.0600) (0.0644) 
Family Size 1.010 0.0100 1.143* 0.133* 
 
(0.0423) (0.0419) (0.0818) (0.0716) 
Own Income 1.000 3.97e-06 1.000 2.61e-06 
 
(3.44e-06) (3.44e-06) (7.83e-06) (7.83e-06) 
Observations 709 709 264 264 
Log Likelihood -3787.5704 -3787.5704 -1165.5346 -1165.5346 
Chi-Square(df) 48.98(27) 48.98(27) 35.59(27) 35.59(27) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Additional control variables include region as well as year 
dummy variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * 
(p<0.1). 




Table 55: All results for OLS regressions predicting length of leave after the birth of a 






Cohabiting -1.138* -0.0867 
 
(0.598) (0.587) 
Single -1.120* -0.496 
 
(0.626) (0.627) 
Black 0.0941 -0.547 
 
(0.599) (0.598) 
Hispanic -0.740 -0.228 
 
(0.625) (0.623) 
Parity -1.067*** -1.297*** 
 
(0.297) (0.305) 
Had Paid Leave -0.603 2.117*** 
 
(0.580) (0.500) 
High School Degree -1.449** -0.712 
 
(0.572) (0.612) 
Some College -2.212** -1.594 
 
(1.073) (1.023) 
College Degree -1.574 -1.650* 
 
(1.055) (0.988) 
Graduate Degree -1.692 -1.569 
 
(1.490) (1.334) 
Years Experience -1.119*** -0.311** 
 
(0.130) (0.133) 
Age 0.776*** 0.622*** 
 
(0.188) (0.190) 
Family Size 0.182 0.00980 
 
(0.149) (0.162) 
Own Income -0.000108*** -4.00e-05* 
 
(2.38e-05) (2.12e-05) 
Constant 6.174* -1.690 
 (3.738) (3.883) 
Observations 2,911 1,928 
R-squared 0.093 0.072 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Additional control variables 
include region as well as state and year dummy variables. Statistically 









Table 56: All results for OLS regressions predicting length of leave after the birth of a 









Partner Income 2.55e-05 -3.66e-05 1.03e-05 -5.74e-05 
 (1.97e-05) (5.60e-05) (1.74e-05) (5.32e-05) 
Black -1.454 0.810 -0.284 0.229 
 (1.285) (1.648) (1.180) (1.792) 
Hispanic -0.0575 0.159 0.465 1.697 
 (1.055) (1.745) (1.007) (1.785) 
Parity -0.449 -0.428 -0.694 -1.366 
 (0.573) (0.902) (0.555) (1.030) 
Had Paid Leave 0.354 0.792 2.129*** 2.645* 
 (0.936) (1.764) (0.802) (1.564) 
High School Degree -3.778*** -0.911 -0.888 -0.261 
 (1.259) (1.569) (1.341) (1.716) 
Some College -5.489*** -4.364 -2.721 -3.200 
 (1.760) (3.003) (1.707) (2.841) 
College Degree -4.875*** 0.0233 -1.464 0.110 
 (1.675) (3.211) (1.626) (2.979) 
Graduate Degree -4.820** 3.334 -1.749 1.370 
 (2.052) (5.623) (1.922) (5.326) 
Years Experience -0.591*** -1.329*** -0.0144 -0.736* 
 (0.207) (0.375) (0.208) (0.386) 
Age 0.958*** 1.143** 0.744** 0.943 
 (0.333) (0.579) (0.317) (0.589) 
Family Size -0.0259 -0.00244 -0.0284 -0.615 
 (0.347) (0.535) (0.341) (0.619) 
Own Income -0.000121*** -0.000151* -3.31e-05 -5.48e-05 
 (3.51e-05) (8.28e-05) (3.15e-05) (7.80e-05) 
Constant 0.0663 -8.804 -9.824 -7.342 
 (7.011) (11.03) (7.212) (11.43) 
Observations 854 350 660 245 
R-squared 0.134 0.165 0.109 0.153 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Additional control variables include region as well as year dummy 










Table 57: All results for logit regressions predicting a mother being employed in the 
mother before birth in NLSY97, 2000-2011 
 All Married Single 
Cohabiting 1.324***   
 
(0.1359)   
Single 1.4772***   
 
(0.1565)   
Partner Income  .999986*** .9999829** 
  (4.17E-06) 8.48E-06 
Black 1.1157 1.2175 0.6355 
 
(0.114) (0.3305) (0.1958) 
Hispanic 1.137 1.2337 1.2800 
 
(0.12) (0.2551) (0.4057) 
High School 1.1186 0.9268 1.5451 
 
(0.1018) (0.2033) (0.4174) 
Some College 1.2426 1.2422 3.0446* 
 
(0.2431) (0.4198) (2.0427) 
College 1.6068** 1.7184 8.5343* 
 
(0.339) (0.579) (9.8616) 
Graduate 2.5124*** 2.4484* 1.0796 
 
(0.9154) (1.219) (1.4467) 
Years 
Experience 1.4896*** 1.4570*** 1.4023*** 
 
(0.0351) (0.0642) (0.1012) 
Age 0.8426*** 0.8969* 0.7419** 
 
(0.0271) (0.0597) (0.0811) 
Family Size 0.9757 1.0287 1.0908 
 
(0.0238) (0.0684) (0.1053) 
Parity 1.0423 1.0162 0.7913 
 
(0.0504) (0.1115) (0.1298) 
Own Income 1.0001*** 1.0001*** 1.0001*** 
 
(-5.48E-06) (9.59E-06) 0.0000172 
Observations 3953 1130 469 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Additional control variables not 
shown include region as well as year dummy variables. Statistically 






Table 58: All results for logit regressions for the probability of being on leave for family 




Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Cohabiting -0.117 0.890 
 
(0.0829) (0.0738) 
Single -0.312*** 0.732*** 
 
(0.0867) (0.0634) 
Wage 0.000579 1.001 
 
(0.000995) (0.000995) 
CAPFL 0.209*** 1.233*** 
 
(0.0394) (0.0486) 
HS Degree 0.117 1.125 
 
(0.116) (0.131) 
Some college 0.276** 1.318** 
 
(0.125) (0.164) 
2 Yr Degree 0.331*** 1.392*** 
 
(0.121) (0.169) 
Bachelors 0.466*** 1.594*** 
 
(0.138) (0.221) 
Masters 0.651*** 1.917*** 
 
(0.117) (0.225) 
Professional 0.256 1.292 
 
(0.167) (0.216) 
Black 0.105 1.110 
 
(0.0946) (0.105) 
Other 0.0802 1.083 
 
(0.109) (0.118) 
Hispanic -0.168* 0.845* 
 
(0.0892) (0.0754) 
Metro Area 0.150** 1.161** 
 
(0.0683) (0.0793) 
Experience 0.00499 1.005 
 
(0.00655) (0.00658) 
Constant -1.916*** 0.147*** 
 (0.151) (0.0222) 
Observations 21,419 21,419 
R-squared 0.0183  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Additional control variables include 
region as well as state and year dummy variables. Statistically significant 





Table 59: All results for logit regressions for the probability of being on leave for family 







Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Wage -0.000115 1.000 0.00435 1.004 
 
(0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00930) (0.00934) 
Partner Inc. 2.08e-06*** 1.000*** -3.18e-06 1.000 
 
(2.87e-07) (2.87e-07) (2.73e-06) (2.73e-06) 
CAPFL 0.0310 1.031 1.291*** 3.635*** 
 
(0.0437) (0.0451) (0.268) (0.975) 
HS Degree 0.255 1.291 -0.193 0.824 
 
(0.170) (0.220) (0.354) (0.292) 
Some college 0.331* 1.392* -0.0875 0.916 
 
(0.185) (0.258) (0.411) (0.376) 
2 Yr Degree 0.444*** 1.559*** -0.404 0.668 
 
(0.160) (0.249) (0.414) (0.277) 
Bachelors 0.530*** 1.699*** -0.425 0.654 
 
(0.175) (0.298) (0.500) (0.327) 
Masters 0.713*** 2.039*** 0.917 2.502 
 
(0.178) (0.364) (0.689) (1.724) 
Professional 0.243 1.275 0.473 1.605 
 
(0.190) (0.242) (0.972) (1.560) 
Black 0.0838 1.087 -0.0110 0.989 
 
(0.0998) (0.109) (0.394) (0.389) 
Other 0.0507 1.052 0.715* 2.044* 
 
(0.127) (0.133) (0.406) (0.831) 
Hispanic -0.121 0.886 -0.316 0.729 
 
(0.101) (0.0899) (0.251) (0.183) 
Metro Area 0.106 1.112 0.361 1.434 
 
(0.0688) (0.0765) (0.354) (0.508) 
Experience -0.00200 0.998 -0.00561 0.994 
 
(0.00836) (0.00834) (0.0206) (0.0205) 
Constant -2.072*** 0.126*** -1.461** 0.232** 
 (0.194) (0.0244) (0.707) (0.164) 
Observations 16,592 16,592 1,035 1,035 
R-squared 0.0181  0.1152  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Additional control variables not shown include 
region as well as state and year dummy variables. Statistically significant results 






Table 60: All results for Heckman Two-Step regressions predicting hours worked last 










Cohabiting 2.636***    
 
(0.899)    
Single 2.473***    
 
(0.604)    
Wage -0.0401*** -0.0322*** 0.00402 -0.0310* 
 
(0.00600) (0.00677) (0.0300) (0.0160) 
Partner Inc.  -1.81e-05*** -1.35e-05  
 
 (2.37e-06) (1.97e-05)  
Parity -3.147*** -3.199*** -0.513 0.211 
 
(0.564) (0.655) (1.629) (0.501) 
HS Degree 7.442*** 5.494** 5.051 -0.632 
 
(1.967) (2.179) (6.287) (3.407) 
Some college 9.166*** 6.650** 4.647 -1.789 
 
(2.618) (2.814) (8.639) (4.996) 
2 Yr Degree 12.72*** 9.086** 8.446 0.189 
 
(3.397) (3.651) (9.214) (6.331) 
Bachelors 12.47*** 8.957** 10.44 -0.574 
 
(3.441) (3.681) (11.74) (7.442) 
Masters 15.09*** 11.06** 9.700 2.008 
 
(4.096) (4.348) (16.25) (8.260) 
Professional 21.80*** 17.90*** 21.62 7.009 
 
(4.650) (4.973) (13.72) (8.505) 
Black 2.870*** 4.084*** 3.446 0.424 
 
(0.569) (0.911) (2.610) (0.943) 
Other 0.0172 0.532 1.748 1.823 
 
(0.782) (0.879) (2.527) (1.961) 
Hispanic 0.614 0.415 0.421 1.757* 
 
(0.672) (0.848) (2.446) (0.982) 
Metro Area -0.817** -1.165** 1.307 0.254 
 
(0.397) (0.492) (2.275) (0.798) 
Experience 0.488*** 0.393*** 0.431* 0.0935 
 
(0.0901) (0.0940) (0.251) (0.178) 
Constant 3.794758 12.06** 9.392 27.95** 
 (5.961576) (5.906) (19.79) (12.96) 
Observations 41397 31566 2129 7,215 
Wald Chi2(df) 369.83(84) 438.7(83) 102.5(83)  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Additional control variables not shown include region as 
well as state and year dummy variables. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), 





Table 61: All results for Heckman Two-Step regressions predicting usual hours worked 










Cohabiting 4.612***    
 
(0.728)    
Single 1.582***    
 
(0.425)    
Wage -0.0849*** -0.0783*** -0.0846*** -0.101*** 
 
(0.00425) (0.00513) (0.0112) (0.00679) 
Partner Inc.  -7.18e-06*** 1.10e-05  
 
 (1.96e-06) (9.92e-06)  
Parity -3.860*** -4.948*** 0.174 0.310 
 
(0.347) (0.435) (0.421) (0.254) 
HS Degree 6.808*** 7.119*** -0.360 0.535 
 
(0.929) (1.132) (1.636) (1.274) 
Some college 9.691*** 9.992*** -0.861 1.588 
 
(1.235) (1.450) (2.333) (1.830) 
2 Yr Degree 11.68*** 12.06*** 0.0137 2.412 
 
(1.492) (1.738) (2.399) (2.127) 
Bachelors 12.99*** 13.18*** 1.938 3.672 
 
(1.467) (1.688) (2.793) (2.613) 
Masters 16.82*** 16.96*** 2.317 4.948 
 
(1.755) (1.986) (3.739) (3.118) 
Professional 21.94*** 22.53*** 8.681** 12.34*** 
 
(1.981) (2.260) (4.249) (2.942) 
Black 2.252*** 3.972*** 0.910 1.104*** 
 
(0.423) (0.663) (0.871) (0.418) 
Other -0.667 -0.601 1.741 -0.579 
 
(0.561) (0.682) (1.147) (0.742) 
Hispanic -1.156** -1.954*** 1.862* 0.789* 
 
(0.496) (0.652) (0.953) (0.476) 
Metro Area 0.256 -0.376 -0.222 0.277 
 
(0.305) (0.385) (0.875) (0.434) 
Experience 0.407*** 0.355*** 0.243*** 0.331*** 
 
(0.0330) (0.0384) (0.0586) (0.0506) 
Constant 21.77*** 24.37*** 34.08*** 35.23*** 
 (2.215) (2.350) (3.510) (4.240) 
Observations 42,324 31,982 2,175 7,484 
Wald 675.35(84) 618.7(83) 189(83)  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Control variables for region, state and year not shown 














Cohabiting 1.253**    
 (0.623)    
Single -0.617*    
 (0.358)    







CAPFL -0.249 -0.893 -1.790 2.311 
 
(0.641) (0.728) (3.046) (1.706) 
Wage -0.150*** -0.122*** -0.219*** -0.250*** 
 (0.00392) (0.00445) (0.0170) (0.0107) 
Parity -1.503*** -1.780*** -0.367 -0.0333 
 (0.321) (0.382) (0.623) (0.400) 
HS Degree 6.714*** 7.142*** 2.579 3.540* 
 
(0.863) (1.000) (2.440) (2.009) 
Some college 9.498*** 9.763*** 3.377 5.781** 
 
(1.154) (1.289) (3.489) (2.888) 
2 Yr Degree 12.52*** 12.72*** 6.858* 7.773** 
 
(1.392) (1.545) (3.571) (3.354) 
Bachelors 14.28*** 14.22*** 9.100** 10.44** 
 
(1.377) (1.510) (4.170) (4.124) 
Masters 15.89*** 15.73*** 8.739 10.32** 
 
(1.642) (1.771) (5.539) (4.920) 
Professional 20.53*** 20.51*** 13.92** 13.11*** 
 
(1.827) (1.990) (6.158) (4.644) 
Black -0.0907 0.829* 1.640 -1.010 
 
(0.329) (0.497) (1.256) (0.659) 
Other -0.811* -0.380 3.319** -1.627 
 
(0.475) (0.551) (1.666) (1.171) 
Hispanic -0.344 -0.813 0.766 0.809 
 
(0.435) (0.550) (1.399) (0.750) 
Metro Area 0.629*** -0.102 3.967*** 1.126 
 
(0.235) (0.286) (1.279) (0.685) 
Experience 0.556*** 0.508*** 0.392*** 0.565*** 
 
(0.0285) (0.0310) (0.0853) (0.0798) 
Constant 26.42*** 27.38*** 29.47*** 33.98*** 
 (1.988) (1.980) (5.174) (6.697) 
Observations 42,324 31,982 2,175 7,484 
R-squared 0.0181  0.1152  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Control variables for region, state and year not shown 
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